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Abstract	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
Students	 ﾠof	 ﾠsocial	 ﾠinequality	 ﾠhave	 ﾠnoted	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpresence	 ﾠof	 ﾠmechanisms	 ﾠmilitating	 ﾠtoward	 ﾠ
cumulative	 ﾠadvantage	 ﾠand	 ﾠincreasing	 ﾠinequality.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠSocial	 ﾠscientists	 ﾠhave	 ﾠestablished	 ﾠthat	 ﾠin-ﾭ‐
dividuals’	 ﾠchoices	 ﾠare	 ﾠinfluenced	 ﾠby	 ﾠthose	 ﾠof	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠnetwork	 ﾠpeers	 ﾠin	 ﾠmany	 ﾠsocial	 ﾠdomains.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
We	 ﾠsuggest	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠubiquity	 ﾠof	 ﾠnetwork	 ﾠeffects	 ﾠand	 ﾠtendencies	 ﾠtowards	 ﾠcumulative	 ﾠadvant-ﾭ‐
age	 ﾠare	 ﾠrelated.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠInequality	 ﾠis	 ﾠexacerbated	 ﾠwhen	 ﾠeffects	 ﾠof	 ﾠindividual	 ﾠdifferences	 ﾠare	 ﾠmulti-ﾭ‐
plied	 ﾠby	 ﾠsocial	 ﾠnetworks:	 ﾠwhen	 ﾠpersons	 ﾠmust	 ﾠdecide	 ﾠwhether	 ﾠto	 ﾠadopt	 ﾠbeneficial	 ﾠpractices;	 ﾠ
network	 ﾠexternalities,	 ﾠsocial	 ﾠlearning,	 ﾠor	 ﾠnormative	 ﾠpressure	 ﾠinfluence	 ﾠadoption	 ﾠdecisions;	 ﾠ
and	 ﾠnetworks	 ﾠare	 ﾠhomophilous	 ﾠwith	 ﾠrespect	 ﾠto	 ﾠindividual	 ﾠcharacteristics	 ﾠthat	 ﾠpredict	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠ
decisions.	 ﾠ	 ﾠWe	 ﾠreview	 ﾠevidence	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠliteratures	 ﾠon	 ﾠnetwork	 ﾠeffects	 ﾠon	 ﾠtechnology,	 ﾠlabor	 ﾠ
markets,	 ﾠeducation,	 ﾠdemography,	 ﾠand	 ﾠhealth;	 ﾠidentify	 ﾠseveral	 ﾠmechanisms	 ﾠthrough	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠ
networks	 ﾠmay	 ﾠgenerate	 ﾠhigher	 ﾠlevels	 ﾠof	 ﾠinequality	 ﾠthan	 ﾠone	 ﾠwould	 ﾠexpect	 ﾠbased	 ﾠon	 ﾠdif-ﾭ‐
ferences	 ﾠin	 ﾠinitial	 ﾠendowments	 ﾠalone;	 ﾠconsider	 ﾠcases	 ﾠwhere	 ﾠnetwork	 ﾠeffects	 ﾠmay	 ﾠamelior-ﾭ‐
ate	 ﾠinequality;	 ﾠand	 ﾠdescribe	 ﾠresearch	 ﾠpriorities.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
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“Them	 ﾠthat’s	 ﾠgot	 ﾠshall	 ﾠget;	 ﾠthem	 ﾠthat’s	 ﾠnot	 ﾠshall	 ﾠlose;	 ﾠ
So	 ﾠthe	 ﾠBible	 ﾠsays,	 ﾠand	 ﾠit	 ﾠstill	 ﾠis	 ﾠnews.”	 ﾠ1	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
“I	 ﾠget	 ﾠby	 ﾠwith	 ﾠa	 ﾠlittle	 ﾠhelp	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠmy	 ﾠfriends.”2	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
Students	 ﾠof	 ﾠinequality	 ﾠhave	 ﾠlong	 ﾠnoted	 ﾠthe	 ﾠtendency	 ﾠfor	 ﾠsmall	 ﾠinitial	 ﾠadvantages	 ﾠand	 ﾠdisad-ﾭ‐
vantages	 ﾠto	 ﾠdevelop	 ﾠinto	 ﾠgreater	 ﾠdifferences,	 ﾠand	 ﾠfor	 ﾠsmall	 ﾠintergroup	 ﾠdifferences	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe-ﾭ‐
come	 ﾠgreater	 ﾠ(Merton	 ﾠ1968;	 ﾠJencks	 ﾠ&	 ﾠMayer	 ﾠ1990;	 ﾠDiPrete	 ﾠ&	 ﾠEirich	 ﾠ2006).	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠStudents	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
social	 ﾠnetworks	 ﾠhave	 ﾠlong	 ﾠnoted	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcapacity	 ﾠof	 ﾠnetworks	 ﾠto	 ﾠprovide	 ﾠaccess	 ﾠto	 ﾠvaluable	 ﾠ
resources.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠThis	 ﾠchapter	 ﾠsuggests	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthese	 ﾠtwo	 ﾠobservations	 ﾠare	 ﾠrelated,	 ﾠin	 ﾠthat	 ﾠinequality	 ﾠ
is	 ﾠaggravated	 ﾠwhen	 ﾠnetwork	 ﾠeffects	 ﾠcompound	 ﾠin	 ﾠindividual-ﾭ‐level	 ﾠadvantages	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠadopt-ﾭ‐
ion	 ﾠof	 ﾠbehaviors	 ﾠthat	 ﾠhelp	 ﾠpeople	 ﾠget	 ﾠahead.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ This	 ﾠmechanism	 ﾠmay	 ﾠoperate	 ﾠunder	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfollowing	 ﾠconditions	 ﾠ(which	 ﾠare	 ﾠnecessary	 ﾠ
but,	 ﾠas	 ﾠwe	 ﾠshall	 ﾠsee	 ﾠbelow,	 ﾠnot	 ﾠsufficient):	 ﾠ
1.	 ﾠA	 ﾠbehavior	 ﾠ(pursuing	 ﾠa	 ﾠcollege	 ﾠdegree)	 ﾠor	 ﾠtransition	 ﾠ(migration)	 ﾠor	 ﾠpractice	 ﾠ
(using	 ﾠa	 ﾠproductivity-ﾭ‐enhancing	 ﾠtechnology)	 ﾠis	 ﾠlikely,	 ﾠif	 ﾠadopted	 ﾠor	 ﾠundertaken,	 ﾠto	 ﾠimprove	 ﾠ
adopters’	 ﾠcurrent	 ﾠor	 ﾠfuture	 ﾠwell-ﾭ‐being.3	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
2.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠprobability	 ﾠof	 ﾠadoption	 ﾠis	 ﾠa	 ﾠfunction	 ﾠboth	 ﾠof	 ﾠindividual	 ﾠendowments	 ﾠand	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠextent	 ﾠto	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠone’s	 ﾠfriends	 ﾠand	 ﾠassociates	 ﾠhave	 ﾠalready	 ﾠadopted	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpractice.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
1	 ﾠBillie	 ﾠHoliday	 ﾠand	 ﾠArthur	 ﾠHertzog,	 ﾠJr.,	 ﾠ“God	 ﾠBless	 ﾠthe	 ﾠChild”	 ﾠ(1939).	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
2	 ﾠPaul	 ﾠMcCartney	 ﾠand	 ﾠJohn	 ﾠLennon,	 ﾠ“With	 ﾠa	 ﾠLittle	 ﾠHelp	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠMy	 ﾠFriends”	 ﾠ(1967).	 ﾠ
3	 ﾠFor	 ﾠsimplicity’s	 ﾠsake,	 ﾠwe	 ﾠuse	 ﾠ“practice”	 ﾠbelow	 ﾠto	 ﾠrefer	 ﾠgenerally	 ﾠto	 ﾠpractices,	 ﾠbehaviors,	 ﾠand	 ﾠtransitions.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
Because	 ﾠof	 ﾠour	 ﾠinterest	 ﾠin	 ﾠinequality,	 ﾠwe	 ﾠfocus	 ﾠprimarily	 ﾠon	 ﾠhow	 ﾠnetworks	 ﾠencourage	 ﾠthe	 ﾠadoption	 ﾠof	 ﾠpract-ﾭ‐
ices	 ﾠthat	 ﾠare	 ﾠlikely	 ﾠto	 ﾠcontribute	 ﾠdirectly	 ﾠor	 ﾠindirectly	 ﾠto	 ﾠsocial	 ﾠmobility,	 ﾠlifetime	 ﾠincome,	 ﾠhealth,	 ﾠor	 ﾠother	 ﾠgen-ﾭ‐
erally	 ﾠdesired	 ﾠoutcomes.	 ﾠWe	 ﾠalso	 ﾠconsider	 ﾠthe	 ﾠrole	 ﾠof	 ﾠnetworks	 ﾠin	 ﾠdiscouraging	 ﾠthe	 ﾠadoption	 ﾠof	 ﾠrisky	 ﾠbehav-ﾭ‐
iors	 ﾠ(e.g.,	 ﾠsubstance	 ﾠabuse	 ﾠor	 ﾠdelinquency)	 ﾠthat	 ﾠare	 ﾠnegative	 ﾠpredictors	 ﾠof	 ﾠlong-ﾭ‐term	 ﾠwelfare.	 ﾠNetwork	 ﾠexternalities	 ﾠand	 ﾠinequality	 ﾠ-ﾭ-ﾭ-ﾭ2-ﾭ-ﾭ-ﾭ	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
3.	 ﾠNetworks	 ﾠare	 ﾠhomophilous	 ﾠwith	 ﾠrespect	 ﾠto	 ﾠindividual	 ﾠcharacteristics	 ﾠassociated	 ﾠ
with	 ﾠadoption,	 ﾠso	 ﾠthat	 ﾠlikely	 ﾠadopters	 ﾠtend	 ﾠto	 ﾠassociate	 ﾠwith	 ﾠother	 ﾠlikely	 ﾠadopters	 ﾠand	 ﾠlikely	 ﾠ
non-ﾭ‐adopters	 ﾠwith	 ﾠother	 ﾠprobable	 ﾠnon-ﾭ‐adopters.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
Under	 ﾠthese	 ﾠconditions,	 ﾠadvantages	 ﾠindividuals	 ﾠobtain	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠinitial	 ﾠendowments	 ﾠ(e.g.,	 ﾠfin-ﾭ‐
ancial	 ﾠor	 ﾠcultural	 ﾠresources)	 ﾠmay	 ﾠbe	 ﾠcompounded	 ﾠby	 ﾠnetwork	 ﾠinfluences,	 ﾠexacerbating	 ﾠin-ﾭ‐
tergroup	 ﾠinequality	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠadoption	 ﾠof	 ﾠrewarding	 ﾠpractices	 ﾠrelative	 ﾠto	 ﾠwhat	 ﾠwe	 ﾠwould	 ﾠex-ﾭ‐
pect	 ﾠbased	 ﾠon	 ﾠindividual	 ﾠdifferences	 ﾠalone.4	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ We	 ﾠfind	 ﾠit	 ﾠuseful	 ﾠto	 ﾠview	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠeffects	 ﾠas	 ﾠresulting	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠdiffusion	 ﾠprocesses	 ﾠshaped	 ﾠ
by	 ﾠnetworks	 ﾠand	 ﾠinitial	 ﾠendowments	 ﾠ(Rogers	 ﾠ2003).	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠInequality	 ﾠis	 ﾠexacerbated	 ﾠwhen	 ﾠan	 ﾠin-ﾭ‐
novation	 ﾠdiffuses	 ﾠmore	 ﾠbroadly	 ﾠwithin	 ﾠan	 ﾠadvantaged	 ﾠthan	 ﾠwithin	 ﾠa	 ﾠdisadvantaged	 ﾠgroup	 ﾠ
and	 ﾠhas	 ﾠpositive	 ﾠeffects	 ﾠon	 ﾠsubsequent	 ﾠwelfare.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠWe	 ﾠare	 ﾠconcerned	 ﾠboth	 ﾠwith	 ﾠclassic	 ﾠcases	 ﾠ
of	 ﾠnew-ﾭ‐product	 ﾠdiffusion,	 ﾠe.g.	 ﾠthe	 ﾠadoption	 ﾠof	 ﾠnew	 ﾠinformation	 ﾠtechnologies,	 ﾠand	 ﾠwith	 ﾠcases	 ﾠ
in	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠdiffusion	 ﾠprovides	 ﾠa	 ﾠconceptual	 ﾠlens	 ﾠfor	 ﾠunderstanding	 ﾠchoices	 ﾠ(e.g.,	 ﾠabout	 ﾠschool-ﾭ‐
ing,	 ﾠhealth	 ﾠbehaviors,	 ﾠmarriage)	 ﾠthat	 ﾠeach	 ﾠcohort	 ﾠfaces	 ﾠanew.	 ﾠ
Although	 ﾠrelatively	 ﾠlittle	 ﾠabout	 ﾠnetworks’	 ﾠimpact	 ﾠon	 ﾠpopulation-ﾭ‐level	 ﾠinequality,	 ﾠre-ﾭ‐
search	 ﾠon	 ﾠnetwork	 ﾠeffects,	 ﾠnetwork	 ﾠexternalities,	 ﾠhomophily,	 ﾠand	 ﾠdiffusion	 ﾠprocesses	 ﾠto-ﾭ‐
gether	 ﾠestablish	 ﾠits	 ﾠplausibility	 ﾠand	 ﾠprovides	 ﾠinsights	 ﾠfor	 ﾠmodeling	 ﾠand	 ﾠempirical	 ﾠresearch.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
In	 ﾠthe	 ﾠnext	 ﾠsection,	 ﾠwe	 ﾠhighlight	 ﾠthree	 ﾠmain	 ﾠclasses	 ﾠof	 ﾠnetwork	 ﾠeffects	 ﾠ–	 ﾠlocal	 ﾠnetwork	 ﾠex-ﾭ‐
ternalities,	 ﾠsocial	 ﾠlearning,	 ﾠand	 ﾠnormative	 ﾠinfluence	 ﾠ-ﾭ‐-ﾭ‐	 ﾠany	 ﾠof	 ﾠwhich,	 ﾠunder	 ﾠthe	 ﾠright	 ﾠcondit-ﾭ‐
ions,	 ﾠcan	 ﾠexacerbate	 ﾠintergroup	 ﾠinequality.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠNext,	 ﾠdrawing	 ﾠon	 ﾠsociological	 ﾠand	 ﾠeconomic	 ﾠ
literatures	 ﾠon	 ﾠnetwork	 ﾠeffects	 ﾠon	 ﾠtechnology	 ﾠadoption,	 ﾠlabor	 ﾠmarkets,	 ﾠmigration,	 ﾠdemo-ﾭ‐
	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	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 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	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 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
4The	 ﾠmechanisms	 ﾠdescribed	 ﾠin	 ﾠthis	 ﾠpaper	 ﾠgenerate	 ﾠinequality	 ﾠwith	 ﾠrespect	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠrate	 ﾠand	 ﾠlevel	 ﾠof	 ﾠadopt-ﾭ‐
ion	 ﾠof	 ﾠparticular	 ﾠbeneficial	 ﾠpractices.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠAlthough	 ﾠwe	 ﾠuse	 ﾠthe	 ﾠshorthand	 ﾠ“inequality”	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsake	 ﾠof	 ﾠbrevity,	 ﾠour	 ﾠ
focus	 ﾠis	 ﾠon	 ﾠinequality	 ﾠin	 ﾠrates	 ﾠof	 ﾠadoption	 ﾠof	 ﾠbehaviors	 ﾠlikely	 ﾠto	 ﾠlead	 ﾠto	 ﾠdesirable	 ﾠoutcomes,	 ﾠnot	 ﾠon	 ﾠthose	 ﾠ
outcomes	 ﾠthemselves,	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠare	 ﾠbeyond	 ﾠthe	 ﾠscope	 ﾠof	 ﾠthis	 ﾠreview.	 ﾠNetwork	 ﾠexternalities	 ﾠand	 ﾠinequality	 ﾠ-ﾭ-ﾭ-ﾭ3-ﾭ-ﾭ-ﾭ	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
graphic	 ﾠtransitions,	 ﾠeducation,	 ﾠhealth,	 ﾠsocial	 ﾠidentity,	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠavoidance	 ﾠof	 ﾠrisky	 ﾠbehaviors,	 ﾠ
we	 ﾠreview	 ﾠevidence	 ﾠon	 ﾠnetwork	 ﾠeffects,	 ﾠtheoretical	 ﾠarguments	 ﾠand	 ﾠformal	 ﾠmodels,	 ﾠand	 ﾠa	 ﾠ
few	 ﾠstudies	 ﾠfocusing	 ﾠdirectly	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠrelationship	 ﾠbetween	 ﾠnetworks	 ﾠand	 ﾠchanges	 ﾠin	 ﾠinter-ﾭ‐
group	 ﾠinequality	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠadoption	 ﾠof	 ﾠadvantageous	 ﾠpractices.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠWe	 ﾠconclude	 ﾠthat	 ﾠhomophily	 ﾠ
is	 ﾠubiquitous,	 ﾠthat	 ﾠnetwork	 ﾠeffects	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠadoption	 ﾠof	 ﾠbeneficial	 ﾠpractices	 ﾠreinforce	 ﾠindivid-ﾭ‐
ual-ﾭ‐level	 ﾠdifferences	 ﾠboth	 ﾠdirectly	 ﾠand,	 ﾠat	 ﾠtimes,	 ﾠthrough	 ﾠpositive	 ﾠstatistical	 ﾠinteractions	 ﾠbe-ﾭ‐
tween	 ﾠnetworks	 ﾠand	 ﾠindividual	 ﾠadvantages,	 ﾠand	 ﾠthat	 ﾠsome	 ﾠdirect	 ﾠevidence	 ﾠsupports	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
view	 ﾠthat	 ﾠnetwork	 ﾠeffects	 ﾠexacerbate	 ﾠintergroup	 ﾠdifference.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠNext,	 ﾠwe	 ﾠdescribe	 ﾠthe	 ﾠscope	 ﾠ
conditions	 ﾠunder	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠwe	 ﾠwould	 ﾠanticipate	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠeffects;	 ﾠand	 ﾠpresent	 ﾠa	 ﾠtaxonomy	 ﾠof	 ﾠmech-ﾭ‐
anisms	 ﾠby	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠnetworks	 ﾠinfluence	 ﾠbehavior,	 ﾠwith	 ﾠattention	 ﾠto	 ﾠvariations	 ﾠin	 ﾠfunctional	 ﾠ
form.	 ﾠ	 ﾠWe	 ﾠconclude	 ﾠby	 ﾠasking	 ﾠwhether	 ﾠnetwork	 ﾠeffects	 ﾠmight,	 ﾠunder	 ﾠsome	 ﾠconditions,	 ﾠre-ﾭ
duce	 ﾠintergroup	 ﾠinequality	 ﾠand	 ﾠby	 ﾠpresenting	 ﾠa	 ﾠresearch	 ﾠagenda.	 ﾠ
HOW	 ﾠNETWORKS	 ﾠINFLUENCE	 ﾠCHOICE	 ﾠ
Network	 ﾠeffects	 ﾠoccur	 ﾠwhen	 ﾠthe	 ﾠprobability	 ﾠthat	 ﾠan	 ﾠactor	 ﾠwill	 ﾠadopt	 ﾠa	 ﾠpractice	 ﾠis	 ﾠan	 ﾠincreas-ﾭ‐
ing	 ﾠfunction	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠnumber	 ﾠor	 ﾠproportion	 ﾠof	 ﾠpersons	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠactor’s	 ﾠsocial	 ﾠnetwork	 ﾠwho	 ﾠal-ﾭ‐
ready	 ﾠhave	 ﾠadopted	 ﾠthat	 ﾠpractice.	 ﾠ	 ﾠSuch	 ﾠeffects	 ﾠwork	 ﾠthrough	 ﾠincreases	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠutility	 ﾠof	 ﾠa	 ﾠ
practice	 ﾠto	 ﾠan	 ﾠactor,	 ﾠwhether	 ﾠachieved	 ﾠthrough	 ﾠdirect	 ﾠimpact	 ﾠon	 ﾠpayoff,	 ﾠrisk-ﾭ‐adjusted	 ﾠ
return,	 ﾠor	 ﾠsocial	 ﾠsanctions.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠAt	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmost	 ﾠabstract	 ﾠlevel,	 ﾠdifferent	 ﾠkinds	 ﾠof	 ﾠnetwork	 ﾠeffects	 ﾠ
can	 ﾠbe	 ﾠmodeled	 ﾠand	 ﾠunderstood	 ﾠusing	 ﾠa	 ﾠcommon	 ﾠframework.	 ﾠ	 ﾠFor	 ﾠany	 ﾠgiven	 ﾠpractice,	 ﾠego	 ﾠ
(i.e.	 ﾠthe	 ﾠactor	 ﾠat	 ﾠrisk	 ﾠto	 ﾠadopt	 ﾠa	 ﾠpractice)	 ﾠhas	 ﾠa	 ﾠreservation	 ﾠprice	 ﾠ(the	 ﾠcombination	 ﾠof	 ﾠtime,	 ﾠ
money	 ﾠand	 ﾠeffort	 ﾠego	 ﾠwill	 ﾠexpend	 ﾠtowards	 ﾠadoption).	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠReservation	 ﾠprice	 ﾠis	 ﾠordinarily	 ﾠas-ﾭ‐
sociated	 ﾠwith	 ﾠfinancial	 ﾠresources	 ﾠ(more	 ﾠwealth,	 ﾠfewer	 ﾠtradeoffs)	 ﾠas	 ﾠwell	 ﾠas	 ﾠwith	 ﾠadvantages	 ﾠ
such	 ﾠas	 ﾠeducation	 ﾠthat	 ﾠmay	 ﾠenable	 ﾠone	 ﾠto	 ﾠunderstand	 ﾠa	 ﾠpractice’s	 ﾠpotential	 ﾠbenefits	 ﾠor	 ﾠto	 ﾠNetwork	 ﾠexternalities	 ﾠand	 ﾠinequality	 ﾠ-ﾭ-ﾭ-ﾭ4-ﾭ-ﾭ-ﾭ	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
employ	 ﾠit	 ﾠmore	 ﾠproductively.	 ﾠ	 ﾠWhere	 ﾠnetwork	 ﾠeffects	 ﾠoperate,	 ﾠego’s	 ﾠreservation	 ﾠprice,	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
therefore	 ﾠthe	 ﾠlikelihood	 ﾠthat	 ﾠego	 ﾠwill	 ﾠadopt	 ﾠa	 ﾠpractice,	 ﾠincreases	 ﾠbeyond	 ﾠthat	 ﾠpredicted	 ﾠby	 ﾠ
individual	 ﾠendowments	 ﾠalone	 ﾠas	 ﾠthe	 ﾠnumber	 ﾠof	 ﾠprior	 ﾠadopters	 ﾠin	 ﾠego’s	 ﾠnetwork	 ﾠincreases.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
We	 ﾠdistill	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠthe	 ﾠliterature	 ﾠthree	 ﾠclasses	 ﾠof	 ﾠnetwork	 ﾠeffects.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠIn	 ﾠthis	 ﾠsection,	 ﾠwe	 ﾠ
introduce	 ﾠthem	 ﾠand	 ﾠprovide	 ﾠsome	 ﾠexamples	 ﾠin	 ﾠorder	 ﾠto	 ﾠclarify	 ﾠterminology.	 ﾠ	 ﾠWe	 ﾠdiscuss	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
modeling	 ﾠimplications	 ﾠ(associating	 ﾠeach	 ﾠmechanism	 ﾠwith	 ﾠdistinctive	 ﾠfunctional	 ﾠforms	 ﾠex-ﾭ‐
pressing	 ﾠthe	 ﾠrelationship	 ﾠbetween	 ﾠnetwork	 ﾠcharacteristics	 ﾠand	 ﾠadoption	 ﾠprobabilities)	 ﾠat	 ﾠ
greater	 ﾠlength	 ﾠin	 ﾠa	 ﾠsubsequent	 ﾠsection.	 ﾠ	 ﾠThese	 ﾠthree	 ﾠprinciple	 ﾠmechanisms	 ﾠinclude:	 ﾠ(1)	 ﾠlocal	 ﾠ
network	 ﾠexternalities;	 ﾠ(2)	 ﾠsocial	 ﾠlearning	 ﾠand	 ﾠpeer	 ﾠassistance;	 ﾠ(3)	 ﾠnormative	 ﾠinfluence.	 ﾠ5	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
	 ﾠNetwork	 ﾠexternalities.	 ﾠ	 ﾠNetwork	 ﾠexternalities	 ﾠoperate	 ﾠwhen	 ﾠthe	 ﾠvalue	 ﾠof	 ﾠa	 ﾠpractice	 ﾠ
depends	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠnumber	 ﾠof	 ﾠprior	 ﾠadopters	 ﾠ(Shy	 ﾠ2001).	 ﾠ	 ﾠNetwork	 ﾠexternalities	 ﾠbegan	 ﾠto	 ﾠre-ﾭ‐
ceive	 ﾠextensive	 ﾠattention	 ﾠin	 ﾠeconomics	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ1980s,	 ﾠprimarily	 ﾠamong	 ﾠindustrial-ﾭ‐organizat-ﾭ‐
ion	 ﾠscholars	 ﾠinterested	 ﾠin	 ﾠhow	 ﾠparticular	 ﾠfirms	 ﾠor	 ﾠtechnologies	 ﾠlock	 ﾠin	 ﾠa	 ﾠdominant	 ﾠposition	 ﾠ
in	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠmarkets	 ﾠ(Arthur	 ﾠ1989).	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠKatz	 ﾠand	 ﾠShapiro’s	 ﾠclassic	 ﾠpaper	 ﾠ(1985)	 ﾠapprehended	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
importance	 ﾠof	 ﾠexternalities	 ﾠfor	 ﾠindividual	 ﾠchoice,	 ﾠpositing	 ﾠboth	 ﾠdirect	 ﾠeffects	 ﾠ(the	 ﾠlarger	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
5	 ﾠThe	 ﾠabsence	 ﾠof	 ﾠa	 ﾠgenerally	 ﾠaccepted	 ﾠvocabulary	 ﾠfor	 ﾠdescribing	 ﾠdistinctive	 ﾠkinds	 ﾠof	 ﾠnetwork	 ﾠeffects	 ﾠis	 ﾠa	 ﾠ
source	 ﾠof	 ﾠconsiderable	 ﾠconfusion	 ﾠ(Liebowitz	 ﾠ&	 ﾠMargolis	 ﾠ1994).	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠSome	 ﾠauthors	 ﾠdefine	 ﾠ“social	 ﾠlearning”	 ﾠas	 ﾠa	 ﾠ
type	 ﾠof	 ﾠ“network	 ﾠexternality”	 ﾠbecause	 ﾠprior	 ﾠadoption	 ﾠof	 ﾠa	 ﾠpractice	 ﾠby	 ﾠone’s	 ﾠpeers	 ﾠenhances	 ﾠthe	 ﾠlikely	 ﾠutility	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
oneself	 ﾠ(Sacerdote	 ﾠ2011).	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠOthers	 ﾠdistinguish	 ﾠbetween	 ﾠ“social	 ﾠlearning”	 ﾠand	 ﾠ“externalities”	 ﾠmore	 ﾠnarrowly	 ﾠ
defined	 ﾠ(Hensvik,	 ﾠAsphjell,	 ﾠ&	 ﾠNilsson	 ﾠ2011).	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠSome	 ﾠview	 ﾠsocial	 ﾠlearning	 ﾠas	 ﾠa	 ﾠtype	 ﾠof	 ﾠ“social	 ﾠinfluence”	 ﾠ(Liu,	 ﾠ
King,	 ﾠ&	 ﾠBearman	 ﾠ2010),	 ﾠwhereas	 ﾠothers	 ﾠdistinguish	 ﾠsharply	 ﾠbetween	 ﾠthe	 ﾠtwo	 ﾠ(Kohler,	 ﾠBehrman	 ﾠ&	 ﾠWatkins	 ﾠ
2000).	 ﾠ	 ﾠBecause,	 ﾠas	 ﾠwe	 ﾠargue	 ﾠbelow,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfunctional	 ﾠform	 ﾠof	 ﾠrelationships	 ﾠbetween	 ﾠnetwork	 ﾠmeasures	 ﾠand	 ﾠre-ﾭ‐
servation	 ﾠprice	 ﾠis	 ﾠlikely	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠdifferent	 ﾠfor	 ﾠsocial	 ﾠlearning	 ﾠthan	 ﾠfor	 ﾠeither	 ﾠpure	 ﾠexternalities	 ﾠ(i.e.,	 ﾠthose	 ﾠin	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠ
advantages	 ﾠflow	 ﾠdirectly	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsize	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠnetwork)	 ﾠor	 ﾠnormative	 ﾠinfluence,	 ﾠwe	 ﾠfind	 ﾠit	 ﾠuseful	 ﾠto	 ﾠtreat	 ﾠsocial	 ﾠ
learning	 ﾠeffects	 ﾠas	 ﾠa	 ﾠdistinct	 ﾠclass	 ﾠof	 ﾠmechanisms.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠAn	 ﾠinfluential	 ﾠtypology	 ﾠ(Young	 ﾠ	 ﾠ2009)	 ﾠincludes	 ﾠnormative	 ﾠ
influence	 ﾠ(“social	 ﾠinfluence”),	 ﾠbut	 ﾠrestricts	 ﾠit	 ﾠto	 ﾠa	 ﾠ“conformity	 ﾠmotive”;	 ﾠ	 ﾠreserves	 ﾠ“social	 ﾠlearning”	 ﾠfor	 ﾠinformat-ﾭ‐
ion	 ﾠgathered	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠobservation	 ﾠof	 ﾠoutcomes	 ﾠfor	 ﾠprior	 ﾠadopters,	 ﾠbut	 ﾠdoes	 ﾠnot	 ﾠinclude	 ﾠpure	 ﾠexternalities,	 ﾠinstead	 ﾠ
promulgating	 ﾠa	 ﾠthird	 ﾠcategory,	 ﾠcontagion,	 ﾠthat	 ﾠrefers	 ﾠto	 ﾠeffortless	 ﾠtransmission	 ﾠof	 ﾠsocial	 ﾠbehavior	 ﾠ–	 ﾠactually,	 ﾠa	 ﾠ
pseudo-ﾭ‐category	 ﾠbased	 ﾠon	 ﾠanalogy	 ﾠ(to	 ﾠbiological	 ﾠepidemics)	 ﾠwithout	 ﾠspecifying	 ﾠa	 ﾠsocial	 ﾠmechanism	 ﾠthrough	 ﾠ
which	 ﾠtransmission	 ﾠoccurs.	 ﾠ	 ﾠOur	 ﾠtripartite	 ﾠdistinction	 ﾠis	 ﾠmost	 ﾠsimilar	 ﾠto	 ﾠthat	 ﾠin	 ﾠRossman,	 ﾠChiu	 ﾠ&	 ﾠMol	 ﾠ(2008:	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
206-ﾭ‐207)	 ﾠwho	 ﾠdistinguish	 ﾠamong	 ﾠexternalities,	 ﾠinformation-ﾭ‐cascade	 ﾠ(one	 ﾠtype	 ﾠof	 ﾠwhat	 ﾠwe	 ﾠrefer	 ﾠto	 ﾠas	 ﾠ“social	 ﾠ
learning”),	 ﾠand	 ﾠcontagion	 ﾠmodels	 ﾠ(normative	 ﾠinfluence	 ﾠin	 ﾠour	 ﾠtypology).	 ﾠNetwork	 ﾠexternalities	 ﾠand	 ﾠinequality	 ﾠ-ﾭ-ﾭ-ﾭ5-ﾭ-ﾭ-ﾭ	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
network,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠgreater	 ﾠits	 ﾠvalue	 ﾠto	 ﾠeach	 ﾠuser)	 ﾠand	 ﾠindirect	 ﾠeffects	 ﾠ(dominant	 ﾠtechnologies	 ﾠat-ﾭ‐
tract	 ﾠmore	 ﾠcomplementary	 ﾠproducts	 ﾠand	 ﾠproduce	 ﾠeconomies	 ﾠin	 ﾠlearning	 ﾠand	 ﾠservicing).	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
Telephone	 ﾠsystems	 ﾠinitially	 ﾠwere	 ﾠviewed	 ﾠas	 ﾠnatural	 ﾠmonopolies	 ﾠin	 ﾠpart	 ﾠbecause	 ﾠof	 ﾠnetwork	 ﾠ
externalities,	 ﾠas	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfirst	 ﾠto	 ﾠbuild	 ﾠa	 ﾠlarge	 ﾠsubscriber	 ﾠbase	 ﾠwould	 ﾠdraw	 ﾠits	 ﾠrivals’	 ﾠcustomers,	 ﾠ
who	 ﾠwould	 ﾠwish	 ﾠto	 ﾠcommunicate	 ﾠwith	 ﾠas	 ﾠmany	 ﾠpeople	 ﾠas	 ﾠpossible	 ﾠ(Fischer	 ﾠ1992).6	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
Information	 ﾠand	 ﾠcommunication	 ﾠtechnologies	 ﾠ(ICTs),	 ﾠof	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠmuch	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠvalue	 ﾠ
comes	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠaccess	 ﾠto	 ﾠone’s	 ﾠnetwork,	 ﾠconstitute	 ﾠthe	 ﾠclassic	 ﾠexample	 ﾠof	 ﾠnetwork	 ﾠexternalities	 ﾠ
(Varian	 ﾠ&	 ﾠFarrell	 ﾠ2004).	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠThe	 ﾠInternet	 ﾠprovides	 ﾠmany	 ﾠexamples:	 ﾠsocial	 ﾠnetworking	 ﾠsites	 ﾠ
like	 ﾠFacebook;	 ﾠauction	 ﾠsites	 ﾠlike	 ﾠeBay;	 ﾠand	 ﾠsoftware	 ﾠlike	 ﾠAdobe	 ﾠAcrobat,	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠdominated	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠmarket	 ﾠfor	 ﾠdocument-ﾭ‐preparation	 ﾠsoftware	 ﾠby	 ﾠgiving	 ﾠAcrobat	 ﾠReader	 ﾠaway	 ﾠfor	 ﾠfree,	 ﾠ
thus	 ﾠexpanding	 ﾠthe	 ﾠnumber	 ﾠof	 ﾠpeople	 ﾠan	 ﾠAcrobat	 ﾠuser	 ﾠcould	 ﾠreach.	 ﾠ	 ﾠAlthough	 ﾠinformation-ﾭ‐
technology	 ﾠadoption	 ﾠprovides	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmost	 ﾠstriking	 ﾠexamples,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠvalue	 ﾠof	 ﾠa	 ﾠchoice	 ﾠincreases	 ﾠ
with	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsize	 ﾠof	 ﾠrelevant	 ﾠnetworks	 ﾠin	 ﾠother	 ﾠdomains	 ﾠas	 ﾠwell.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠDeSwaan	 ﾠ(2001)	 ﾠargues	 ﾠthat	 ﾠ
network	 ﾠexternalities	 ﾠare	 ﾠcentral	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠemergence	 ﾠof	 ﾠregionally	 ﾠdominant	 ﾠlanguages.	 ﾠ	 ﾠAnd	 ﾠ
demographers	 ﾠhave	 ﾠnoted	 ﾠeffects	 ﾠon	 ﾠdemographic	 ﾠphenomena	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠas	 ﾠmarriage	 ﾠ(Drewian-ﾭ‐
ka	 ﾠ2003).	 ﾠ	 ﾠAs	 ﾠmembers	 ﾠof	 ﾠone’s	 ﾠsocial	 ﾠnetwork	 ﾠand	 ﾠage	 ﾠcohort	 ﾠmarry,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠstock	 ﾠof	 ﾠpotential	 ﾠ
mates	 ﾠdeclines	 ﾠ(reducing	 ﾠopportunity	 ﾠcost)	 ﾠand	 ﾠfriends	 ﾠbecome	 ﾠless	 ﾠavailable	 ﾠas	 ﾠleisure	 ﾠ
companions	 ﾠor	 ﾠconfidants	 ﾠ(as	 ﾠthey	 ﾠspend	 ﾠmore	 ﾠtime	 ﾠwith	 ﾠmarried	 ﾠpeers).	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠSimilarly,	 ﾠdi-ﾭ‐
	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	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6	 ﾠWhereas	 ﾠeconomists	 ﾠoriginally	 ﾠviewed	 ﾠnetwork	 ﾠexternalities	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠthe	 ﾠperspective	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfirm	 ﾠor	 ﾠthe	 ﾠecon-ﾭ‐
omic	 ﾠsystem,	 ﾠsociologists	 ﾠand,	 ﾠincreasingly,	 ﾠeconomists	 ﾠnow	 ﾠview	 ﾠnetwork	 ﾠeffects	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠthe	 ﾠperspective	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
potential	 ﾠadopter.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠWhereas	 ﾠclassic	 ﾠwork	 ﾠin	 ﾠeconomics	 ﾠdefined	 ﾠ“network”	 ﾠeither	 ﾠtechnologically	 ﾠ(to	 ﾠrefer,	 ﾠe.g.,	 ﾠ
to	 ﾠa	 ﾠrailroad,	 ﾠtelephone	 ﾠsystem	 ﾠor	 ﾠelectrical	 ﾠgrid)	 ﾠor	 ﾠvery	 ﾠgenerally	 ﾠ(to	 ﾠrefer	 ﾠto	 ﾠall	 ﾠusers	 ﾠof	 ﾠa	 ﾠproduct,	 ﾠwhether	 ﾠ
or	 ﾠnot	 ﾠthey	 ﾠare	 ﾠsocially	 ﾠconnected),	 ﾠsociologists	 ﾠ(and,	 ﾠincreasingly,	 ﾠeconomists)	 ﾠfocus	 ﾠon	 ﾠsocial	 ﾠnetworks	 ﾠcom-ﾭ‐
prising	 ﾠspecific	 ﾠpersons	 ﾠlinked	 ﾠby	 ﾠsome	 ﾠconcrete	 ﾠrelation.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠFor	 ﾠpresent	 ﾠpurposes,	 ﾠwe	 ﾠrefer	 ﾠto	 ﾠexternalities	 ﾠ
deriving	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠone’s	 ﾠown	 ﾠcontacts’	 ﾠadoption	 ﾠof	 ﾠa	 ﾠpractice	 ﾠor	 ﾠtechnology	 ﾠas	 ﾠ“local”	 ﾠ(because	 ﾠthe	 ﾠnetworks	 ﾠare	 ﾠ
specific	 ﾠto	 ﾠego)	 ﾠand	 ﾠrefer	 ﾠto	 ﾠexternalities	 ﾠresulting	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsheer	 ﾠnumber	 ﾠof	 ﾠprior	 ﾠadopters	 ﾠas	 ﾠ“global.”	 ﾠ	 ﾠIn	 ﾠ
earlier	 ﾠwork	 ﾠ(DiMaggio	 ﾠ&	 ﾠCohen	 ﾠ2005,	 ﾠDiMaggio	 ﾠ&	 ﾠGarip	 ﾠ2011)	 ﾠwe	 ﾠreferred	 ﾠto	 ﾠ“global”	 ﾠas	 ﾠ“general”	 ﾠand	 ﾠ“loc-ﾭ‐
al”	 ﾠas	 ﾠ“identity-ﾭ‐specific.”	 ﾠ	 ﾠFrom	 ﾠhere	 ﾠon,	 ﾠwe	 ﾠfocus	 ﾠexclusively	 ﾠon	 ﾠlocal	 ﾠexternalities,	 ﾠand	 ﾠuse	 ﾠ“externalities”	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
“local	 ﾠexternalities”	 ﾠinterchangeably.	 ﾠ	 ﾠBecause	 ﾠglobal	 ﾠexternalities	 ﾠbenefit	 ﾠany	 ﾠpotential	 ﾠadopter,	 ﾠthey	 ﾠdo	 ﾠnot	 ﾠ
exacerbate	 ﾠintergroup	 ﾠinequality	 ﾠ(DiMaggio	 ﾠ&	 ﾠGarip	 ﾠ2011)	 ﾠand	 ﾠare	 ﾠtherefore	 ﾠnot	 ﾠof	 ﾠinterest	 ﾠhere.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠNetwork	 ﾠexternalities	 ﾠand	 ﾠinequality	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 ﾠ
vorce	 ﾠmay	 ﾠbe	 ﾠmore	 ﾠattractive	 ﾠas	 ﾠa	 ﾠfunction	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠnumber	 ﾠof	 ﾠpersons	 ﾠin	 ﾠone’s	 ﾠsocial	 ﾠnet-ﾭ‐
work	 ﾠalready	 ﾠdivorced,	 ﾠand	 ﾠtherefore	 ﾠsexually	 ﾠand	 ﾠsocially	 ﾠavailable	 ﾠ(Aberg	 ﾠ2009).	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
Social	 ﾠlearning.	 ﾠ	 ﾠSocial	 ﾠlearning	 ﾠeffects	 ﾠoperate	 ﾠwhen	 ﾠnetwork	 ﾠpeers	 ﾠprovide	 ﾠinform-ﾭ‐
ation	 ﾠthat	 ﾠincreases	 ﾠthe	 ﾠutility	 ﾠof	 ﾠa	 ﾠnew	 ﾠpractice	 ﾠor	 ﾠreduces	 ﾠits	 ﾠcost	 ﾠor	 ﾠrisk.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ(The	 ﾠpassage	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
information	 ﾠthrough	 ﾠnetworks	 ﾠoften	 ﾠdoes	 ﾠall	 ﾠthree	 ﾠsimultaneously.)	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠNetwork	 ﾠmembers	 ﾠ
may	 ﾠprovide	 ﾠinformation	 ﾠthat	 ﾠenables	 ﾠone	 ﾠto	 ﾠget	 ﾠmore	 ﾠout	 ﾠof	 ﾠa	 ﾠnew	 ﾠtechnology,	 ﾠfor	 ﾠexamp-ﾭ‐
le,	 ﾠdiscovering	 ﾠadditional	 ﾠproductive	 ﾠuses	 ﾠfor	 ﾠan	 ﾠiPad;	 ﾠor	 ﾠto	 ﾠexploit	 ﾠlearning	 ﾠopportunities	 ﾠ
more	 ﾠfully,	 ﾠas	 ﾠwhen	 ﾠstudents	 ﾠform	 ﾠstudy	 ﾠgroups	 ﾠto	 ﾠinduce	 ﾠgreater	 ﾠwork	 ﾠeffort.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
Social	 ﾠlearning	 ﾠalso	 ﾠinfluences	 ﾠbehavior	 ﾠthrough	 ﾠeffects	 ﾠon	 ﾠcost	 ﾠand,	 ﾠespecially,	 ﾠrisk.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
Cost	 ﾠeffects	 ﾠmay	 ﾠbe	 ﾠsimple	 ﾠbut	 ﾠdecisive,	 ﾠas	 ﾠwhen	 ﾠa	 ﾠfriend	 ﾠtells	 ﾠyou	 ﾠthat	 ﾠa	 ﾠmicrowave	 ﾠoven	 ﾠis	 ﾠ
on	 ﾠsale	 ﾠat	 ﾠa	 ﾠcost	 ﾠbelow	 ﾠyour	 ﾠreservation	 ﾠprice.	 ﾠ	 ﾠOr	 ﾠnetwork-ﾭ‐borne	 ﾠinformation	 ﾠmay	 ﾠlead	 ﾠone	 ﾠ
to	 ﾠraise	 ﾠone’s	 ﾠreservation	 ﾠprice	 ﾠdue	 ﾠto	 ﾠa	 ﾠreduction	 ﾠin	 ﾠperceived	 ﾠrisk).	 ﾠ	 ﾠFor	 ﾠexample,	 ﾠif	 ﾠnet-ﾭ‐
work	 ﾠpeers	 ﾠhave	 ﾠalready	 ﾠmigrated	 ﾠto	 ﾠa	 ﾠnearby	 ﾠcity	 ﾠto	 ﾠlook	 ﾠfor	 ﾠwork,	 ﾠthey	 ﾠcan	 ﾠhelp	 ﾠone	 ﾠfind	 ﾠ
cheaper	 ﾠlodging	 ﾠand	 ﾠavoid	 ﾠexploitative	 ﾠworking	 ﾠconditions	 ﾠ(Garip	 ﾠ2008).	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠIf	 ﾠone	 ﾠis	 ﾠuncer-ﾭ‐
tain	 ﾠabout	 ﾠwhether	 ﾠto	 ﾠuse	 ﾠa	 ﾠnew	 ﾠcontraceptive	 ﾠdevice,	 ﾠspeaking	 ﾠwith	 ﾠfriends	 ﾠwho	 ﾠhave	 ﾠal-ﾭ‐
ready	 ﾠused	 ﾠit	 ﾠmay	 ﾠreduce	 ﾠuncertainty	 ﾠ(Kohler,	 ﾠBehrman,	 ﾠ&	 ﾠWatkins	 ﾠ2001).	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
Normative	 ﾠinfluence.	 ﾠ	 ﾠNormative	 ﾠinfluence	 ﾠdoes	 ﾠnot	 ﾠaffect	 ﾠthe	 ﾠintrinsic	 ﾠvalue	 ﾠor	 ﾠcost	 ﾠ
of	 ﾠa	 ﾠpractice,	 ﾠbut	 ﾠoperates	 ﾠthrough	 ﾠsocial	 ﾠside	 ﾠpayments,	 ﾠrewards	 ﾠbestowed	 ﾠon	 ﾠadopters	 ﾠ
and	 ﾠsanctions	 ﾠexacted	 ﾠon	 ﾠnon-ﾭ‐adopters	 ﾠby	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠpeers.	 ﾠ	 ﾠInfluence	 ﾠmay	 ﾠoperate	 ﾠthrough	 ﾠpos-ﾭ‐
itive	 ﾠor	 ﾠnegative	 ﾠsanctions:	 ﾠone’s	 ﾠinclination	 ﾠto	 ﾠrecycle,	 ﾠfor	 ﾠexample,	 ﾠmay	 ﾠbe	 ﾠreinforced	 ﾠby	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠpositive	 ﾠresponse	 ﾠof	 ﾠenvironmentalist	 ﾠfriends;	 ﾠor	 ﾠone’s	 ﾠvaluation	 ﾠof	 ﾠmarriage	 ﾠmay	 ﾠin-ﾭ‐
crease	 ﾠif	 ﾠone	 ﾠlearns	 ﾠthat	 ﾠone’s	 ﾠromantic	 ﾠlife	 ﾠhas	 ﾠbecome	 ﾠa	 ﾠtopic	 ﾠof	 ﾠunsympathetic	 ﾠgossip	 ﾠ
among	 ﾠone’s	 ﾠmarried	 ﾠacquaintances.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠNormative	 ﾠinfluence	 ﾠdoes	 ﾠnot	 ﾠjust	 ﾠencourage	 ﾠthe	 ﾠad-ﾭ‐Network	 ﾠexternalities	 ﾠand	 ﾠinequality	 ﾠ-ﾭ-ﾭ-ﾭ7-ﾭ-ﾭ-ﾭ	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
option	 ﾠof	 ﾠbeneficial	 ﾠpractices.	 ﾠ	 ﾠIt	 ﾠis	 ﾠalso	 ﾠimportant	 ﾠin	 ﾠinducing	 ﾠactors	 ﾠto	 ﾠrefrain	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠadopt-ﾭ‐
ing	 ﾠpotentially	 ﾠharmful	 ﾠpractices,	 ﾠand	 ﾠa	 ﾠlarge	 ﾠliterature	 ﾠaddresses	 ﾠnetwork	 ﾠeffects	 ﾠon	 ﾠsub-ﾭ‐
stance	 ﾠabuse	 ﾠand	 ﾠdelinquent	 ﾠbehavior	 ﾠamong	 ﾠyouth	 ﾠ(Case	 ﾠ&	 ﾠKatz	 ﾠ1991).	 ﾠ
RESEARCH	 ﾠBEARING	 ﾠON	 ﾠNETWORK	 ﾠEFFECTS	 ﾠON	 ﾠINTERGROUP	 ﾠINEQUALITY	 ﾠ
Scholars	 ﾠwho	 ﾠhave	 ﾠreviewed	 ﾠthe	 ﾠliteratures	 ﾠon	 ﾠnetwork	 ﾠeffects	 ﾠin	 ﾠparticular	 ﾠfields	 ﾠhave	 ﾠoft-ﾭ‐
en	 ﾠconcluded	 ﾠthat	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠeffects	 ﾠcumulate	 ﾠto	 ﾠhigher	 ﾠlevels	 ﾠof	 ﾠsocial	 ﾠinequality.	 ﾠ	 ﾠIn	 ﾠa	 ﾠreview	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
research	 ﾠon	 ﾠhealth,	 ﾠPampel,	 ﾠKrueger	 ﾠ&	 ﾠDenney	 ﾠ(2010)	 ﾠstate	 ﾠ“given	 ﾠthat	 ﾠhigh-ﾭ‐SES	 ﾠpersons	 ﾠ
adopt	 ﾠhealthy	 ﾠbehaviors	 ﾠand	 ﾠassociate	 ﾠwith	 ﾠother	 ﾠhigh-ﾭ‐SES	 ﾠpersons,	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠnetworks	 ﾠof	 ﾠ	 ﾠsoc-ﾭ‐
ial	 ﾠsupport,	 ﾠinfluence	 ﾠand	 ﾠengagement	 ﾠpromote	 ﾠhealth	 ﾠand	 ﾠwiden	 ﾠdisparities.”	 ﾠ	 ﾠSimilarly,	 ﾠ
Freese	 ﾠ&	 ﾠLutfey	 ﾠ(2011)	 ﾠsuggest	 ﾠthat	 ﾠnetwork	 ﾠeffects	 ﾠmay	 ﾠcontribute	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠgreater	 ﾠcapacity	 ﾠ
of	 ﾠhigh-ﾭ‐income	 ﾠpeople	 ﾠto	 ﾠexploit	 ﾠadvances	 ﾠin	 ﾠmedical	 ﾠscience,	 ﾠcausing	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠadvances	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
widen	 ﾠrather	 ﾠthan	 ﾠreduce	 ﾠinequality	 ﾠin	 ﾠhealth	 ﾠoutcomes.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠGamoran	 ﾠ(2011:112)	 ﾠconcludes	 ﾠ
from	 ﾠa	 ﾠreview	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠliterature	 ﾠon	 ﾠschool	 ﾠtracking	 ﾠ(a	 ﾠform	 ﾠof	 ﾠinduced	 ﾠhomophily)	 ﾠthat	 ﾠ
“tracking	 ﾠtends	 ﾠto	 ﾠhave	 ﾠno	 ﾠeffect	 ﾠon	 ﾠoverall	 ﾠacademic	 ﾠperformance	 ﾠor	 ﾠproductivity,	 ﾠbut	 ﾠit	 ﾠ
tends	 ﾠto	 ﾠwiden	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdispersion	 ﾠof	 ﾠachievement,	 ﾠthat	 ﾠis,	 ﾠit	 ﾠincreases	 ﾠinequality…”	 ﾠ	 ﾠSociologists	 ﾠ
are	 ﾠnot	 ﾠalone	 ﾠin	 ﾠthese	 ﾠintuitions:	 ﾠ	 ﾠIn	 ﾠa	 ﾠreview	 ﾠof	 ﾠwork	 ﾠin	 ﾠeconomics	 ﾠon	 ﾠsocial	 ﾠinteractions,	 ﾠ
Durlauf	 ﾠ&	 ﾠIoannides	 ﾠ(2010:459)	 ﾠassert	 ﾠthat	 ﾠ“endogenous	 ﾠsocial	 ﾠinteractions	 ﾠhelp	 ﾠamplify	 ﾠ
differences	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠaverage	 ﾠgroup	 ﾠbehavior.”	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ In	 ﾠthis	 ﾠsection,	 ﾠwe	 ﾠconsider	 ﾠseveral	 ﾠkinds	 ﾠof	 ﾠevidence	 ﾠthat	 ﾠbears	 ﾠon	 ﾠthese	 ﾠpropos-ﾭ‐
itions.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠFor	 ﾠnetwork	 ﾠeffects	 ﾠto	 ﾠexacerbate	 ﾠintergroup	 ﾠinequality	 ﾠin	 ﾠadoption	 ﾠof	 ﾠsome	 ﾠpract-ﾭ‐
ice,	 ﾠthree	 ﾠthings	 ﾠmust	 ﾠbe	 ﾠtrue.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ First,	 ﾠat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠindividual	 ﾠlevel,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠprobability	 ﾠof	 ﾠadopting	 ﾠa	 ﾠbeneficial	 ﾠpractice	 ﾠshould	 ﾠbe	 ﾠ
a	 ﾠpositive	 ﾠfunction	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfinancial	 ﾠor	 ﾠcultural	 ﾠresources	 ﾠat	 ﾠa	 ﾠperson’s	 ﾠcommand.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠIn	 ﾠgeneral,	 ﾠNetwork	 ﾠexternalities	 ﾠand	 ﾠinequality	 ﾠ-ﾭ-ﾭ-ﾭ8-ﾭ-ﾭ-ﾭ	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
financial	 ﾠresources	 ﾠincrease	 ﾠa	 ﾠperson’s	 ﾠability	 ﾠto	 ﾠpay,	 ﾠthus	 ﾠraising	 ﾠhis	 ﾠor	 ﾠher	 ﾠreservation	 ﾠ
price.	 ﾠ	 ﾠCultural	 ﾠresources	 ﾠ(ordinarily	 ﾠmeasured	 ﾠas	 ﾠyears	 ﾠof	 ﾠformal	 ﾠeducation)	 ﾠmay	 ﾠinfluence	 ﾠ
adoption	 ﾠby	 ﾠincreasing	 ﾠawareness	 ﾠof	 ﾠnew	 ﾠpractices	 ﾠ(especially	 ﾠof	 ﾠinnovations),	 ﾠincreasing	 ﾠ
comprehension	 ﾠof	 ﾠcomplex	 ﾠinnovations,	 ﾠor	 ﾠenabling	 ﾠpeople	 ﾠto	 ﾠexploit	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpractices	 ﾠmore	 ﾠ
fully.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠThe	 ﾠpositive	 ﾠcorrelation	 ﾠof	 ﾠsocioeconomic	 ﾠstatus	 ﾠwith	 ﾠmost	 ﾠbehaviors,	 ﾠresources,	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
practices	 ﾠthat	 ﾠimprove	 ﾠpeople’s	 ﾠlife	 ﾠchances	 ﾠis	 ﾠperhaps	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmost	 ﾠrobust	 ﾠand	 ﾠgeneralizable	 ﾠ
finding	 ﾠin	 ﾠsociology,	 ﾠso	 ﾠthis	 ﾠpoint	 ﾠneed	 ﾠnot	 ﾠdetain	 ﾠus	 ﾠfurther.	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ Second,	 ﾠactors’	 ﾠsocial	 ﾠnetworks	 ﾠmust	 ﾠconsist	 ﾠof	 ﾠpersons	 ﾠsimilar	 ﾠto	 ﾠthemselves	 ﾠwith	 ﾠ
respect	 ﾠto	 ﾠcharacteristics	 ﾠthat	 ﾠpredict	 ﾠadoption	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠnew	 ﾠpractice.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠHomophily	 ﾠ–	 ﾠthe	 ﾠten-ﾭ‐
dency	 ﾠof	 ﾠpersons	 ﾠto	 ﾠform	 ﾠnetworks	 ﾠwith	 ﾠothers	 ﾠto	 ﾠwhom	 ﾠthey	 ﾠare	 ﾠsocioeconomically	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
demographically	 ﾠsimilar	 ﾠ–	 ﾠhas	 ﾠbeen	 ﾠobserved	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠubiquitous	 ﾠacross	 ﾠa	 ﾠwide	 ﾠrange	 ﾠof	 ﾠcon-ﾭ‐
texts.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠHomophily	 ﾠis	 ﾠcharacteristic	 ﾠof	 ﾠadult	 ﾠfriendship	 ﾠnetworks	 ﾠ(O’Malley	 ﾠ&	 ﾠChristakis	 ﾠ
2009;	 ﾠRivera,	 ﾠSoderstrom	 ﾠ&	 ﾠUzzi	 ﾠ2010)	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfriendship	 ﾠnetworks	 ﾠof	 ﾠchildren	 ﾠ(Kandel	 ﾠ
1978).	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠSocioeconomic	 ﾠand	 ﾠracial	 ﾠhomophily	 ﾠhave	 ﾠalso	 ﾠbeen	 ﾠobserved	 ﾠin	 ﾠmarital	 ﾠchoice	 ﾠ
(Rosenfeld	 ﾠ2008;	 ﾠSchwartz	 ﾠ&	 ﾠMare.	 ﾠ2005).	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠHomophily	 ﾠcan	 ﾠresult	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠstructural	 ﾠfactors	 ﾠor	 ﾠ
from	 ﾠchoice	 ﾠ(McPherson,	 ﾠSmith-ﾭ‐Lovin	 ﾠ&	 ﾠCook	 ﾠ2001),	 ﾠbut	 ﾠeither	 ﾠmay	 ﾠgenerate	 ﾠpressures	 ﾠfor	 ﾠ
greater	 ﾠinequality	 ﾠgiven	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpresence	 ﾠof	 ﾠnetwork	 ﾠeffects.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠFor	 ﾠexample,	 ﾠBlossfeld	 ﾠ(2009)	 ﾠ
suggests	 ﾠthat	 ﾠeducational	 ﾠhomogamy	 ﾠhas	 ﾠrisen	 ﾠbecause	 ﾠcolleges	 ﾠproduce	 ﾠeducationally	 ﾠho-ﾭ‐
mogeneous	 ﾠnetworks	 ﾠat	 ﾠjust	 ﾠthe	 ﾠtime	 ﾠmate	 ﾠselection	 ﾠbecomes	 ﾠsalient,	 ﾠwhereas	 ﾠyoung	 ﾠpeop-ﾭ‐
le	 ﾠwho	 ﾠmove	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠsecondary	 ﾠschool	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠworkforce	 ﾠencounter	 ﾠmore	 ﾠdiverse	 ﾠnetworks,	 ﾠ
leading	 ﾠto	 ﾠless	 ﾠhomogamous	 ﾠmatches.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠBecause	 ﾠcollege	 ﾠgraduates	 ﾠalso	 ﾠearn	 ﾠmore,	 ﾠthis	 ﾠ
pattern	 ﾠtends	 ﾠto	 ﾠexacerbate	 ﾠincome	 ﾠinequality	 ﾠ(Schwartz	 ﾠ2010).	 ﾠ
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 ﾠ-ﾭ-ﾭ-ﾭ9-ﾭ-ﾭ-ﾭ	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
Evidence	 ﾠfor	 ﾠnetwork	 ﾠeffects	 ﾠ
For	 ﾠsocial	 ﾠnetworks	 ﾠto	 ﾠproduce	 ﾠsurplus	 ﾠinequality	 ﾠ–	 ﾠi.e.,	 ﾠinequality	 ﾠgreater	 ﾠthan	 ﾠthat	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠ
individual	 ﾠdifferences	 ﾠwould	 ﾠproduce	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠabsence	 ﾠof	 ﾠnetwork	 ﾠeffects	 ﾠ-ﾭ‐-ﾭ‐	 ﾠ	 ﾠa	 ﾠfinal	 ﾠnecessary	 ﾠ
(but	 ﾠnot	 ﾠsufficient)	 ﾠcondition	 ﾠis	 ﾠthat	 ﾠadoption	 ﾠof	 ﾠbeneficial	 ﾠpractices	 ﾠmust	 ﾠbe	 ﾠpositively	 ﾠassoc-ﾭ
iated	 ﾠwith	 ﾠprior	 ﾠadoption	 ﾠby	 ﾠone’s	 ﾠnetwork	 ﾠpeers.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠSpace	 ﾠdoes	 ﾠnot	 ﾠpermit	 ﾠus	 ﾠto	 ﾠreview	 ﾠex-ﾭ‐
tensive	 ﾠliteratures	 ﾠon	 ﾠnetwork	 ﾠeffects	 ﾠin	 ﾠmany	 ﾠfields,	 ﾠnor	 ﾠis	 ﾠit	 ﾠnecessary	 ﾠto	 ﾠdo	 ﾠso	 ﾠgiven	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
availability	 ﾠof	 ﾠuseful	 ﾠreview	 ﾠessays	 ﾠ(see	 ﾠBoyd	 ﾠ1989	 ﾠon	 ﾠmigration;	 ﾠCalvó-ﾭ‐Armengol,	 ﾠ
Patacchini	 ﾠ&	 ﾠZenou	 ﾠ2009,	 ﾠSacerdote	 ﾠ2011,	 ﾠand	 ﾠEpple	 ﾠ&	 ﾠRomano	 ﾠ2011	 ﾠon	 ﾠeducation;	 ﾠDur-ﾭ‐
lauf	 ﾠ&	 ﾠIoannides	 ﾠ2010	 ﾠon	 ﾠeconomic	 ﾠresearch;	 ﾠMarsden	 ﾠ&	 ﾠGorman	 ﾠ2001	 ﾠon	 ﾠlabor	 ﾠmarkets;	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
Pampel,	 ﾠKruger	 ﾠ&	 ﾠDenney	 ﾠ2010,	 ﾠPescosolido	 ﾠ1992,	 ﾠand	 ﾠSmith	 ﾠ&	 ﾠChristakis	 ﾠ2008	 ﾠon	 ﾠhealth;	 ﾠ
and	 ﾠSampson,	 ﾠMorenoff	 ﾠand	 ﾠGannon-ﾭ‐Rowsley	 ﾠ2002	 ﾠon	 ﾠneighborhood	 ﾠeffects).	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠWell-ﾭ‐de-ﾭ‐
signed	 ﾠstudies	 ﾠhave	 ﾠfound	 ﾠnetwork	 ﾠeffects	 ﾠon	 ﾠemployment	 ﾠout	 ﾠof	 ﾠcollege	 ﾠ(Marmaros	 ﾠ&	 ﾠSac-ﾭ‐
erdote	 ﾠ2002)	 ﾠand	 ﾠmid-ﾭ‐career	 ﾠ(Laschever	 ﾠ2005),	 ﾠ	 ﾠon	 ﾠschoolteachers’	 ﾠretirement	 ﾠdecisions	 ﾠ
(Brown	 ﾠ&	 ﾠLaschever	 ﾠ2009),	 ﾠon	 ﾠimmigrants’	 ﾠuse	 ﾠof	 ﾠtransfer	 ﾠprograms	 ﾠ(Bertrand,	 ﾠLuttmer	 ﾠ&	 ﾠ
Mullainathan	 ﾠ2000),	 ﾠon	 ﾠFinns’	 ﾠstock-ﾭ‐market	 ﾠentry	 ﾠ(Kaustia	 ﾠ&	 ﾠKnupfer	 ﾠforthcoming)	 ﾠand	 ﾠon	 ﾠ
CEO	 ﾠcompensation	 ﾠpackages	 ﾠ(Shue	 ﾠ2011).	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠSuch	 ﾠstudies	 ﾠhave	 ﾠalso	 ﾠreported	 ﾠnetwork	 ﾠeffects	 ﾠ
on	 ﾠItalian	 ﾠcollege	 ﾠstudents’	 ﾠgraduation	 ﾠrates	 ﾠ(DeGiorgi,	 ﾠPellizzari	 ﾠ&	 ﾠRedaelli	 ﾠ2009),	 ﾠU.S.	 ﾠ
students’	 ﾠcollege	 ﾠperformance	 ﾠ(Fletcher	 ﾠ&	 ﾠTienda	 ﾠ2009),	 ﾠand	 ﾠother	 ﾠeducational	 ﾠoutcomes.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
Networks	 ﾠhave	 ﾠbeen	 ﾠshown	 ﾠto	 ﾠinfluence	 ﾠmajor	 ﾠlife	 ﾠtransitions	 ﾠas	 ﾠwell,	 ﾠincluding	 ﾠchild-ﾭ‐bear-ﾭ‐
ing	 ﾠ(Buhler	 ﾠ&	 ﾠFratczak	 ﾠ2007;	 ﾠKuziemko	 ﾠ2006),	 ﾠmigration	 ﾠ(Massey	 ﾠ1986;	 ﾠMassey	 ﾠ&	 ﾠEspin-ﾭ‐
oza	 ﾠ1997;	 ﾠAmuedo-ﾭ‐Dorantes	 ﾠ&	 ﾠMundra	 ﾠ2007;	 ﾠFussell	 ﾠ&	 ﾠMassey	 ﾠ2004),	 ﾠmarriage	 ﾠ(Adam-ﾭ‐
opoulou	 ﾠ2011),	 ﾠand	 ﾠdivorce	 ﾠ(McDermott,	 ﾠFowler	 ﾠ&	 ﾠChristakis	 ﾠ2011;	 ﾠAberg	 ﾠ2009).	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠRe-ﾭ‐
search	 ﾠhas	 ﾠalso	 ﾠrevealed	 ﾠnetwork	 ﾠeffects	 ﾠon	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠhealth-ﾭ‐related	 ﾠbehaviors	 ﾠas	 ﾠcontraceptive	 ﾠNetwork	 ﾠexternalities	 ﾠand	 ﾠinequality	 ﾠ-ﾭ-ﾭ-ﾭ10-ﾭ-ﾭ-ﾭ	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
use	 ﾠ(Kohler,	 ﾠBehrmann,	 ﾠ&	 ﾠWatkins	 ﾠ2001),	 ﾠparticipation	 ﾠin	 ﾠfamily	 ﾠplanning	 ﾠprograms	 ﾠ
(Behrman,	 ﾠKohler	 ﾠ&	 ﾠWatkins	 ﾠ2008),	 ﾠand	 ﾠsmoking	 ﾠcessation	 ﾠ(Christakis	 ﾠ&	 ﾠFowler	 ﾠ2008),	 ﾠbut	 ﾠ
not	 ﾠon	 ﾠcancer	 ﾠscreening	 ﾠ(Keating,	 ﾠO’Malley,	 ﾠSmith	 ﾠ&	 ﾠChristakis	 ﾠ2011).	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ Networks	 ﾠare	 ﾠalso	 ﾠimplicated	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠadoption	 ﾠof	 ﾠrisky	 ﾠbehaviors	 ﾠ(e.g.,	 ﾠdrug	 ﾠuse,	 ﾠtru-ﾭ‐
ancy,	 ﾠearly	 ﾠinitiation	 ﾠof	 ﾠsexual	 ﾠintercourse),	 ﾠespecially	 ﾠamong	 ﾠyoung	 ﾠpeople.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠWhen,	 ﾠas	 ﾠis	 ﾠ
usually	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcase,	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠbehaviors	 ﾠnegatively	 ﾠaffect	 ﾠsubsequent	 ﾠeducational	 ﾠand	 ﾠoccupational	 ﾠ
attainment,	 ﾠare	 ﾠnegatively	 ﾠcorrelated	 ﾠwith	 ﾠsocioeconomic	 ﾠstatus,	 ﾠand	 ﾠspread	 ﾠthrough	 ﾠhom-ﾭ‐
ophilic	 ﾠnetworks,	 ﾠnetwork	 ﾠeffects	 ﾠmay	 ﾠexacerbate	 ﾠinequality.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠUsing	 ﾠdata	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠthe	 ﾠNational	 ﾠ
Longitudinal	 ﾠStudy	 ﾠof	 ﾠAdolescent	 ﾠHealth	 ﾠ(Add	 ﾠHealth),	 ﾠCard	 ﾠand	 ﾠGiuliano	 ﾠ(2011)	 ﾠdemon-ﾭ‐
strate	 ﾠeffects	 ﾠof	 ﾠbest	 ﾠfriends’	 ﾠbehaviors	 ﾠon	 ﾠego’s	 ﾠinitiation	 ﾠof	 ﾠsex,	 ﾠsmoking,	 ﾠmarijuana	 ﾠuse,	 ﾠ
and	 ﾠtruancy.	 ﾠ	 ﾠA	 ﾠseminal	 ﾠstudy	 ﾠof	 ﾠlow-ﾭ‐income	 ﾠurban	 ﾠyouth	 ﾠ(Case	 ﾠ&	 ﾠKatz	 ﾠ1991)	 ﾠfound	 ﾠthat	 ﾠ
parents’	 ﾠand	 ﾠsibling’s	 ﾠexperiences	 ﾠaffected	 ﾠyoung	 ﾠpeople’s	 ﾠrisk	 ﾠof	 ﾠincarceration,	 ﾠdrug	 ﾠabuse,	 ﾠ
and	 ﾠ(for	 ﾠgirls)	 ﾠearly	 ﾠpregnancy.7	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠBy	 ﾠcontrast,	 ﾠa	 ﾠstudy	 ﾠof	 ﾠcollege	 ﾠroommates	 ﾠfound	 ﾠmore	 ﾠ
limited	 ﾠeffects	 ﾠon	 ﾠdrinking	 ﾠand	 ﾠno	 ﾠeffect	 ﾠof	 ﾠroommate	 ﾠbehavior	 ﾠon	 ﾠegos’	 ﾠdrug	 ﾠuse	 ﾠor	 ﾠsexual	 ﾠ
behavior	 ﾠ(Duncan,	 ﾠBoisjoly,	 ﾠKremer,	 ﾠLevy	 ﾠ&	 ﾠEccles	 ﾠ2004).	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠResearch	 ﾠin	 ﾠcriminology	 ﾠshows	 ﾠ
substantial	 ﾠimpacts	 ﾠof	 ﾠpeer	 ﾠnetworks	 ﾠon	 ﾠcriminal	 ﾠbehavior	 ﾠin	 ﾠadolescence	 ﾠand	 ﾠearly	 ﾠ
adulthood	 ﾠ(Elliott	 ﾠ&	 ﾠMenard	 ﾠ1996;	 ﾠHaynie	 ﾠ&	 ﾠOsgood	 ﾠ2005).	 ﾠ
To	 ﾠbe	 ﾠsure,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠliterature	 ﾠmay	 ﾠoverstate	 ﾠnetwork	 ﾠeffects.	 ﾠ	 ﾠFor	 ﾠone	 ﾠthing,	 ﾠit	 ﾠis	 ﾠlikely	 ﾠ
that	 ﾠauthors	 ﾠwho	 ﾠfind	 ﾠnetwork	 ﾠeffects	 ﾠare	 ﾠmore	 ﾠlikely	 ﾠto	 ﾠpublish	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠresults	 ﾠthan	 ﾠthose	 ﾠ
who	 ﾠdo	 ﾠnot.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠMoreover,	 ﾠresearch	 ﾠon	 ﾠnetwork	 ﾠeffects,	 ﾠand	 ﾠa	 ﾠfortiori	 ﾠon	 ﾠpeer-ﾭ‐group	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
neighborhood	 ﾠeffects,	 ﾠis	 ﾠmethodologically	 ﾠchallenging,	 ﾠfor	 ﾠat	 ﾠleast	 ﾠtwo	 ﾠreasons	 ﾠ(Aberg	 ﾠ	 ﾠ&	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
7	 ﾠThere	 ﾠis	 ﾠalso	 ﾠa	 ﾠlarge	 ﾠliterature	 ﾠdemonstrating	 ﾠpeer	 ﾠand	 ﾠneighborhood	 ﾠeffects	 ﾠon	 ﾠrisky	 ﾠbehavior	 ﾠamong	 ﾠ
youth	 ﾠthat,	 ﾠwhile	 ﾠinteresting,	 ﾠis	 ﾠless	 ﾠthan	 ﾠconclusive	 ﾠas	 ﾠto	 ﾠnetwork	 ﾠmechanisms,	 ﾠin	 ﾠthat	 ﾠegos’	 ﾠpersonal	 ﾠ
networks	 ﾠare	 ﾠrarely	 ﾠrandom	 ﾠsamples	 ﾠof	 ﾠpeers	 ﾠor	 ﾠneighbors.	 ﾠ	 ﾠFor	 ﾠa	 ﾠreview,	 ﾠsee	 ﾠDishion	 ﾠ&	 ﾠTipsord	 ﾠ2011.	 ﾠFor	 ﾠ
evidence	 ﾠthat	 ﾠpeer-ﾭ‐effect	 ﾠmodels	 ﾠunderestimate	 ﾠtrue	 ﾠnetwork	 ﾠeffects	 ﾠsee	 ﾠHalliday	 ﾠ&	 ﾠKwak	 ﾠ2007.	 ﾠNetwork	 ﾠexternalities	 ﾠand	 ﾠinequality	 ﾠ-ﾭ-ﾭ-ﾭ11-ﾭ-ﾭ-ﾭ	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
Hedstrom	 ﾠ2011;	 ﾠManski	 ﾠ1993;	 ﾠHarding,	 ﾠGennetian,	 ﾠWinship,	 ﾠSanbonmatsu	 ﾠ&	 ﾠKling	 ﾠ2010).8	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
First,	 ﾠindividuals	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsame	 ﾠsocial	 ﾠnetwork	 ﾠor	 ﾠpeer	 ﾠgroup	 ﾠmay	 ﾠbe	 ﾠsubject	 ﾠto	 ﾠsimilar	 ﾠ
unobserved	 ﾠenvironmental	 ﾠpressures	 ﾠor	 ﾠshocks.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠUnobserved-ﾭ‐variable	 ﾠbias	 ﾠvexes	 ﾠmost	 ﾠ
social-ﾭ‐scientific	 ﾠmodels,	 ﾠof	 ﾠcourse.	 ﾠ	 ﾠMany	 ﾠstudies	 ﾠhave	 ﾠemployed	 ﾠingenious	 ﾠmethods	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
guard	 ﾠagainst	 ﾠspecification	 ﾠerror,	 ﾠe.g.,	 ﾠby	 ﾠdemonstrating	 ﾠvarying	 ﾠoutcomes	 ﾠfor	 ﾠactors	 ﾠwho	 ﾠ
should	 ﾠbe	 ﾠsubject	 ﾠequally	 ﾠto	 ﾠenvironmental	 ﾠeffects	 ﾠbut	 ﾠdifferentially	 ﾠto	 ﾠnetwork	 ﾠinfluences	 ﾠ
(e.g.	 ﾠHensvik,	 ﾠAsphjell	 ﾠ&	 ﾠNillson	 ﾠ2011;	 ﾠLiu,	 ﾠKing	 ﾠ&	 ﾠBearman	 ﾠ2010;	 ﾠMcDermott,	 ﾠFowler	 ﾠ&	 ﾠ
Christakis	 ﾠ2011).	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
Second,	 ﾠselection	 ﾠinto	 ﾠnetworks	 ﾠis	 ﾠa	 ﾠpotential	 ﾠproblem	 ﾠif	 ﾠindividuals	 ﾠseek	 ﾠout	 ﾠothers	 ﾠ
whose	 ﾠpractices	 ﾠthey	 ﾠwish	 ﾠto	 ﾠemulate,	 ﾠin	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠcase	 ﾠthe	 ﾠintent	 ﾠto	 ﾠadopt	 ﾠa	 ﾠpractice	 ﾠproduces	 ﾠ
rather	 ﾠthan	 ﾠis	 ﾠcaused	 ﾠby	 ﾠnetworks	 ﾠ(Mouw	 ﾠ2002;	 ﾠShalizi	 ﾠ&	 ﾠThomas	 ﾠ2011).9	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠResearchers	 ﾠ
have	 ﾠaddressed	 ﾠthis	 ﾠproblem	 ﾠby	 ﾠemploying	 ﾠfixed-ﾭ‐effects	 ﾠmodels	 ﾠwith	 ﾠlongitudinal	 ﾠdata	 ﾠ(a	 ﾠ
useful	 ﾠif	 ﾠincomplete	 ﾠsolution),	 ﾠby	 ﾠundertaking	 ﾠfieldwork	 ﾠto	 ﾠexplore	 ﾠthe	 ﾠplausibility	 ﾠof	 ﾠen-ﾭ‐
dogenous	 ﾠselection	 ﾠ(Watkins	 ﾠ&	 ﾠWarriner	 ﾠ2003),	 ﾠby	 ﾠemploying	 ﾠsensitivity	 ﾠanalysis	 ﾠto	 ﾠassess	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠrobustness	 ﾠof	 ﾠparticular	 ﾠnetwork	 ﾠeffects	 ﾠto	 ﾠvarying	 ﾠdegrees	 ﾠof	 ﾠconfounding	 ﾠ(Vander-ﾭ‐
Weele	 ﾠ2011),	 ﾠand	 ﾠby	 ﾠidentifying	 ﾠquasi-ﾭ‐experimental	 ﾠcontexts	 ﾠwhere	 ﾠties	 ﾠresult	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠ
choices	 ﾠthat	 ﾠcould	 ﾠnot	 ﾠplausibly	 ﾠhave	 ﾠbeen	 ﾠinfluenced	 ﾠby	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpractice	 ﾠin	 ﾠquestion	 ﾠ(e.g.	 ﾠ
Marmaros	 ﾠ&	 ﾠSacerdote	 ﾠ2002;	 ﾠAberg	 ﾠ2009;	 ﾠLaschever	 ﾠ2005).	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
8	 ﾠManski	 ﾠ(1993)	 ﾠmentions	 ﾠa	 ﾠthird,	 ﾠ“the	 ﾠreflection	 ﾠproblem,”	 ﾠthat	 ﾠstems	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdifficulty	 ﾠof	 ﾠallocating	 ﾠ
influence	 ﾠin	 ﾠa	 ﾠsystem	 ﾠin	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠseveral	 ﾠactors	 ﾠsimultaneously	 ﾠinfluence	 ﾠone	 ﾠanother	 ﾠin	 ﾠreal	 ﾠtime.	 ﾠ	 ﾠAlthough	 ﾠthis	 ﾠ
problem	 ﾠobscures	 ﾠthe	 ﾠrelative	 ﾠimpact	 ﾠof	 ﾠpeer	 ﾠbehavior	 ﾠand	 ﾠpeer	 ﾠattributes	 ﾠat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠindividual	 ﾠlevel,	 ﾠit	 ﾠis	 ﾠnot	 ﾠrel-ﾭ‐
evant	 ﾠto	 ﾠassessing	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcontribution	 ﾠof	 ﾠnetwork	 ﾠeffects	 ﾠto	 ﾠinequality	 ﾠat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpopulation	 ﾠlevel,	 ﾠso	 ﾠwe	 ﾠdo	 ﾠnot	 ﾠdis-ﾭ‐
cuss	 ﾠit	 ﾠhere.	 ﾠ
9	 ﾠFew	 ﾠstudies	 ﾠhave	 ﾠused	 ﾠlongitudinal	 ﾠnetwork	 ﾠdata	 ﾠto	 ﾠcompare	 ﾠthe	 ﾠeffects	 ﾠof	 ﾠinfluence	 ﾠand	 ﾠselection	 ﾠ(both	 ﾠ
entering	 ﾠand	 ﾠleaving	 ﾠnetworks)	 ﾠon	 ﾠbehavioral	 ﾠsimilarity.	 ﾠ	 ﾠThose	 ﾠthat	 ﾠhave,	 ﾠhave	 ﾠused	 ﾠdata	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠschools	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
have	 ﾠreached	 ﾠdifferent	 ﾠconclusions	 ﾠ(based	 ﾠon	 ﾠdifferent	 ﾠdata	 ﾠsets).	 ﾠ	 ﾠCohen	 ﾠ(1977)	 ﾠand	 ﾠMercken,	 ﾠSnijders,	 ﾠ
Vartiainen	 ﾠ&	 ﾠDeVries	 ﾠ(2009),	 ﾠfor	 ﾠexample,	 ﾠfinds	 ﾠlarge	 ﾠselection	 ﾠeffects	 ﾠin	 ﾠhigh-ﾭ‐school	 ﾠpeer	 ﾠgroups,	 ﾠwhereas	 ﾠ
McFarland	 ﾠ&	 ﾠPals	 ﾠ(2005)	 ﾠfind	 ﾠlittle	 ﾠselection	 ﾠbetween	 ﾠmiddle	 ﾠschool	 ﾠand	 ﾠearly	 ﾠhigh	 ﾠschool.	 ﾠ	 ﾠNetwork	 ﾠexternalities	 ﾠand	 ﾠinequality	 ﾠ-ﾭ-ﾭ-ﾭ12-ﾭ-ﾭ-ﾭ	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
Even	 ﾠwhen	 ﾠendogeneity	 ﾠdoes	 ﾠexist,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠextent	 ﾠto	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠit	 ﾠis	 ﾠgermane	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠimpact	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
networks	 ﾠon	 ﾠinequality	 ﾠdepends	 ﾠon	 ﾠwhether	 ﾠadoption	 ﾠof	 ﾠa	 ﾠnew	 ﾠpractice	 ﾠmerely	 ﾠrequires	 ﾠ
awareness	 ﾠand	 ﾠinterest,	 ﾠor	 ﾠif	 ﾠpeer	 ﾠsupport	 ﾠis	 ﾠnecessary	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthat	 ﾠinterest	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠtransformed	 ﾠ
into	 ﾠbehavior.	 ﾠ	 ﾠAdoption	 ﾠof	 ﾠa	 ﾠnew	 ﾠpractice	 ﾠoften	 ﾠproceeds	 ﾠin	 ﾠtwo	 ﾠstages:	 ﾠThe	 ﾠactor	 ﾠfirst	 ﾠbe-ﾭ‐
comes	 ﾠaware	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpractice	 ﾠand	 ﾠwishes	 ﾠto	 ﾠadopt	 ﾠit;	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠactor	 ﾠthen	 ﾠturns	 ﾠto	 ﾠpeers	 ﾠfor	 ﾠas-ﾭ‐
sistance	 ﾠin	 ﾠdoing	 ﾠso.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠWhen	 ﾠadoption	 ﾠis	 ﾠeasy,	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠactor	 ﾠdoes	 ﾠnot	 ﾠneed	 ﾠsocial	 ﾠsupport	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
fulfill	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdesire	 ﾠto	 ﾠadopt,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠanalyst	 ﾠmay	 ﾠfind	 ﾠspurious	 ﾠnetwork	 ﾠeffects	 ﾠif	 ﾠactor	 ﾠprefers	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
associate	 ﾠwith	 ﾠother	 ﾠadopters.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠWhen	 ﾠadoption	 ﾠis	 ﾠdifficult	 ﾠ–	 ﾠwhere	 ﾠan	 ﾠactor	 ﾠrequires	 ﾠassist-ﾭ‐
ance	 ﾠto	 ﾠadopt	 ﾠsuccessfully	 ﾠor	 ﾠwhen	 ﾠa	 ﾠpractice’s	 ﾠrewards	 ﾠaccrue	 ﾠto	 ﾠan	 ﾠactor	 ﾠby	 ﾠvirtue	 ﾠof	 ﾠper-ﾭ‐
sistence	 ﾠin	 ﾠa	 ﾠnetwork	 ﾠ(e.g.	 ﾠjoining	 ﾠa	 ﾠfood	 ﾠbuying	 ﾠco-ﾭ‐op)	 ﾠ-ﾭ‐-ﾭ‐	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsituation	 ﾠis	 ﾠmore	 ﾠcomplex.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠIn	 ﾠ
this	 ﾠcase,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠactor’s	 ﾠdecision	 ﾠto	 ﾠadopt	 ﾠis	 ﾠnot	 ﾠaffected	 ﾠby	 ﾠnetwork	 ﾠties,	 ﾠas	 ﾠthese	 ﾠwere	 ﾠformed	 ﾠ
as	 ﾠa	 ﾠconsequence	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠactor’s	 ﾠdecision.	 ﾠ	 ﾠThe	 ﾠactual	 ﾠadoption,	 ﾠhowever,	 ﾠis	 ﾠa	 ﾠproduct	 ﾠof	 ﾠnet-ﾭ‐
work	 ﾠeffects,	 ﾠin	 ﾠthat	 ﾠit	 ﾠcould	 ﾠnot	 ﾠhave	 ﾠoccurred	 ﾠhad	 ﾠthe	 ﾠactor	 ﾠnot	 ﾠsucceeded	 ﾠin	 ﾠforming	 ﾠnew	 ﾠ
ties.	 ﾠ	 ﾠIn	 ﾠthis	 ﾠlatter	 ﾠcase,	 ﾠnetwork	 ﾠeffects	 ﾠwill	 ﾠincrease	 ﾠinequality	 ﾠin	 ﾠrates	 ﾠof	 ﾠadoption	 ﾠof	 ﾠa	 ﾠ
practice	 ﾠat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpopulation	 ﾠlevel,	 ﾠeven	 ﾠif	 ﾠthey	 ﾠcannot	 ﾠbe	 ﾠsaid	 ﾠto	 ﾠhave	 ﾠ“caused”	 ﾠadoption	 ﾠat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
level	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠindividual.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠUltimately,	 ﾠa	 ﾠmore	 ﾠsatisfactory	 ﾠapproach	 ﾠmay	 ﾠbe	 ﾠto	 ﾠmodel	 ﾠthe	 ﾠrelat-ﾭ‐
ionship	 ﾠbetween	 ﾠnetworks	 ﾠand	 ﾠbehaviors	 ﾠnot	 ﾠas	 ﾠcausal,	 ﾠbut	 ﾠas	 ﾠco-ﾭ‐evolutionary,	 ﾠeach	 ﾠside	 ﾠ
(networks	 ﾠand	 ﾠbehaviors)	 ﾠconstituting	 ﾠan	 ﾠenvironment	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthe	 ﾠselection	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠother.	 ﾠ
These	 ﾠmethodological	 ﾠconcerns	 ﾠare	 ﾠimportant.	 ﾠ	 ﾠNontheless,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠweight	 ﾠof	 ﾠevidence	 ﾠ
supporting	 ﾠnetwork	 ﾠeffects,	 ﾠmuch	 ﾠof	 ﾠit	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠstudies	 ﾠemploying	 ﾠcredible	 ﾠmeans	 ﾠto	 ﾠaddress	 ﾠ
potential	 ﾠproblems,	 ﾠconvinces	 ﾠus	 ﾠthat	 ﾠpeer	 ﾠnetworks	 ﾠinfluence	 ﾠmany	 ﾠkinds	 ﾠof	 ﾠbehavior,	 ﾠin-ﾭ‐
cluding	 ﾠpractices	 ﾠwith	 ﾠsignificant	 ﾠimplications	 ﾠfor	 ﾠsocial	 ﾠinequality.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
	 ﾠNetwork	 ﾠexternalities	 ﾠand	 ﾠinequality	 ﾠ-ﾭ-ﾭ-ﾭ13-ﾭ-ﾭ-ﾭ	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
Network	 ﾠand	 ﾠPeer	 ﾠInteraction	 ﾠEffects	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
The	 ﾠmere	 ﾠexistence	 ﾠof	 ﾠnetwork	 ﾠeffects	 ﾠon	 ﾠadoption	 ﾠof	 ﾠa	 ﾠpractice	 ﾠ(if	 ﾠthe	 ﾠnetwork	 ﾠis	 ﾠhomo-ﾭ‐
philous	 ﾠwith	 ﾠrespect	 ﾠto	 ﾠindividual	 ﾠcharacteristics	 ﾠassociated	 ﾠwith	 ﾠadoption)	 ﾠis	 ﾠsufficient	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
render	 ﾠit	 ﾠplausible	 ﾠthat	 ﾠnetworks	 ﾠexacerbate	 ﾠintergroup	 ﾠinequality	 ﾠin	 ﾠthat	 ﾠpractice’s	 ﾠadopt-ﾭ‐
ion.	 ﾠ	 ﾠThis	 ﾠwill	 ﾠonly	 ﾠbe	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcase,	 ﾠof	 ﾠcourse,	 ﾠif	 ﾠthose	 ﾠgroups	 ﾠare	 ﾠdefined	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠbasis	 ﾠof	 ﾠcharact-ﾭ‐
eristics	 ﾠthat	 ﾠserve	 ﾠboth	 ﾠto	 ﾠincrease	 ﾠindividual-ﾭ‐level	 ﾠodds	 ﾠof	 ﾠadoption	 ﾠand	 ﾠas	 ﾠbases	 ﾠfor	 ﾠho-ﾭ‐
mophily.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠGiven	 ﾠthe	 ﾠwide	 ﾠrange	 ﾠof	 ﾠcases	 ﾠfor	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠcharacteristics	 ﾠas	 ﾠeducation,	 ﾠrace	 ﾠor	 ﾠ
income	 ﾠsatisfy	 ﾠthese	 ﾠconditions,	 ﾠthis	 ﾠis	 ﾠa	 ﾠmodest	 ﾠqualification.	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ An	 ﾠemerging	 ﾠset	 ﾠof	 ﾠnetwork-ﾭ‐effects	 ﾠstudies	 ﾠgo	 ﾠbeyond	 ﾠmerely	 ﾠdocumenting	 ﾠeffects,	 ﾠ
however,	 ﾠto	 ﾠdemonstrate	 ﾠthat	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠeffects	 ﾠinteract	 ﾠwith	 ﾠmeasures	 ﾠof	 ﾠindividual	 ﾠadvantage	 ﾠ
such	 ﾠthat	 ﾠhigh-ﾭ‐status	 ﾠpeople	 ﾠbenefit	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠnetwork	 ﾠeffects	 ﾠmore	 ﾠthan	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠlower-ﾭ‐status	 ﾠ
counterparts.	 ﾠ	 ﾠIn	 ﾠother	 ﾠwords,	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠstudies	 ﾠidentify	 ﾠpractices	 ﾠfor	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠnetworks	 ﾠmay	 ﾠexac-ﾭ‐
erbate	 ﾠinequality	 ﾠin	 ﾠtwo	 ﾠdistinct	 ﾠways	 ﾠ–	 ﾠfirst,	 ﾠby	 ﾠaugmenting	 ﾠthe	 ﾠimpact	 ﾠof	 ﾠindividual	 ﾠen-ﾭ‐
dowments;	 ﾠand,	 ﾠsecond,	 ﾠby	 ﾠdoing	 ﾠso	 ﾠdisproportionately	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthe	 ﾠalready	 ﾠadvantaged.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠThis	 ﾠ
second-ﾭ‐level	 ﾠeffect	 ﾠis	 ﾠpotentially	 ﾠconsequential,	 ﾠas	 ﾠit	 ﾠmay	 ﾠextend	 ﾠthe	 ﾠscope	 ﾠconditions	 ﾠfor	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠinequality-ﾭ‐exacerbating	 ﾠmechanisms	 ﾠconsiderably	 ﾠby	 ﾠsuppressing	 ﾠthe	 ﾠability	 ﾠof	 ﾠlower-ﾭ‐
status	 ﾠmembers	 ﾠof	 ﾠheterogeneous	 ﾠpeer	 ﾠnetworks	 ﾠto	 ﾠserve	 ﾠas	 ﾠbridges	 ﾠdiffusing	 ﾠaccess	 ﾠto	 ﾠa	 ﾠ
practice	 ﾠbeyond	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcircle	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠinitially	 ﾠadvantaged.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ Intergroup	 ﾠvariation	 ﾠin	 ﾠreturns	 ﾠto	 ﾠnetworks	 ﾠhas	 ﾠbeen	 ﾠexplored	 ﾠmost	 ﾠthoroughly	 ﾠin	 ﾠ
work	 ﾠon	 ﾠlabor	 ﾠmarkets.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠSeveral	 ﾠpapers	 ﾠreport	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠassociation	 ﾠbetween	 ﾠusing	 ﾠnet-ﾭ‐
works	 ﾠto	 ﾠfind	 ﾠjobs	 ﾠand	 ﾠjob	 ﾠquality	 ﾠis	 ﾠstronger	 ﾠfor	 ﾠhigh-ﾭ‐SES	 ﾠthan	 ﾠfor	 ﾠlow-ﾭ‐SES	 ﾠworkers	 ﾠ(Lin	 ﾠ
1999;	 ﾠIoannides	 ﾠ&	 ﾠLoury	 ﾠ2004)	 ﾠand	 ﾠfor	 ﾠmen	 ﾠthan	 ﾠfor	 ﾠwomen	 ﾠ(Ensel	 ﾠ1979).	 ﾠ	 ﾠOther	 ﾠevidence	 ﾠ
indicates	 ﾠthat	 ﾠone’s	 ﾠpeers’	 ﾠemployment	 ﾠstatus	 ﾠaffects	 ﾠone’s	 ﾠown	 ﾠmore	 ﾠstrongly	 ﾠfor	 ﾠwhites	 ﾠNetwork	 ﾠexternalities	 ﾠand	 ﾠinequality	 ﾠ-ﾭ-ﾭ-ﾭ14-ﾭ-ﾭ-ﾭ	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
than	 ﾠfor	 ﾠAfrican-ﾭ‐Americans.	 ﾠ	 ﾠHolzer	 ﾠ(1987)	 ﾠargues	 ﾠthat	 ﾠbetween	 ﾠ24	 ﾠand	 ﾠ38	 ﾠpercent	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
difference	 ﾠin	 ﾠemployment	 ﾠrates	 ﾠbetween	 ﾠwhite	 ﾠand	 ﾠBlack	 ﾠyouth	 ﾠis	 ﾠattributable	 ﾠto	 ﾠsuperior	 ﾠ
returns	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠjob	 ﾠreferral	 ﾠnetworks	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠlatter	 ﾠ(and	 ﾠsee	 ﾠalso	 ﾠBortnick	 ﾠ&	 ﾠPorts	 ﾠ1992).	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
Similarly,	 ﾠKorenman	 ﾠ&	 ﾠTurner	 ﾠ(1996)	 ﾠreport	 ﾠthat	 ﾠhigher	 ﾠreturns	 ﾠfor	 ﾠwhites	 ﾠthan	 ﾠBlacks	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠuse	 ﾠof	 ﾠpersonal	 ﾠnetworks	 ﾠfor	 ﾠjob-ﾭ‐seeking	 ﾠaccount	 ﾠfor	 ﾠa	 ﾠsignificant	 ﾠshare	 ﾠof	 ﾠracial	 ﾠ
inequality	 ﾠin	 ﾠwages.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ Indications	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠrelatively	 ﾠprivileged	 ﾠbenefit	 ﾠdisproportionately	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠpeer	 ﾠef-ﾭ‐
fects	 ﾠeven	 ﾠin	 ﾠheterogeneous	 ﾠgroups	 ﾠhave	 ﾠalso	 ﾠbeen	 ﾠobserved	 ﾠin	 ﾠeducation,	 ﾠthough	 ﾠinter-ﾭ‐
actions	 ﾠare	 ﾠweaker	 ﾠand	 ﾠless	 ﾠconsistent	 ﾠ(Epple	 ﾠ&	 ﾠRomano	 ﾠ2011).	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠSacerdote	 ﾠ(2011:260)	 ﾠ
concludes	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠhis	 ﾠliterature	 ﾠreview	 ﾠthat	 ﾠ“students	 ﾠat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠhigh	 ﾠend	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠability	 ﾠdistrib-ﾭ‐
ution	 ﾠexperience	 ﾠthe	 ﾠlargest	 ﾠpeer	 ﾠeffects	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠhigh	 ﾠability	 ﾠpeers.”	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠA	 ﾠstudy	 ﾠof	 ﾠIsraeli	 ﾠelem-ﾭ‐
entary-ﾭ‐school	 ﾠclassrooms	 ﾠreports	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠnumber	 ﾠof	 ﾠexceptional	 ﾠachievers	 ﾠpositively	 ﾠ
affects	 ﾠthe	 ﾠlearning	 ﾠof	 ﾠhigh-ﾭ‐achieving	 ﾠstudents	 ﾠbut	 ﾠnot	 ﾠof	 ﾠother	 ﾠchildren,	 ﾠwhereas	 ﾠthe	 ﾠnum-ﾭ‐
ber	 ﾠof	 ﾠunusually	 ﾠlow	 ﾠachievers	 ﾠdisproportionately	 ﾠaffects	 ﾠthe	 ﾠperformance	 ﾠof	 ﾠlow-ﾭ‐ability	 ﾠ
children	 ﾠ(Lavy,	 ﾠPaserman	 ﾠ&	 ﾠSchlosser	 ﾠ2007).	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠExploiting	 ﾠa	 ﾠsituation	 ﾠin	 ﾠone	 ﾠlarge	 ﾠschool	 ﾠ
district	 ﾠin	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠhigh	 ﾠnumbers	 ﾠof	 ﾠrandom	 ﾠschool	 ﾠreassignments	 ﾠproduced	 ﾠa	 ﾠquasi-ﾭ‐exper-ﾭ‐
imental	 ﾠdesign,	 ﾠHoxby	 ﾠ&	 ﾠWeingarth	 ﾠ(2006)	 ﾠlikewise	 ﾠfound	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpositive	 ﾠeffects	 ﾠof	 ﾠhigh-ﾭ‐
achieving	 ﾠpeers	 ﾠwere	 ﾠconcentrated	 ﾠamong	 ﾠother	 ﾠhigh	 ﾠachievers.	 ﾠ	 ﾠHoxby	 ﾠ(2000)	 ﾠsimilarly	 ﾠ
reported	 ﾠthat	 ﾠpeer	 ﾠeffects	 ﾠon	 ﾠperformance	 ﾠoperated	 ﾠmore	 ﾠstrongly	 ﾠwithin	 ﾠracial	 ﾠgroups	 ﾠ
than	 ﾠbetween	 ﾠthem.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠBy	 ﾠcontrast,	 ﾠsome	 ﾠstudies	 ﾠhave	 ﾠfound	 ﾠthat	 ﾠhigh-ﾭ‐ability	 ﾠpeers	 ﾠaffect	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
performance	 ﾠof	 ﾠlow-ﾭ‐	 ﾠor	 ﾠmedium-ﾭ‐ability	 ﾠpeers	 ﾠas	 ﾠwell	 ﾠas	 ﾠone	 ﾠanother	 ﾠ(Burke	 ﾠ&	 ﾠSass	 ﾠ2008).	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
Unfortunately,	 ﾠall	 ﾠof	 ﾠthese	 ﾠstudies	 ﾠfocus	 ﾠon	 ﾠcolocation	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsame	 ﾠclassroom	 ﾠor	 ﾠschool,	 ﾠ
without	 ﾠdrawing	 ﾠupon	 ﾠactual	 ﾠnetwork	 ﾠdata.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠThus	 ﾠwhere	 ﾠinteractions	 ﾠhave	 ﾠbeen	 ﾠfound,	 ﾠit	 ﾠis	 ﾠNetwork	 ﾠexternalities	 ﾠand	 ﾠinequality	 ﾠ-ﾭ-ﾭ-ﾭ15-ﾭ-ﾭ-ﾭ	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
unclear	 ﾠwhether	 ﾠthey	 ﾠreflect	 ﾠa	 ﾠdisproportionate	 ﾠpositive	 ﾠimpact	 ﾠof	 ﾠnetworks	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠalready	 ﾠ
advantaged.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠAn	 ﾠalternative	 ﾠinterpretation	 ﾠconsistent	 ﾠwith	 ﾠthese	 ﾠresults	 ﾠis	 ﾠthat	 ﾠnetwork	 ﾠ
effects,	 ﾠnot	 ﾠpeer	 ﾠeffects,	 ﾠdrive	 ﾠachievement,	 ﾠand	 ﾠthat	 ﾠstudents	 ﾠsort	 ﾠthemselves	 ﾠinto	 ﾠ
homogeneous	 ﾠgroups	 ﾠwithin	 ﾠheterogeneous	 ﾠschools	 ﾠor	 ﾠclassrooms	 ﾠ(Carrell,	 ﾠSacerdote	 ﾠ&	 ﾠ
West	 ﾠ2011).	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ Differential	 ﾠnetwork	 ﾠeffects	 ﾠbased	 ﾠon	 ﾠSES	 ﾠor	 ﾠethnicity	 ﾠhave	 ﾠbeen	 ﾠreported	 ﾠin	 ﾠseveral	 ﾠ
other	 ﾠdomains.	 ﾠ	 ﾠIn	 ﾠa	 ﾠstudy	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠuse	 ﾠof	 ﾠfamily	 ﾠplanning	 ﾠprograms	 ﾠin	 ﾠtwo	 ﾠAfrican	 ﾠcountries,	 ﾠ
Behrman,	 ﾠKohler	 ﾠ&	 ﾠWatkins	 ﾠ(2008)	 ﾠfound	 ﾠthat	 ﾠnetwork	 ﾠeffects	 ﾠwere	 ﾠstronger	 ﾠfor	 ﾠwomen	 ﾠ
with	 ﾠhigher	 ﾠlevels	 ﾠof	 ﾠformal	 ﾠeducation.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠSeveral	 ﾠmigration	 ﾠstudies	 ﾠreport	 ﾠthat	 ﾠmen’s	 ﾠmi-ﾭ‐
gration	 ﾠchoices	 ﾠare	 ﾠinfluenced	 ﾠmore	 ﾠby	 ﾠnetwork	 ﾠalters	 ﾠthan	 ﾠthose	 ﾠof	 ﾠwomen	 ﾠ(Curran,	 ﾠGarip,	 ﾠ
Chung	 ﾠ&	 ﾠTangchonlatip	 ﾠ2005;	 ﾠKanaiaupuni	 ﾠ2000;	 ﾠGramusk	 ﾠ&	 ﾠPessar	 ﾠ1991)	 ﾠand	 ﾠthat	 ﾠmen	 ﾠ
benefit	 ﾠmore	 ﾠthan	 ﾠwomen	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠties	 ﾠto	 ﾠco-ﾭ‐ethnics	 ﾠin	 ﾠdestination	 ﾠ(Hagan	 ﾠ1998;	 ﾠHondagneu-ﾭ‐
Sotolo	 ﾠ1994).	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠIn	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdomain	 ﾠof	 ﾠhealth,	 ﾠChristakis	 ﾠand	 ﾠFowler	 ﾠ(2008)	 ﾠreport	 ﾠthat	 ﾠhighly	 ﾠ
educated	 ﾠfriends	 ﾠinfluence	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdecision	 ﾠto	 ﾠstop	 ﾠsmoking	 ﾠmore	 ﾠthan	 ﾠless	 ﾠeducated	 ﾠfriends. 
	 ﾠ We	 ﾠfeature	 ﾠthis	 ﾠresearch	 ﾠbecause	 ﾠit	 ﾠindicates	 ﾠthat	 ﾠunder	 ﾠthe	 ﾠright	 ﾠconditions,	 ﾠhigh-ﾭ‐
status	 ﾠpeople	 ﾠbenefit	 ﾠdisproportionately	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠnetwork	 ﾠeffects	 ﾠnot	 ﾠjust	 ﾠbecause	 ﾠthey	 ﾠare	 ﾠ
more	 ﾠlikely	 ﾠto	 ﾠhave	 ﾠnetwork	 ﾠpeers	 ﾠwho	 ﾠhave	 ﾠalready	 ﾠadopted	 ﾠbeneficial	 ﾠpractices,	 ﾠbut	 ﾠfur-ﾭ‐
thermore	 ﾠbecause	 ﾠthey	 ﾠare	 ﾠmore	 ﾠsusceptible	 ﾠto	 ﾠpositive	 ﾠinfluences,	 ﾠeven	 ﾠwhen	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠpeer	 ﾠ
networks	 ﾠare	 ﾠsocially	 ﾠheterogeneous.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠIndeed,	 ﾠeither	 ﾠcondition	 ﾠ–	 ﾠif	 ﾠindividual	 ﾠendowments	 ﾠ
are	 ﾠassociated	 ﾠwith	 ﾠhaving	 ﾠmore	 ﾠprior	 ﾠadopters	 ﾠin	 ﾠone’s	 ﾠnetwork	 ﾠor	 ﾠwith	 ﾠa	 ﾠhigher	 ﾠsuscept-ﾭ‐
ibility	 ﾠto	 ﾠinfluence	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠas	 ﾠmany	 ﾠpreviously	 ﾠadopting	 ﾠnetwork	 ﾠalters	 ﾠone	 ﾠhas	 ﾠ–	 ﾠwould	 ﾠsuf-ﾭ‐
fice	 ﾠto	 ﾠproduce	 ﾠsurplus	 ﾠinequality.	 ﾠ	 ﾠThe	 ﾠcombination	 ﾠwould	 ﾠboost	 ﾠinequality	 ﾠyet	 ﾠfurther.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
Outside	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠlabor-ﾭ‐markets	 ﾠfield,	 ﾠevidence	 ﾠon	 ﾠdifferential	 ﾠinfluence	 ﾠis	 ﾠscattered,	 ﾠand	 ﾠit	 ﾠis	 ﾠNetwork	 ﾠexternalities	 ﾠand	 ﾠinequality	 ﾠ-ﾭ-ﾭ-ﾭ16-ﾭ-ﾭ-ﾭ	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
difficult	 ﾠto	 ﾠknow	 ﾠwhether	 ﾠresearchers	 ﾠhave	 ﾠtested	 ﾠinteraction	 ﾠmodels	 ﾠbut	 ﾠfailed	 ﾠto	 ﾠreport	 ﾠ
them	 ﾠdue	 ﾠto	 ﾠnegative	 ﾠfindings,	 ﾠor	 ﾠwhether	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠmodels	 ﾠare	 ﾠrarely	 ﾠincluded	 ﾠin	 ﾠanalyses.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠIn	 ﾠ
any	 ﾠevent,	 ﾠfurther	 ﾠstudy	 ﾠis	 ﾠwarranted.	 ﾠ
Direct	 ﾠModels	 ﾠof	 ﾠand	 ﾠEvidence	 ﾠon	 ﾠNetwork	 ﾠEffects	 ﾠon	 ﾠIntergroup	 ﾠInequality	 ﾠ
Thus	 ﾠfar	 ﾠwe	 ﾠhave	 ﾠexamined	 ﾠresearch	 ﾠthat	 ﾠbears	 ﾠindirectly	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcontribution	 ﾠof	 ﾠnetworks	 ﾠ
to	 ﾠinequality	 ﾠin	 ﾠaccess	 ﾠto	 ﾠor	 ﾠadoption	 ﾠof	 ﾠpractices	 ﾠthat	 ﾠpositively	 ﾠaffect	 ﾠone’s	 ﾠlife	 ﾠchances.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
In	 ﾠthis	 ﾠsection	 ﾠwe	 ﾠdiscuss	 ﾠa	 ﾠfew	 ﾠstudies	 ﾠthat	 ﾠeither	 ﾠmodel	 ﾠthis	 ﾠprocess	 ﾠor	 ﾠpresent	 ﾠevidence	 ﾠ
about	 ﾠchanging	 ﾠinequality	 ﾠdirectly.	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ We	 ﾠbegin	 ﾠwith	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmodels,	 ﾠone	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠearliest	 ﾠof	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠis	 ﾠMontgomery’s	 ﾠ(1991)	 ﾠsoc-ﾭ‐
ial-ﾭ‐learning	 ﾠmodel	 ﾠof	 ﾠa	 ﾠlabor	 ﾠmarket	 ﾠin	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠemployers	 ﾠmay	 ﾠrecruit	 ﾠworkers	 ﾠthrough	 ﾠre-ﾭ‐
ferrals	 ﾠor	 ﾠthrough	 ﾠwant	 ﾠads,	 ﾠworkers	 ﾠtake	 ﾠjobs	 ﾠthrough	 ﾠreferrals	 ﾠwhen	 ﾠavailable	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
through	 ﾠformal	 ﾠchannels	 ﾠotherwise,	 ﾠemployers	 ﾠwho	 ﾠrecruit	 ﾠthrough	 ﾠreferrals	 ﾠpay	 ﾠbetter	 ﾠ
wages	 ﾠthan	 ﾠthose	 ﾠwho	 ﾠdo	 ﾠnot,	 ﾠand	 ﾠemployers	 ﾠcan	 ﾠobserve	 ﾠthe	 ﾠproductivity	 ﾠof	 ﾠworkers	 ﾠex	 ﾠ
post	 ﾠbut	 ﾠnot	 ﾠex	 ﾠante,	 ﾠand	 ﾠalso	 ﾠassume	 ﾠ(correctly,	 ﾠgiven	 ﾠhomophily	 ﾠbias	 ﾠbuilt	 ﾠinto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmodel)	 ﾠ
that	 ﾠworkers	 ﾠcontacts	 ﾠwill	 ﾠbe	 ﾠsimilar	 ﾠin	 ﾠproductivity.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠMontgomery	 ﾠdemonstrates	 ﾠthat	 ﾠ
wage	 ﾠdifferentials	 ﾠbetween	 ﾠhigh-ﾭ‐ability	 ﾠand	 ﾠlow-ﾭ‐ability	 ﾠworkers	 ﾠexpand	 ﾠover	 ﾠtime.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠAdding	 ﾠ
social	 ﾠcharacteristics	 ﾠthat	 ﾠare	 ﾠuncorrelated	 ﾠwith	 ﾠability	 ﾠbut	 ﾠwith	 ﾠrespect	 ﾠto	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠcontacts	 ﾠ
are	 ﾠalso	 ﾠhomophilous	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmodel,	 ﾠhe	 ﾠdemonstrates	 ﾠthat	 ﾠif	 ﾠemployment	 ﾠrates	 ﾠare	 ﾠlower	 ﾠfor	 ﾠ
members	 ﾠof	 ﾠone	 ﾠgroup	 ﾠ(for	 ﾠexample	 ﾠwomen)	 ﾠat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠstart,	 ﾠwage	 ﾠinequality	 ﾠwill	 ﾠbecome	 ﾠ
greater	 ﾠover	 ﾠtime.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠThis	 ﾠsimple	 ﾠmodel	 ﾠcaptures	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmajor	 ﾠoutlines	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmechanism	 ﾠin	 ﾠ
which	 ﾠwe	 ﾠare	 ﾠinterested	 ﾠand,	 ﾠmoreover,	 ﾠcould	 ﾠbe	 ﾠextended	 ﾠto	 ﾠsituations	 ﾠin	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠemploy-ﾭ‐
ers	 ﾠmake	 ﾠex	 ﾠante	 ﾠassumptions	 ﾠabout	 ﾠclasses	 ﾠof	 ﾠworkers	 ﾠ(for	 ﾠexample,	 ﾠunderestimating	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
productivity	 ﾠof	 ﾠwomen	 ﾠand	 ﾠAfrican-ﾭ‐Americans	 ﾠrelative	 ﾠto	 ﾠmen)	 ﾠat	 ﾠtime	 ﾠ1,	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠwould	 ﾠalso	 ﾠNetwork	 ﾠexternalities	 ﾠand	 ﾠinequality	 ﾠ-ﾭ-ﾭ-ﾭ17-ﾭ-ﾭ-ﾭ	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
yield	 ﾠgreater	 ﾠinequality	 ﾠover	 ﾠtime.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠUsing	 ﾠa	 ﾠmore	 ﾠcomplex	 ﾠmodel	 ﾠthat	 ﾠfocuses	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcon-ﾭ‐
tribution	 ﾠof	 ﾠnetworks	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠquality	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠworker	 ﾠjob	 ﾠmatch,	 ﾠArrow	 ﾠand	 ﾠBorzekowski	 ﾠ
(2004)	 ﾠreach	 ﾠsimilar	 ﾠconclusions.	 ﾠ
Calvó-ﾭ‐Armengol	 ﾠand	 ﾠJackson	 ﾠ(2004)	 ﾠpresent	 ﾠa	 ﾠmore	 ﾠelaborate	 ﾠfinite-ﾭ‐state	 ﾠMarkov	 ﾠ
social-ﾭ‐learning	 ﾠmodel	 ﾠof	 ﾠemployment	 ﾠin	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠexogenously	 ﾠprovided	 ﾠjob	 ﾠinformation	 ﾠis	 ﾠ
passed	 ﾠamong	 ﾠnetwork	 ﾠmembers,	 ﾠwho	 ﾠact	 ﾠupon	 ﾠit	 ﾠto	 ﾠimprove	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠpositions.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠAgents	 ﾠmay	 ﾠ
be	 ﾠ“fired”	 ﾠ(randomly)	 ﾠand	 ﾠdrop	 ﾠout	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠlabor	 ﾠmarket	 ﾠwhen	 ﾠdiscounted	 ﾠexpected	 ﾠfuture	 ﾠ
income	 ﾠfalls	 ﾠbelow	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcost	 ﾠof	 ﾠlabor-ﾭ‐market	 ﾠparticipation.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠEmployed	 ﾠagents	 ﾠwho	 ﾠreceive	 ﾠ
information	 ﾠabout	 ﾠjob	 ﾠopportunities	 ﾠpass	 ﾠit	 ﾠon	 ﾠto	 ﾠagents	 ﾠto	 ﾠwhom	 ﾠthey	 ﾠare	 ﾠtied,	 ﾠwho	 ﾠpass	 ﾠit	 ﾠ
on	 ﾠif	 ﾠalready	 ﾠemployed	 ﾠor	 ﾠtake	 ﾠthe	 ﾠjob	 ﾠif	 ﾠunemployed.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠTherefore,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠgreater	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpercent-ﾭ‐
age	 ﾠof	 ﾠnetwork	 ﾠalters	 ﾠwho	 ﾠare	 ﾠemployed,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠhigher	 ﾠis	 ﾠego’s	 ﾠprobability	 ﾠof	 ﾠlearning	 ﾠabout	 ﾠ
(and	 ﾠtaking)	 ﾠa	 ﾠjob.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠThe	 ﾠauthors	 ﾠreport	 ﾠthat	 ﾠ“small	 ﾠdifferences	 ﾠin	 ﾠinitial	 ﾠconditions	 ﾠcan	 ﾠlead	 ﾠ
to	 ﾠlarge	 ﾠdifferences	 ﾠin	 ﾠdrop-ﾭ‐out	 ﾠrates	 ﾠand	 ﾠsustained	 ﾠdifferences	 ﾠin	 ﾠemployment	 ﾠrates”	 ﾠ
(2004:	 ﾠ247).	 ﾠ	 ﾠThey	 ﾠcontend	 ﾠthat	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠmodel	 ﾠprovides	 ﾠinsight	 ﾠinto	 ﾠlong-ﾭ‐term	 ﾠdifferences	 ﾠin	 ﾠ
labor-ﾭ‐market	 ﾠparticipation	 ﾠby	 ﾠblacks	 ﾠand	 ﾠwhites	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠU.S.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
DiMaggio	 ﾠand	 ﾠGarip	 ﾠ(2011)	 ﾠpresent	 ﾠa	 ﾠmoving-ﾭ‐threshold	 ﾠmodel	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠinfluence	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
network	 ﾠexternalities	 ﾠon	 ﾠInternet	 ﾠadoption,	 ﾠin	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠeach	 ﾠagent	 ﾠhas	 ﾠa	 ﾠreservation	 ﾠprice	 ﾠat	 ﾠ
which	 ﾠit	 ﾠwill	 ﾠsubscribe	 ﾠto	 ﾠhome	 ﾠInternet	 ﾠservice.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠThe	 ﾠreservation	 ﾠprice	 ﾠis	 ﾠa	 ﾠfunction	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
income	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpercentage	 ﾠof	 ﾠnetwork	 ﾠalters	 ﾠwho	 ﾠhave	 ﾠalready	 ﾠadopted.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠInternet	 ﾠprice	 ﾠis	 ﾠa	 ﾠ
declining	 ﾠfunction	 ﾠof	 ﾠadoption	 ﾠlevels.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠAgents	 ﾠwere	 ﾠsampled	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ2002	 ﾠGeneral	 ﾠSocial	 ﾠ
Survey	 ﾠto	 ﾠproduce	 ﾠrealistic	 ﾠdistributions	 ﾠand	 ﾠcovariance	 ﾠof	 ﾠincome,	 ﾠrace,	 ﾠeducational	 ﾠat-ﾭ‐
tainment,	 ﾠand	 ﾠsocial	 ﾠnetwork	 ﾠsize.	 ﾠ	 ﾠAfter	 ﾠeach	 ﾠperiod,	 ﾠeach	 ﾠagent	 ﾠcompares	 ﾠthe	 ﾠprice	 ﾠof	 ﾠIn-ﾭ‐
ternet	 ﾠservice	 ﾠto	 ﾠits	 ﾠreservation	 ﾠprice	 ﾠand	 ﾠadopts	 ﾠor	 ﾠdeclines	 ﾠto	 ﾠadopt.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠAdoption	 ﾠoccurs	 ﾠNetwork	 ﾠexternalities	 ﾠand	 ﾠinequality	 ﾠ-ﾭ-ﾭ-ﾭ18-ﾭ-ﾭ-ﾭ	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
due	 ﾠto	 ﾠa	 ﾠprice	 ﾠdecline	 ﾠto	 ﾠbelow	 ﾠego’s	 ﾠreservation	 ﾠprice,	 ﾠan	 ﾠincrease	 ﾠin	 ﾠego’s	 ﾠreservation	 ﾠ
price	 ﾠdue	 ﾠto	 ﾠadoptions	 ﾠby	 ﾠnetwork	 ﾠalters,	 ﾠor	 ﾠa	 ﾠcombination	 ﾠof	 ﾠboth.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠThe	 ﾠmodel	 ﾠwas	 ﾠrun	 ﾠ
without	 ﾠexternalities	 ﾠ(the	 ﾠimpact	 ﾠof	 ﾠpercentage	 ﾠof	 ﾠadopters	 ﾠin	 ﾠnetwork	 ﾠwas	 ﾠset	 ﾠat	 ﾠ0),	 ﾠwith	 ﾠ
global	 ﾠexternalities	 ﾠ(any	 ﾠadoption	 ﾠaffects	 ﾠall	 ﾠpotential	 ﾠadopters	 ﾠequally),	 ﾠand	 ﾠwith	 ﾠlocal	 ﾠ
externalities	 ﾠ(only	 ﾠone’s	 ﾠnetwork	 ﾠalters’	 ﾠadoptions	 ﾠmatter)	 ﾠand	 ﾠfive	 ﾠlevels	 ﾠof	 ﾠhomophily.10	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ Without	 ﾠexternalities	 ﾠadoption	 ﾠnever	 ﾠtook	 ﾠoff	 ﾠand	 ﾠusage	 ﾠrates	 ﾠincreased	 ﾠminimally.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
Diffusion	 ﾠwith	 ﾠexternalities	 ﾠhewed	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfamiliar	 ﾠsigmoid	 ﾠcurve	 ﾠ(starting	 ﾠslow,	 ﾠaccelerat-ﾭ‐
ing,	 ﾠthen	 ﾠtapering	 ﾠoff).	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠPenetration	 ﾠwas	 ﾠgreatest	 ﾠunder	 ﾠglobal	 ﾠexternalities,	 ﾠwith	 ﾠsimilar	 ﾠ
results	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmodel	 ﾠpositing	 ﾠlocal	 ﾠexternalities	 ﾠwithout	 ﾠhomophily.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠAs	 ﾠhomophily	 ﾠbias	 ﾠ
increased,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdiffusion	 ﾠcurve’s	 ﾠslope	 ﾠsteepened,	 ﾠbut	 ﾠoverall	 ﾠpenetration	 ﾠdeclined	 ﾠand	 ﾠinter-ﾭ‐
group	 ﾠinequality	 ﾠ(by	 ﾠrace,	 ﾠincome	 ﾠlevel,	 ﾠand	 ﾠeducation	 ﾠlevel)	 ﾠincreased	 ﾠmonotonically.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠAn	 ﾠ
advantage	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠthreshold	 ﾠapproach	 ﾠ(Granovetter	 ﾠ1978)	 ﾠis	 ﾠthe	 ﾠease	 ﾠwith	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠdifferent	 ﾠ
mechanisms	 ﾠcan	 ﾠbe	 ﾠmodeled	 ﾠby	 ﾠsimply	 ﾠchanging	 ﾠthe	 ﾠnetwork	 ﾠmeasures	 ﾠand/or	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfunct-ﾭ‐
ional	 ﾠform	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠequation	 ﾠspecifying	 ﾠthe	 ﾠnetwork	 ﾠeffect	 ﾠon	 ﾠreservation	 ﾠprices.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ Such	 ﾠmodels	 ﾠexplicate	 ﾠthe	 ﾠways	 ﾠin	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠnetworks	 ﾠmay	 ﾠaggravate	 ﾠinequality,	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
even	 ﾠsuggest	 ﾠstrongly	 ﾠ(by	 ﾠarticulating	 ﾠinferences	 ﾠbased	 ﾠupon	 ﾠrelatively	 ﾠwell	 ﾠestablished	 ﾠ
findings)	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthey	 ﾠdo	 ﾠso;	 ﾠbut	 ﾠthey	 ﾠcannot	 ﾠprovide	 ﾠdirect	 ﾠevidence	 ﾠof	 ﾠan	 ﾠeffect.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠIndeed,	 ﾠrel-ﾭ‐
atively	 ﾠfew	 ﾠstudies	 ﾠhave	 ﾠyielded	 ﾠdirectly	 ﾠrelevant	 ﾠempirical	 ﾠevidence.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠDiMaggio	 ﾠand	 ﾠGarip	 ﾠ
(2011)	 ﾠproduced	 ﾠwhat	 ﾠmay	 ﾠbe	 ﾠthe	 ﾠonly	 ﾠpublished	 ﾠempirical	 ﾠstudy	 ﾠthat	 ﾠfocuses	 ﾠas	 ﾠits	 ﾠprin-ﾭ‐
	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
10	 ﾠThe	 ﾠmechanism	 ﾠis	 ﾠdescribed	 ﾠas	 ﾠbased	 ﾠon	 ﾠ“network	 ﾠexternalities,”	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠthe	 ﾠauthors	 ﾠdefined	 ﾠbroadly.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
Given	 ﾠour	 ﾠmore	 ﾠrestricted	 ﾠdefinition	 ﾠof	 ﾠexternalities	 ﾠin	 ﾠthis	 ﾠpaper,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠuse	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpercentage	 ﾠrather	 ﾠthan	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
number	 ﾠof	 ﾠadopters	 ﾠin	 ﾠone’s	 ﾠnetwork	 ﾠmay	 ﾠbe	 ﾠconsidered	 ﾠmore	 ﾠappropriate	 ﾠ(for	 ﾠreasons	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠexplained	 ﾠ
below)	 ﾠfor	 ﾠa	 ﾠmodel	 ﾠof	 ﾠnormative	 ﾠinfluence	 ﾠthan	 ﾠof	 ﾠnetwork	 ﾠvalue	 ﾠ(i.e.	 ﾠpure	 ﾠexternalities).	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠAt	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsame	 ﾠtime,	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠrationale	 ﾠfor	 ﾠusing	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpercentage	 ﾠmeasure	 ﾠ–	 ﾠi.e.,	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠvalue	 ﾠof	 ﾠbeing	 ﾠable	 ﾠto	 ﾠcommunicate	 ﾠthrough	 ﾠa	 ﾠ
new	 ﾠchannel	 ﾠwith	 ﾠa	 ﾠgiven	 ﾠcontact	 ﾠwill	 ﾠbe	 ﾠgreater	 ﾠfor	 ﾠpeople	 ﾠwith	 ﾠfew	 ﾠfriends	 ﾠthan	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthose	 ﾠwith	 ﾠmany	 ﾠ–	 ﾠis	 ﾠ
sufficiently	 ﾠpersuasive	 ﾠthat	 ﾠit	 ﾠunderscores	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdifficulty	 ﾠof	 ﾠmatching	 ﾠmeasures	 ﾠto	 ﾠmechanisms.	 ﾠ
	 ﾠNetwork	 ﾠexternalities	 ﾠand	 ﾠinequality	 ﾠ-ﾭ-ﾭ-ﾭ19-ﾭ-ﾭ-ﾭ	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
cipal	 ﾠconcern	 ﾠon	 ﾠchange	 ﾠin	 ﾠinequality	 ﾠas	 ﾠa	 ﾠfunction	 ﾠof	 ﾠnetwork	 ﾠeffects.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠThe	 ﾠauthors	 ﾠstudied	 ﾠ
economically	 ﾠmotivated	 ﾠtemporary	 ﾠmigration	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠ22	 ﾠThai	 ﾠvillages	 ﾠto	 ﾠBangkok	 ﾠand	 ﾠother	 ﾠ
urban	 ﾠcenters	 ﾠbetween	 ﾠ1972	 ﾠand	 ﾠ2000,	 ﾠa	 ﾠperiod	 ﾠduring	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠmigration	 ﾠgrew	 ﾠsub-ﾭ‐
stantially	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠsimilarly	 ﾠlow	 ﾠlevels	 ﾠin	 ﾠall	 ﾠvillages.	 ﾠ	 ﾠAfter	 ﾠidentifying	 ﾠpeer	 ﾠand	 ﾠnetwork	 ﾠeffects	 ﾠ
on	 ﾠmigration,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠauthors	 ﾠdemonstrate	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠvillages	 ﾠwhere	 ﾠhomophily	 ﾠwas	 ﾠgreatest	 ﾠ
diverged	 ﾠmost	 ﾠmarkedly	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠthe	 ﾠgroup	 ﾠmean,	 ﾠexhibiting	 ﾠsignificantly	 ﾠhigher	 ﾠvariance	 ﾠ
(inequality)	 ﾠin	 ﾠ2000	 ﾠmigration	 ﾠrates	 ﾠthan	 ﾠvillages	 ﾠwith	 ﾠless	 ﾠhomophilous	 ﾠnetworks.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠCon-ﾭ‐
sistent	 ﾠwith	 ﾠCalvó-ﾭ‐Armengol	 ﾠand	 ﾠJackson’s	 ﾠemployment	 ﾠmodel,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠanalyses	 ﾠdemonstrate	 ﾠ
that	 ﾠa	 ﾠcombination	 ﾠof	 ﾠnetwork	 ﾠeffects	 ﾠand	 ﾠsocial	 ﾠhomophily	 ﾠcan	 ﾠgenerate	 ﾠinequality	 ﾠeven	 ﾠ
where	 ﾠinitial	 ﾠdifferences	 ﾠare	 ﾠvery	 ﾠmodest.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠIn	 ﾠrelated	 ﾠwork,	 ﾠCurran,	 ﾠGarip,	 ﾠChung	 ﾠ&	 ﾠTan-ﾭ‐
chonlatip	 ﾠ(2005)	 ﾠfound	 ﾠevidence	 ﾠthat	 ﾠdifferences	 ﾠin	 ﾠmigration	 ﾠpropensities	 ﾠbetween	 ﾠmen	 ﾠ
and	 ﾠwomen	 ﾠwere	 ﾠaugmented	 ﾠby	 ﾠlocal	 ﾠnetwork	 ﾠeffects	 ﾠin	 ﾠhomogeneous	 ﾠnetworks.	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ Other	 ﾠrelevant	 ﾠfindings	 ﾠare	 ﾠscattered	 ﾠover	 ﾠseveral	 ﾠliteratures.	 ﾠ	 ﾠGoolsbee	 ﾠand	 ﾠKlenow	 ﾠ
(2002)	 ﾠreport	 ﾠincreasing	 ﾠdivergence	 ﾠ(net	 ﾠmeasurable	 ﾠurban	 ﾠdifferences)	 ﾠin	 ﾠcomputer	 ﾠown-ﾭ‐
ership	 ﾠrates	 ﾠin	 ﾠU.S.	 ﾠcities	 ﾠduring	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ1990s,	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠthey	 ﾠattribute	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠeffect	 ﾠof	 ﾠnetwork	 ﾠex-ﾭ‐
ternalities.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠIn	 ﾠa	 ﾠcross-ﾭ‐national	 ﾠstudy	 ﾠof	 ﾠproduct	 ﾠdiffusion,	 ﾠVan	 ﾠden	 ﾠBulte	 ﾠand	 ﾠStremersch	 ﾠ
(2004)	 ﾠfind	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠrelative	 ﾠimportance	 ﾠof	 ﾠendogenous	 ﾠ(network)	 ﾠeffects	 ﾠon	 ﾠadoption	 ﾠas	 ﾠ
opposed	 ﾠto	 ﾠexogenous	 ﾠeffects	 ﾠ(e.g.,	 ﾠof	 ﾠexternal	 ﾠshocks	 ﾠor	 ﾠmarketing	 ﾠcampaigns)	 ﾠon	 ﾠadoption	 ﾠ
was	 ﾠassociated	 ﾠwith	 ﾠthe	 ﾠextent	 ﾠof	 ﾠsocial	 ﾠinequality	 ﾠ–	 ﾠan	 ﾠintriguing	 ﾠresult	 ﾠconsistent	 ﾠwith	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
notion	 ﾠthat	 ﾠnetworks	 ﾠaggravate	 ﾠinequality	 ﾠbut	 ﾠalso	 ﾠwith	 ﾠthe	 ﾠauthors’	 ﾠinterpretation	 ﾠempha-ﾭ‐
sizing	 ﾠheterogeneity	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpropensity	 ﾠto	 ﾠadopt.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠChristakis	 ﾠand	 ﾠFowler	 ﾠ(2008)	 ﾠreport	 ﾠpol-ﾭ‐
arization	 ﾠof	 ﾠsocial	 ﾠnetworks	 ﾠover	 ﾠtime	 ﾠwith	 ﾠrespect	 ﾠto	 ﾠsmoking	 ﾠcessation.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠShue	 ﾠ(2011),	 ﾠex-ﾭ‐
ploiting	 ﾠrandom	 ﾠassignment	 ﾠof	 ﾠHarvard	 ﾠBusiness	 ﾠSchool	 ﾠ(HBS)	 ﾠstudents	 ﾠto	 ﾠsections	 ﾠto	 ﾠrule	 ﾠNetwork	 ﾠexternalities	 ﾠand	 ﾠinequality	 ﾠ-ﾭ-ﾭ-ﾭ20-ﾭ-ﾭ-ﾭ	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
out	 ﾠselection	 ﾠeffects,	 ﾠreports	 ﾠthat,	 ﾠamong	 ﾠstudents	 ﾠwho	 ﾠgo	 ﾠon	 ﾠto	 ﾠbecome	 ﾠCEOs,	 ﾠpeer	 ﾠeffects	 ﾠ
increase	 ﾠincome	 ﾠvariance	 ﾠby	 ﾠ20	 ﾠto	 ﾠ40	 ﾠpercent	 ﾠ(with	 ﾠvariance	 ﾠincreasing	 ﾠfastest	 ﾠone	 ﾠyear	 ﾠaf-ﾭ‐
ter	 ﾠmajor	 ﾠHBS	 ﾠreunions).	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠDuflo	 ﾠand	 ﾠSaez	 ﾠ(2002)	 ﾠreport	 ﾠgreater	 ﾠthan	 ﾠexpected	 ﾠvariance	 ﾠ
among	 ﾠlibraries	 ﾠin	 ﾠemployee	 ﾠparticipation	 ﾠin	 ﾠretirement	 ﾠsavings	 ﾠplans	 ﾠ(and	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠprovid-ﾭ‐
ers	 ﾠthat	 ﾠparticipants	 ﾠchose),	 ﾠand	 ﾠnote	 ﾠthat	 ﾠdifferences	 ﾠwere	 ﾠeven	 ﾠstronger	 ﾠamong	 ﾠgroups	 ﾠ
defined	 ﾠby	 ﾠage,	 ﾠgender,	 ﾠand	 ﾠorganizational	 ﾠauthority.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠThus	 ﾠmodels	 ﾠand	 ﾠempirical	 ﾠstudies	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
labor	 ﾠmarkets,	 ﾠnew-ﾭ‐product	 ﾠdiffusion,	 ﾠmigration,	 ﾠeconomic	 ﾠbehavior,	 ﾠand	 ﾠhealth-ﾭ‐related	 ﾠ
behavior	 ﾠall	 ﾠsuggest	 ﾠthat	 ﾠnetwork	 ﾠeffects	 ﾠexacerbate	 ﾠinequality	 ﾠwhen	 ﾠgroups	 ﾠvary	 ﾠin	 ﾠinitial	 ﾠ
endowments,	 ﾠand	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthey	 ﾠcan	 ﾠproduce	 ﾠinequality	 ﾠwhen	 ﾠinitial	 ﾠendowment	 ﾠare	 ﾠsimilar.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
*	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ*	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ*	 ﾠ
We	 ﾠbelieve	 ﾠwe	 ﾠhave	 ﾠbuilt	 ﾠa	 ﾠconvincing	 ﾠcase	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthe	 ﾠproposition	 ﾠthat	 ﾠsocial	 ﾠnetworks	 ﾠmay	 ﾠ
exacerbate	 ﾠinequality	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠadoption	 ﾠof	 ﾠbeneficial	 ﾠpractices.	 ﾠ	 ﾠHomophily	 ﾠis	 ﾠubiquitous.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
Empirical	 ﾠevidence	 ﾠsupporting	 ﾠthe	 ﾠimportance	 ﾠof	 ﾠnetwork	 ﾠeffects	 ﾠis	 ﾠwidespread	 ﾠin	 ﾠmany	 ﾠ
research	 ﾠfields.	 ﾠ	 ﾠMoreover,	 ﾠevidence	 ﾠindicates	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠalready	 ﾠadvantaged	 ﾠnot	 ﾠonly	 ﾠbenefit	 ﾠ
directly	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠassociation	 ﾠwith	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠpeers,	 ﾠbut	 ﾠmay,	 ﾠin	 ﾠsome	 ﾠcases,	 ﾠbe	 ﾠmore	 ﾠsusceptible	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
social	 ﾠlearning	 ﾠthan	 ﾠpersons	 ﾠof	 ﾠlower	 ﾠstatus	 ﾠ–	 ﾠso	 ﾠthat	 ﾠpure	 ﾠnetwork	 ﾠeffects	 ﾠare	 ﾠaugmented	 ﾠ
by	 ﾠinteractions	 ﾠbetween	 ﾠnetwork	 ﾠmeasures	 ﾠand	 ﾠindividual	 ﾠendowments.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠFormal	 ﾠmodels	 ﾠ
demonstrate	 ﾠhow	 ﾠthe	 ﾠconcatenation	 ﾠof	 ﾠhomophily	 ﾠand	 ﾠnetwork	 ﾠeffects	 ﾠgenerate	 ﾠintergroup	 ﾠ
inequality	 ﾠover	 ﾠtime,	 ﾠand	 ﾠa	 ﾠlimited	 ﾠempirical	 ﾠliterature	 ﾠis	 ﾠconsistent	 ﾠwith	 ﾠthe	 ﾠresults	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
these	 ﾠmodels.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠWe	 ﾠhope	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠreader	 ﾠagrees	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthis	 ﾠevidence	 ﾠis	 ﾠsufficient	 ﾠto	 ﾠestablish	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠplausibility	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠproposition	 ﾠthat	 ﾠnetwork	 ﾠeffects	 ﾠare	 ﾠa	 ﾠsignificant	 ﾠsource	 ﾠof	 ﾠinter-ﾭ‐
group	 ﾠinequality,	 ﾠand	 ﾠto	 ﾠstimulate	 ﾠresearch	 ﾠinto	 ﾠthat	 ﾠphenomenon.	 ﾠ
	 ﾠNetwork	 ﾠexternalities	 ﾠand	 ﾠinequality	 ﾠ-ﾭ-ﾭ-ﾭ21-ﾭ-ﾭ-ﾭ	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
FOR	 ﾠWHAT	 ﾠPRACTICES	 ﾠDO	 ﾠNETWORKS	 ﾠAGGRAVATE	 ﾠINEQUALITY	 ﾠTHE	 ﾠMOST?	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ
At	 ﾠthis	 ﾠpoint,	 ﾠhowever,	 ﾠwe	 ﾠwish	 ﾠto	 ﾠcomplicate	 ﾠand	 ﾠqualify	 ﾠthis	 ﾠbroader	 ﾠargument,	 ﾠfocusing	 ﾠ
on	 ﾠhow	 ﾠcharacteristics	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpractices	 ﾠavailable	 ﾠfor	 ﾠadoption	 ﾠwill	 ﾠinfluence	 ﾠthe	 ﾠextent	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
which	 ﾠnetwork	 ﾠeffects	 ﾠexacerbate	 ﾠinequality.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
Simple	 ﾠvs.	 ﾠComplex	 ﾠContagion	 ﾠ
We	 ﾠhave	 ﾠalready	 ﾠarticulated	 ﾠseveral	 ﾠscope	 ﾠconditions	 ﾠnecessary	 ﾠfor	 ﾠsocial	 ﾠnetworks	 ﾠto	 ﾠin-ﾭ‐
crease	 ﾠinequality	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmanner	 ﾠproposed:	 ﾠactors	 ﾠmust	 ﾠbe	 ﾠfree	 ﾠ(given	 ﾠadequate	 ﾠresources	 ﾠ
and	 ﾠinformation)	 ﾠto	 ﾠadopt	 ﾠor	 ﾠnot	 ﾠadopt	 ﾠa	 ﾠpractice	 ﾠthat	 ﾠmay	 ﾠhelp	 ﾠthem	 ﾠget	 ﾠahead;	 ﾠadoption	 ﾠ
must	 ﾠbe	 ﾠinfluenced	 ﾠby	 ﾠsocial	 ﾠnetworks;	 ﾠand	 ﾠthose	 ﾠnetworks	 ﾠmust	 ﾠbe	 ﾠcharacterized	 ﾠby	 ﾠho-ﾭ‐
mophily	 ﾠwith	 ﾠrespect	 ﾠto	 ﾠindividual	 ﾠcharacteristics	 ﾠpositively	 ﾠassociated	 ﾠwith	 ﾠadoption,	 ﾠor	 ﾠ
subject	 ﾠto	 ﾠrandom	 ﾠor	 ﾠexogenously	 ﾠdetermined	 ﾠinequalities	 ﾠin	 ﾠinitial	 ﾠadoption	 ﾠrates.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
Here	 ﾠwe	 ﾠsuggest	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthere	 ﾠmay	 ﾠbe	 ﾠa	 ﾠfourth	 ﾠscope	 ﾠcondition	 ﾠ-ﾭ‐-ﾭ‐-ﾭ‐	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠargument	 ﾠ
applies	 ﾠto	 ﾠwhat	 ﾠCentola	 ﾠand	 ﾠMacy	 ﾠ(2007)	 ﾠrefer	 ﾠto	 ﾠas	 ﾠ“complex	 ﾠcontagions”	 ﾠ–	 ﾠcontagions	 ﾠfor	 ﾠ
which	 ﾠadoption	 ﾠis	 ﾠa	 ﾠrelatively	 ﾠhard	 ﾠsell,	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠthat	 ﾠa	 ﾠpotential	 ﾠadopter	 ﾠrequires	 ﾠcontact	 ﾠwith	 ﾠ
multiple	 ﾠprior	 ﾠadopters	 ﾠbefore	 ﾠdeciding	 ﾠto	 ﾠadopt.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠThe	 ﾠauthors	 ﾠcontrast	 ﾠcomplex	 ﾠcontag-ﾭ‐
ions	 ﾠto	 ﾠsimple	 ﾠcontagions,	 ﾠcharacteristic	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠflow	 ﾠof	 ﾠhighly	 ﾠcommunicable	 ﾠdiseases	 ﾠor	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
information,	 ﾠwhere	 ﾠa	 ﾠsingle	 ﾠcontact	 ﾠproduces	 ﾠan	 ﾠeffect.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠSimple	 ﾠcontagions	 ﾠare	 ﾠefficient:	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
you	 ﾠdo	 ﾠnot	 ﾠneed	 ﾠtwo	 ﾠpeople	 ﾠto	 ﾠtell	 ﾠyou	 ﾠthat	 ﾠmilk	 ﾠis	 ﾠon	 ﾠsale	 ﾠat	 ﾠSafeway	 ﾠthis	 ﾠweek	 ﾠto	 ﾠact	 ﾠon	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠinformation.	 ﾠ	 ﾠBy	 ﾠcontrast,	 ﾠcomplex	 ﾠcontagions	 ﾠrequire	 ﾠreinforcement	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠtwo	 ﾠor	 ﾠmore	 ﾠ
trusted	 ﾠassociates.	 ﾠ	 ﾠBefore	 ﾠyou	 ﾠsign	 ﾠup	 ﾠfor	 ﾠan	 ﾠOccupy	 ﾠWall	 ﾠStreet	 ﾠor	 ﾠTea	 ﾠParty	 ﾠrally,	 ﾠor	 ﾠmove	 ﾠ
to	 ﾠanother	 ﾠstate	 ﾠto	 ﾠfind	 ﾠemployment,	 ﾠyou	 ﾠmay	 ﾠrequire	 ﾠencouragement	 ﾠand	 ﾠpersuasion	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠ
several	 ﾠfriends.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠIf	 ﾠwe	 ﾠtranslate	 ﾠCentola	 ﾠand	 ﾠMacy’s	 ﾠtypology	 ﾠof	 ﾠnetwork	 ﾠeffects	 ﾠ(2007:	 ﾠ707-ﾭ‐
08)	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠthree	 ﾠmechanisms	 ﾠnoted	 ﾠat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠbeginning	 ﾠof	 ﾠthis	 ﾠpaper,	 ﾠwe	 ﾠsee	 ﾠthat	 ﾠsimple	 ﾠcon-ﾭ‐Network	 ﾠexternalities	 ﾠand	 ﾠinequality	 ﾠ-ﾭ-ﾭ-ﾭ22-ﾭ-ﾭ-ﾭ	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
tagions	 ﾠare	 ﾠmost	 ﾠlikely	 ﾠto	 ﾠplay	 ﾠa	 ﾠrole	 ﾠin	 ﾠsocial	 ﾠlearning	 ﾠprocesses.	 ﾠ	 ﾠDiffusion	 ﾠdriven	 ﾠby	 ﾠ
externalities	 ﾠis	 ﾠnecessarily	 ﾠcomplex	 ﾠ(I	 ﾠam	 ﾠunlikely	 ﾠto	 ﾠinvest	 ﾠin	 ﾠa	 ﾠcommunication	 ﾠdevice	 ﾠwith	 ﾠ
which	 ﾠI	 ﾠcould	 ﾠcontact	 ﾠonly	 ﾠone	 ﾠfriend),	 ﾠas	 ﾠare	 ﾠprocesses	 ﾠdriven	 ﾠby	 ﾠnormative	 ﾠinfluence	 ﾠ(e.g.,	 ﾠ
most	 ﾠpeople	 ﾠwill	 ﾠneed	 ﾠassurance	 ﾠor	 ﾠpersuasion	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠmultiple	 ﾠcontacts	 ﾠbefore	 ﾠjoining	 ﾠa	 ﾠsect	 ﾠ
or	 ﾠquitting	 ﾠsmoking).	 ﾠ	 ﾠWe	 ﾠexplain	 ﾠwhy	 ﾠwe	 ﾠdoubt	 ﾠthat	 ﾠnetwork	 ﾠeffects	 ﾠin	 ﾠsimple	 ﾠcontagions	 ﾠ
produce	 ﾠsurplus	 ﾠinequality	 ﾠin	 ﾠmore	 ﾠdetail	 ﾠbelow.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠBut	 ﾠthe	 ﾠintuition	 ﾠis	 ﾠthis:	 ﾠ	 ﾠFew	 ﾠpersons’	 ﾠ
networks	 ﾠare	 ﾠentirely	 ﾠsocially	 ﾠhomogenous	 ﾠand	 ﾠalmost	 ﾠeveryone	 ﾠhas	 ﾠa	 ﾠfew	 ﾠcontacts	 ﾠdiffer-ﾭ‐
ent	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠoneself	 ﾠon	 ﾠat	 ﾠleast	 ﾠone	 ﾠor	 ﾠtwo	 ﾠdimensions.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠEven	 ﾠif	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠties	 ﾠare	 ﾠfew,	 ﾠthey	 ﾠcan	 ﾠ
facilitate	 ﾠthe	 ﾠflow	 ﾠof	 ﾠinformation	 ﾠbetween	 ﾠotherwise	 ﾠisolated	 ﾠnetwork	 ﾠneighborhoods,	 ﾠso	 ﾠ
that	 ﾠpractices	 ﾠadopted	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠbasis	 ﾠof	 ﾠa	 ﾠsingle	 ﾠcontact	 ﾠtend	 ﾠto	 ﾠspread	 ﾠbroadly	 ﾠand	 ﾠrapidly.	 ﾠ
What	 ﾠMakes	 ﾠa	 ﾠContagion	 ﾠComplex?	 ﾠ
To	 ﾠput	 ﾠit	 ﾠsomewhat	 ﾠdifferently,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmore	 ﾠcomplex	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcontagion,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠgreater	 ﾠthe	 ﾠextent	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
which	 ﾠnetwork	 ﾠeffects	 ﾠmay	 ﾠproduce	 ﾠsurplus	 ﾠinequality.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠSeveral	 ﾠcharacteristics	 ﾠof	 ﾠa	 ﾠ
practice	 ﾠrender	 ﾠit	 ﾠsubject	 ﾠto	 ﾠcomplex	 ﾠrather	 ﾠthan	 ﾠsimple	 ﾠcontagion.	 ﾠ
Risk	 ﾠand	 ﾠuncertainty.	 ﾠ	 ﾠThe	 ﾠmore	 ﾠpeople	 ﾠdoubt	 ﾠa	 ﾠpractice’s	 ﾠefficacy	 ﾠor	 ﾠface	 ﾠrisk	 ﾠin	 ﾠ
adopting	 ﾠit,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmore	 ﾠreinforcement	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠchoice	 ﾠwill	 ﾠrequire.	 ﾠ	 ﾠFor	 ﾠexample,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpractice	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
international	 ﾠmigration	 ﾠshould	 ﾠspread	 ﾠby	 ﾠcomplex	 ﾠcontagion	 ﾠdue	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠrisks	 ﾠinherent	 ﾠin	 ﾠ
moving	 ﾠto	 ﾠa	 ﾠnew	 ﾠand	 ﾠpotentially	 ﾠdangerous	 ﾠenvironment	 ﾠ(Massey	 ﾠ&	 ﾠEspinosa	 ﾠ1997).	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
Complexity.	 ﾠ	 ﾠPractices	 ﾠalso	 ﾠvary	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠease	 ﾠwith	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠa	 ﾠnovice	 ﾠcan	 ﾠpull	 ﾠthem	 ﾠoff	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠsocial	 ﾠsupport	 ﾠnecessary	 ﾠto	 ﾠdo	 ﾠso	 ﾠcredibly.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠEmploying	 ﾠa	 ﾠpotentially	 ﾠuseful	 ﾠtechnology	 ﾠ
(e.g.,	 ﾠa	 ﾠnew	 ﾠsoftware	 ﾠpackage)	 ﾠmay	 ﾠrequire	 ﾠconcentrated	 ﾠpeer	 ﾠassistance	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠearly	 ﾠstages	 ﾠ
(DiMaggio,	 ﾠHargittai,	 ﾠCeleste	 ﾠ&	 ﾠShafer	 ﾠ2004).	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠOr	 ﾠa	 ﾠpractice	 ﾠmay	 ﾠbe	 ﾠcomplex	 ﾠdue	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsoc-ﾭ
ial	 ﾠskill	 ﾠit	 ﾠrequires:	 ﾠe.g.,	 ﾠcredibly	 ﾠclaiming	 ﾠa	 ﾠnew	 ﾠsocial	 ﾠidentity	 ﾠ(McFarland	 ﾠ&	 ﾠPals	 ﾠ2005).	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠNetwork	 ﾠexternalities	 ﾠand	 ﾠinequality	 ﾠ-ﾭ-ﾭ-ﾭ23-ﾭ-ﾭ-ﾭ	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
Observability.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠStrang	 ﾠand	 ﾠSoule	 ﾠ(1998:	 ﾠ269)	 ﾠcall	 ﾠattention	 ﾠto	 ﾠimportance	 ﾠof	 ﾠobserv-ﾭ‐
ability.	 ﾠ	 ﾠHow	 ﾠeasy	 ﾠis	 ﾠit	 ﾠto	 ﾠtell	 ﾠif	 ﾠa	 ﾠnetwork	 ﾠpeer	 ﾠhas	 ﾠadopted	 ﾠa	 ﾠnew	 ﾠpractice?	 ﾠ	 ﾠHow	 ﾠeffectively	 ﾠ
can	 ﾠone	 ﾠobserve	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpractice	 ﾠin	 ﾠoperation?	 ﾠ	 ﾠTo	 ﾠwhat	 ﾠextent	 ﾠcan	 ﾠone	 ﾠobserve	 ﾠits	 ﾠconsequen-ﾭ‐
ces?	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠConsider,	 ﾠfor	 ﾠexample,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdifference	 ﾠbetween	 ﾠplanting	 ﾠa	 ﾠnew	 ﾠcrop	 ﾠ(relatively	 ﾠobserv-ﾭ‐
able	 ﾠto	 ﾠother	 ﾠmembers	 ﾠof	 ﾠan	 ﾠagricultural	 ﾠcommunity)	 ﾠand	 ﾠusing	 ﾠa	 ﾠnew	 ﾠmethod	 ﾠof	 ﾠbirth	 ﾠcon-ﾭ‐
trol	 ﾠ(relatively	 ﾠunobservable)	 ﾠ(Behrman,	 ﾠKohler	 ﾠ&	 ﾠWatkins	 ﾠ2002).	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠThe	 ﾠlower	 ﾠthe	 ﾠprobab-ﾭ‐
ility	 ﾠthat	 ﾠa	 ﾠgiven	 ﾠpeer	 ﾠwho	 ﾠhas	 ﾠadopted	 ﾠwill	 ﾠreveal	 ﾠ(intentionally	 ﾠor	 ﾠunintentionally)	 ﾠthat	 ﾠ
she	 ﾠor	 ﾠhe	 ﾠhas	 ﾠdone	 ﾠso,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠless	 ﾠlikely	 ﾠa	 ﾠpractice	 ﾠis	 ﾠto	 ﾠspread	 ﾠby	 ﾠsimple	 ﾠcontagion.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ	 ﾠLegitimacy.	 ﾠ	 ﾠRossman	 ﾠ(2011)	 ﾠargues	 ﾠthat	 ﾠa	 ﾠnew	 ﾠpractice	 ﾠthat	 ﾠis	 ﾠan	 ﾠinstance	 ﾠof	 ﾠan	 ﾠ
already	 ﾠaccepted	 ﾠpractice	 ﾠ(e.g.,	 ﾠdownloading	 ﾠa	 ﾠtune	 ﾠin	 ﾠan	 ﾠestablished	 ﾠgenre)	 ﾠspreads	 ﾠby	 ﾠ
simple	 ﾠcontagion,	 ﾠwhereas	 ﾠa	 ﾠpractice	 ﾠthat	 ﾠhas	 ﾠnot	 ﾠyet	 ﾠbeen	 ﾠfully	 ﾠinstitutionalized	 ﾠrequires	 ﾠ
more	 ﾠsubstantial	 ﾠpeer	 ﾠsupport,	 ﾠespecially	 ﾠif	 ﾠadoption	 ﾠis	 ﾠunobservable.	 ﾠ
Sustainability.	 ﾠ	 ﾠPractices	 ﾠalso	 ﾠvary	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠextent	 ﾠto	 ﾠwhich,	 ﾠonce	 ﾠinitiated,	 ﾠthey	 ﾠare	 ﾠ
self-ﾭ‐sustaining,	 ﾠin	 ﾠcontrast	 ﾠto	 ﾠrequiring	 ﾠcontinual	 ﾠpeer	 ﾠsupport.	 ﾠ	 ﾠWhere	 ﾠnetwork	 ﾠexternalit-ﾭ‐
ies	 ﾠdrive	 ﾠadoption	 ﾠ(e.g.,	 ﾠjoining	 ﾠFacebook)	 ﾠor	 ﾠwhere	 ﾠthe	 ﾠkey	 ﾠmechanism	 ﾠis	 ﾠnormative	 ﾠin-ﾭ‐
fluence	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠbehavior	 ﾠis	 ﾠobservable,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpractice	 ﾠrequires	 ﾠon-ﾭ‐going	 ﾠsocial	 ﾠsupport.	 ﾠ	 ﾠBy	 ﾠ
contrast,	 ﾠhaving	 ﾠone’s	 ﾠchildren	 ﾠreceive	 ﾠrequired	 ﾠvaccinations	 ﾠmay	 ﾠbe	 ﾠmore	 ﾠlikely	 ﾠto	 ﾠspread	 ﾠ
by	 ﾠsimple	 ﾠcontagion	 ﾠ(other	 ﾠthings	 ﾠequal),	 ﾠas	 ﾠit	 ﾠis	 ﾠa	 ﾠone-ﾭ‐act	 ﾠthat	 ﾠis	 ﾠnot	 ﾠsubject	 ﾠto	 ﾠsustained	 ﾠ
peer	 ﾠinfluence.	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ To	 ﾠsummarize:	 ﾠ	 ﾠWe	 ﾠexpect	 ﾠnetwork	 ﾠeffects	 ﾠto	 ﾠexacerbate	 ﾠintergroup	 ﾠinequality	 ﾠin	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠdiffusion	 ﾠof	 ﾠa	 ﾠuseful	 ﾠpractice	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠextent	 ﾠto	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠthat	 ﾠpractice	 ﾠis	 ﾠrisky,	 ﾠcomplex,	 ﾠ
difficult	 ﾠto	 ﾠobserve,	 ﾠweakly	 ﾠinstitutionalized,	 ﾠand	 ﾠunsustainable	 ﾠwithout	 ﾠsocial	 ﾠsupport.	 ﾠ
	 ﾠNetwork	 ﾠexternalities	 ﾠand	 ﾠinequality	 ﾠ-ﾭ-ﾭ-ﾭ24-ﾭ-ﾭ-ﾭ	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
A	 ﾠTAXONOMY	 ﾠOF	 ﾠNETWORK	 ﾠEFFECTS	 ﾠ
The	 ﾠprevious	 ﾠsection	 ﾠdistinguished	 ﾠamong	 ﾠtypes	 ﾠof	 ﾠbehaviors,	 ﾠfocusing	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcharacterist-ﾭ‐
ics	 ﾠlikely	 ﾠto	 ﾠfacilitate	 ﾠor	 ﾠimpede	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠspread	 ﾠacross	 ﾠnetwork	 ﾠties.	 ﾠ	 ﾠThis	 ﾠsection	 ﾠfocuses	 ﾠon	 ﾠ
differences	 ﾠamong	 ﾠmechanisms	 ﾠof	 ﾠnetwork	 ﾠinfluence,	 ﾠclassifying	 ﾠmechanisms	 ﾠaccording	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠfunctional	 ﾠforms	 ﾠthat	 ﾠbest	 ﾠdescribe	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmanner	 ﾠin	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠthey	 ﾠshape	 ﾠbehavior.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
The	 ﾠextent	 ﾠto	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠnetwork	 ﾠeffects	 ﾠexacerbate	 ﾠintergroup	 ﾠinequality	 ﾠwill	 ﾠvary,	 ﾠeven	 ﾠ
among	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmost	 ﾠcomplex	 ﾠcontagions,	 ﾠdepending	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmechanisms	 ﾠthrough	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠnet-ﾭ‐
work	 ﾠeffects	 ﾠoperate.11	 ﾠ	 ﾠYet,	 ﾠas	 ﾠDurlauf	 ﾠ&	 ﾠIoannides	 ﾠnote	 ﾠ(2010:458),	 ﾠresearchers	 ﾠoften	 ﾠ
neglect	 ﾠto	 ﾠspecify	 ﾠmechanisms	 ﾠor	 ﾠfail	 ﾠto	 ﾠmatch	 ﾠmeasures	 ﾠand	 ﾠfunctional	 ﾠforms	 ﾠof	 ﾠnetwork	 ﾠ
influence	 ﾠto	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠtheoretical	 ﾠintuitions.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠHere	 ﾠwe	 ﾠdiscuss	 ﾠthe	 ﾠimplications	 ﾠfor	 ﾠmeasurement	 ﾠ
of	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmost	 ﾠimportant	 ﾠmechanisms.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠThe	 ﾠdiscussion	 ﾠis	 ﾠsummarized	 ﾠin	 ﾠTable	 ﾠ1,	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠlists	 ﾠ
three	 ﾠprimary	 ﾠmechanisms	 ﾠand	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠmajor	 ﾠvariations	 ﾠ(including	 ﾠhybrids),	 ﾠand	 ﾠdescribes	 ﾠ
each	 ﾠmechanism’s	 ﾠfingerprint	 ﾠ(a	 ﾠdistinctive	 ﾠfunctional	 ﾠform	 ﾠconnecting	 ﾠnetwork	 ﾠproperties	 ﾠ
to	 ﾠindividual-ﾭ‐level	 ﾠeffects,	 ﾠby	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠit	 ﾠmay	 ﾠbe	 ﾠrecognized	 ﾠempirically).	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ We	 ﾠuse	 ﾠmathematical	 ﾠnotation	 ﾠto	 ﾠclarify	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdifferences	 ﾠamong	 ﾠthe	 ﾠthree	 ﾠkinds	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
network	 ﾠeffects.	 ﾠ	 ﾠFor	 ﾠeach,	 ﾠwe	 ﾠassume	 ﾠthat	 ﾠ 	 ﾠdenotes	 ﾠindividual	 ﾠi’s	 ﾠlatent	 ﾠreservation	 ﾠprice	 ﾠ
for	 ﾠadopting	 ﾠa	 ﾠpractice	 ﾠat	 ﾠtime	 ﾠt12	 ﾠ
(1)	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ i	 ﾠ=	 ﾠ1,…,N	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
11	 ﾠWe	 ﾠdo	 ﾠnot	 ﾠclaim	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthis	 ﾠlist	 ﾠis	 ﾠexhaustive	 ﾠand	 ﾠwe	 ﾠrecognize	 ﾠthat	 ﾠnetworks	 ﾠinduce	 ﾠadoption	 ﾠof	 ﾠmany	 ﾠ
practices	 ﾠthrough	 ﾠmore	 ﾠthan	 ﾠone	 ﾠmechanism.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠTo	 ﾠtake	 ﾠone	 ﾠexample:	 ﾠ	 ﾠHaving	 ﾠmarried	 ﾠfriends	 ﾠmay	 ﾠraise	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
probability	 ﾠof	 ﾠmarriage	 ﾠthrough	 ﾠexternalities	 ﾠ(the	 ﾠvalue	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠnetwork	 ﾠonce	 ﾠone	 ﾠis	 ﾠmarried),	 ﾠsocial	 ﾠlearning	 ﾠ
(from	 ﾠone’s	 ﾠfriends	 ﾠexperience	 ﾠor	 ﾠhelp	 ﾠin	 ﾠfinding	 ﾠa	 ﾠspouse),	 ﾠand	 ﾠnormative	 ﾠinfluence	 ﾠ(social	 ﾠpressure).	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠOr	 ﾠ
bright	 ﾠand	 ﾠhigh-ﾭ‐status	 ﾠclassmates	 ﾠmay	 ﾠproduce	 ﾠexternalities	 ﾠ(a	 ﾠpeaceful	 ﾠclassroom	 ﾠin	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠthe	 ﾠteacher	 ﾠcan	 ﾠ
spend	 ﾠmore	 ﾠtime	 ﾠon	 ﾠinstruction),	 ﾠinduce	 ﾠsocial	 ﾠlearning	 ﾠ(help	 ﾠin	 ﾠunderstanding	 ﾠnew	 ﾠmaterial),	 ﾠor	 ﾠexert	 ﾠ
normative	 ﾠinfluence	 ﾠ(encouragement	 ﾠto	 ﾠstudy	 ﾠor	 ﾠtake	 ﾠa	 ﾠdifficult	 ﾠcourse).	 ﾠ
12 Researchers	 ﾠoften	 ﾠobserve	 ﾠthe	 ﾠbinary	 ﾠadoption	 ﾠoutcome	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ(equals	 ﾠ1	 ﾠif	 ﾠ 	 ﾠand	 ﾠ0	 ﾠotherwise),	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
model	 ﾠit	 ﾠwith	 ﾠa	 ﾠlogit	 ﾠor	 ﾠprobit	 ﾠspecification	 ﾠto	 ﾠestimate	 ﾠnetwork	 ﾠeffects.	 ﾠManski	 ﾠ(1993)	 ﾠnotes	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
identification	 ﾠproblems	 ﾠin	 ﾠthis	 ﾠstrategy. Network	 ﾠexternalities	 ﾠand	 ﾠinequality	 ﾠ-ﾭ-ﾭ-ﾭ25-ﾭ-ﾭ-ﾭ	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
where	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ	 ﾠdenotes	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcontribution	 ﾠof	 ﾠindividual	 ﾠcharacteristics	 ﾠrelated	 ﾠto	 ﾠadoption,	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
	 ﾠis	 ﾠthe	 ﾠerror	 ﾠterm	 ﾠknown	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠindividual	 ﾠbut	 ﾠunobserved	 ﾠby	 ﾠthe	 ﾠresearcher.	 ﾠ 	 ﾠis	 ﾠa	 ﾠbin-ﾭ‐
ary	 ﾠvector	 ﾠof	 ﾠadoption	 ﾠoutcomes	 ﾠof	 ﾠall	 ﾠindividuals	 ﾠat	 ﾠtime	 ﾠt	 ﾠ(where	 ﾠeach	 ﾠentry	 ﾠis	 ﾠa	 ﾠfunction	 ﾠ
of	 ﾠcorresponding	 ﾠindividual’s	 ﾠlatent	 ﾠreservation	 ﾠprice	 ﾠ )	 ﾠand	 ﾠ 	 ﾠis	 ﾠa	 ﾠvector	 ﾠthat	 ﾠindicates	 ﾠ
individual	 ﾠi’s	 ﾠnetwork	 ﾠties	 ﾠat	 ﾠtime	 ﾠt,	 ﾠwhere	 ﾠnon-ﾭ‐existing	 ﾠties	 ﾠare	 ﾠrepresented	 ﾠwith	 ﾠa	 ﾠzero	 ﾠ
entry.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
_________________________________________________________________________________________________________	 ﾠ
Table	 ﾠ1	 ﾠabout	 ﾠhere	 ﾠ
_________________________________________________________________________________________________________	 ﾠ
Network	 ﾠExternalities	 ﾠ
Network	 ﾠexternalities	 ﾠexist	 ﾠwhen	 ﾠthe	 ﾠvalue	 ﾠof	 ﾠa	 ﾠpractice	 ﾠincreases	 ﾠas	 ﾠa	 ﾠfunction	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
number	 ﾠof	 ﾠprior	 ﾠadopters.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠThis	 ﾠfeature	 ﾠ–	 ﾠthe	 ﾠtendency	 ﾠfor	 ﾠeach	 ﾠadditional	 ﾠadopter	 ﾠto	 ﾠadd	 ﾠ
value	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠnetwork	 ﾠand	 ﾠthus	 ﾠincrease	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsize	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠnetwork	 ﾠeffect	 ﾠ-ﾭ‐-ﾭ‐	 ﾠis	 ﾠits	 ﾠfingerprint.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠOf	 ﾠ
interest	 ﾠhere	 ﾠare	 ﾠlocal	 ﾠnetwork	 ﾠexternalities:	 ﾠcases	 ﾠin	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠthe	 ﾠrelevant	 ﾠadopters	 ﾠare	 ﾠthose	 ﾠ
to	 ﾠwhom	 ﾠego	 ﾠis	 ﾠdirectly	 ﾠtied,	 ﾠas	 ﾠis	 ﾠtypical	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcase	 ﾠof	 ﾠcommunications	 ﾠtechnologies.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
Network-ﾭ‐externality	 ﾠeffects	 ﾠmay	 ﾠbe	 ﾠ(a)	 ﾠa	 ﾠlinear	 ﾠfunction	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠnumber	 ﾠof	 ﾠpeers	 ﾠwho	 ﾠ
have	 ﾠadopted	 ﾠpreviously	 ﾠ(e.g.,	 ﾠin	 ﾠcertain	 ﾠforms	 ﾠof	 ﾠvoluntary	 ﾠlabor-ﾭ‐pooling	 ﾠlike	 ﾠfood	 ﾠco-ﾭ‐ops);	 ﾠ
(b)	 ﾠa	 ﾠlogarithmic	 ﾠfunction	 ﾠ(if	 ﾠeach	 ﾠadditional	 ﾠpeer	 ﾠover	 ﾠa	 ﾠcertain	 ﾠnumber	 ﾠprovides	 ﾠless	 ﾠ
incremental	 ﾠvalue	 ﾠthan	 ﾠthe	 ﾠlast),	 ﾠprobably	 ﾠcharacteristic	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠvalue	 ﾠof	 ﾠcommunications	 ﾠ
technologies	 ﾠto	 ﾠindividual	 ﾠusers;	 ﾠor	 ﾠ(c)	 ﾠan	 ﾠexponential	 ﾠfunction	 ﾠ(if	 ﾠthe	 ﾠvalue	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠnetwork	 ﾠ
lies	 ﾠnot	 ﾠonly	 ﾠin	 ﾠego’s	 ﾠaccess	 ﾠto	 ﾠeach	 ﾠpeer,	 ﾠbut	 ﾠin	 ﾠego’s	 ﾠaccess	 ﾠto	 ﾠinteractions	 ﾠamong	 ﾠego’s	 ﾠ
peers),	 ﾠtypical	 ﾠof	 ﾠuser	 ﾠcommunities	 ﾠand	 ﾠsuccessful	 ﾠonline	 ﾠsocial	 ﾠnetworks	 ﾠ(e.g.,	 ﾠFacebook,	 ﾠ
for	 ﾠits	 ﾠdevotees).	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠGiven	 ﾠcompeting	 ﾠtechnologies,	 ﾠeach	 ﾠsubject	 ﾠto	 ﾠnetwork	 ﾠexternalities	 ﾠNetwork	 ﾠexternalities	 ﾠand	 ﾠinequality	 ﾠ-ﾭ-ﾭ-ﾭ26-ﾭ-ﾭ-ﾭ	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
(e.g.,	 ﾠWindows	 ﾠvs.	 ﾠMac	 ﾠOS,	 ﾠor	 ﾠExcel	 ﾠvs.	 ﾠLotus	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ1980s),	 ﾠone	 ﾠalso	 ﾠmay	 ﾠobserve	 ﾠa	 ﾠmixed	 ﾠ
mechanism	 ﾠ(part	 ﾠexternalities,	 ﾠpart	 ﾠnormative	 ﾠinfluence)	 ﾠ(Brynjolfssen	 ﾠ&	 ﾠKemerer	 ﾠ1996).	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
When	 ﾠobservation	 ﾠis	 ﾠdifficult,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠnumber	 ﾠor	 ﾠpercentage	 ﾠof	 ﾠadopters	 ﾠshould	 ﾠbe	 ﾠmultiplied	 ﾠ
by	 ﾠthe	 ﾠprobability	 ﾠthat	 ﾠego	 ﾠwill	 ﾠbe	 ﾠaware	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠadoption	 ﾠstatus	 ﾠof	 ﾠa	 ﾠnetwork	 ﾠtie.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠNote	 ﾠthat	 ﾠ
because	 ﾠthe	 ﾠvalue	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠnetwork	 ﾠis	 ﾠa	 ﾠfunction	 ﾠof	 ﾠits	 ﾠsize,	 ﾠnetwork	 ﾠinfluences	 ﾠare	 ﾠongoing	 ﾠ
and	 ﾠdefections	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠa	 ﾠnetwork	 ﾠreduce	 ﾠits	 ﾠoverall	 ﾠvalue.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠUnder	 ﾠthese	 ﾠconditions,	 ﾠmembers	 ﾠ
of	 ﾠgroups	 ﾠleast	 ﾠlikely	 ﾠto	 ﾠadopt	 ﾠa	 ﾠpractice	 ﾠare	 ﾠalso	 ﾠdisproportionately	 ﾠprone	 ﾠto	 ﾠabandon	 ﾠit.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
To	 ﾠmodel	 ﾠlocal	 ﾠexternalities,	 ﾠ 	 ﾠentries	 ﾠ(in	 ﾠEq.	 ﾠ1	 ﾠabove)	 ﾠmay	 ﾠbe	 ﾠnormalized	 ﾠby	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
total	 ﾠnetwork	 ﾠsize	 ﾠor	 ﾠmay	 ﾠbe	 ﾠweighted	 ﾠby	 ﾠnetwork	 ﾠproximity	 ﾠ(e.g.,	 ﾠto	 ﾠreflect	 ﾠthe	 ﾠprobability	 ﾠ
of	 ﾠobserving	 ﾠthe	 ﾠadoption	 ﾠoutcome	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcorresponding	 ﾠalter).	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠIn	 ﾠthe	 ﾠformer	 ﾠcase,	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ
would	 ﾠequal	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpercentage	 ﾠof	 ﾠadopters;	 ﾠand	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠlatter,	 ﾠa	 ﾠweighted	 ﾠsum	 ﾠof	 ﾠobserved	 ﾠad-ﾭ‐
opters	 ﾠin	 ﾠan	 ﾠindividual’s	 ﾠnetwork.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠFinally,	 ﾠf(	 ﾠ)	 ﾠcan	 ﾠbe	 ﾠa	 ﾠlinear,	 ﾠlogarithmic	 ﾠor	 ﾠexponential	 ﾠ
function	 ﾠrelating	 ﾠthe	 ﾠtotal	 ﾠnumber	 ﾠor	 ﾠpercentage	 ﾠof	 ﾠall	 ﾠor	 ﾠobserved	 ﾠadopters	 ﾠin	 ﾠan	 ﾠindivid-ﾭ‐
ual’s	 ﾠnetwork	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠindividual’s	 ﾠreservation	 ﾠprice.13	 ﾠ(See	 ﾠBrock	 ﾠand	 ﾠDurlauf	 ﾠ(2001)	 ﾠfor	 ﾠa	 ﾠ
similar	 ﾠformulation.)	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
Social	 ﾠLearning	 ﾠ
In	 ﾠsocial	 ﾠlearning,	 ﾠadoption	 ﾠoccurs	 ﾠwhen	 ﾠego	 ﾠbecomes	 ﾠaware	 ﾠof	 ﾠa	 ﾠbehavioral	 ﾠoption	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
convinced	 ﾠthat	 ﾠit	 ﾠis	 ﾠefficacious	 ﾠand	 ﾠentails	 ﾠan	 ﾠacceptable	 ﾠlevel	 ﾠof	 ﾠrisk.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠBecause	 ﾠat	 ﾠsome	 ﾠ
point	 ﾠone	 ﾠhas	 ﾠlearned	 ﾠenough	 ﾠto	 ﾠmake	 ﾠa	 ﾠdecision	 ﾠ(or	 ﾠhas	 ﾠenough	 ﾠsocial	 ﾠsupport	 ﾠto	 ﾠsustain	 ﾠ
it),	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfingerprint	 ﾠof	 ﾠsocial-ﾭ‐learning	 ﾠprocesses	 ﾠis	 ﾠthe	 ﾠexistence	 ﾠof	 ﾠstep	 ﾠfunctions	 ﾠor	 ﾠthresh-ﾭ‐
	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
13 DiMaggio and Garip (2011) use a similar model, but allow the individual characteristics and 
network effects to interact. We opt for a simpler model here for the sake of demonstration. We also focus 
on contemporaneous network effects, but a more general model could incorporate lagged effects as well. Network	 ﾠexternalities	 ﾠand	 ﾠinequality	 ﾠ-ﾭ-ﾭ-ﾭ27-ﾭ-ﾭ-ﾭ	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
olds	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠrelationship	 ﾠbetween	 ﾠthe	 ﾠnumber	 ﾠof	 ﾠpeers	 ﾠwho	 ﾠhave	 ﾠadopted	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠstrength	 ﾠ
of	 ﾠthe	 ﾠnetwork	 ﾠeffect.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
When	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpayoff	 ﾠof	 ﾠa	 ﾠcourse	 ﾠof	 ﾠaction	 ﾠis	 ﾠobvious,	 ﾠas	 ﾠin	 ﾠinstances	 ﾠof	 ﾠsimple	 ﾠcontagion,	 ﾠ
social	 ﾠlearning	 ﾠmay	 ﾠbe	 ﾠbased	 ﾠon	 ﾠa	 ﾠsingle	 ﾠcontact	 ﾠ(so	 ﾠthat	 ﾠnetwork	 ﾠeffects	 ﾠcan	 ﾠbe	 ﾠexpressed	 ﾠ
as	 ﾠthe	 ﾠprobability	 ﾠthat	 ﾠat	 ﾠleast	 ﾠone	 ﾠnetwork	 ﾠtie	 ﾠwill	 ﾠprovide	 ﾠinformation).	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠWe	 ﾠsuspect,	 ﾠ
however,	 ﾠthat	 ﾠmost	 ﾠsocial	 ﾠlearning,	 ﾠat	 ﾠleast	 ﾠof	 ﾠpractices	 ﾠthat	 ﾠare	 ﾠconsequential	 ﾠfor	 ﾠan	 ﾠactor’s	 ﾠ
welfare,	 ﾠrequires	 ﾠinformation	 ﾠthat	 ﾠis	 ﾠthick	 ﾠwith	 ﾠdetail	 ﾠand	 ﾠvalidated	 ﾠby	 ﾠmore	 ﾠthan	 ﾠone	 ﾠtie	 ﾠ
(i.e.,	 ﾠas	 ﾠin	 ﾠcomplex	 ﾠcontagions).	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠThus	 ﾠsomeone	 ﾠsearching	 ﾠfor	 ﾠa	 ﾠcancer	 ﾠspecialist	 ﾠor	 ﾠconsid-ﾭ‐
ering	 ﾠwhether	 ﾠto	 ﾠpurchase	 ﾠan	 ﾠelectric	 ﾠcar	 ﾠis	 ﾠlikely,	 ﾠif	 ﾠshe	 ﾠor	 ﾠhe	 ﾠcan,	 ﾠto	 ﾠdiscuss	 ﾠthe	 ﾠoptions	 ﾠ
with	 ﾠseveral	 ﾠexperienced	 ﾠpeers	 ﾠbefore	 ﾠmaking	 ﾠa	 ﾠdecision.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠIn	 ﾠthis	 ﾠinstance,	 ﾠthen,	 ﾠaction	 ﾠis	 ﾠ
likely	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠtriggered	 ﾠwhen	 ﾠthe	 ﾠn	 ﾠof	 ﾠnetwork	 ﾠmembers	 ﾠwho	 ﾠhave	 ﾠalready	 ﾠadopted	 ﾠa	 ﾠpractice	 ﾠ
(who	 ﾠhave	 ﾠused	 ﾠa	 ﾠgiven	 ﾠdoctor	 ﾠor	 ﾠwho	 ﾠown	 ﾠa	 ﾠPrius),	 ﾠor	 ﾠwho	 ﾠhave	 ﾠin	 ﾠsome	 ﾠother	 ﾠway	 ﾠ
learned	 ﾠenough	 ﾠto	 ﾠprovide	 ﾠrich	 ﾠinformation	 ﾠto	 ﾠego	 ﾠ(who	 ﾠhave	 ﾠhad	 ﾠto	 ﾠfind	 ﾠa	 ﾠmedical	 ﾠspec-ﾭ‐
ialist	 ﾠfor	 ﾠa	 ﾠloved	 ﾠone,	 ﾠor	 ﾠwho	 ﾠwork	 ﾠin	 ﾠautomotive	 ﾠengineering)	 ﾠhas	 ﾠreached	 ﾠa	 ﾠthreshold	 ﾠthat	 ﾠ
exceeds	 ﾠunity.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠThis	 ﾠis	 ﾠalso	 ﾠlikely	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcase	 ﾠwhere	 ﾠsuccessful	 ﾠadoption	 ﾠof	 ﾠa	 ﾠpractice	 ﾠ
(e.g.,	 ﾠusing	 ﾠa	 ﾠnew	 ﾠform	 ﾠof	 ﾠbirth	 ﾠcontrol	 ﾠor	 ﾠbecoming	 ﾠa	 ﾠnew	 ﾠparent)	 ﾠrequires	 ﾠnot	 ﾠonly	 ﾠadvice	 ﾠ
but	 ﾠalso	 ﾠsupport	 ﾠduring	 ﾠthe	 ﾠadoption	 ﾠpractice	 ﾠitself.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠFinally,	 ﾠin	 ﾠsome	 ﾠinstances,	 ﾠwhere	 ﾠad-ﾭ‐
option	 ﾠentails	 ﾠa	 ﾠcommitment	 ﾠto	 ﾠa	 ﾠnew	 ﾠpractice	 ﾠthat	 ﾠposes	 ﾠrecurrent	 ﾠchallenges	 ﾠ(e.g.,	 ﾠmigrat-ﾭ‐
ing	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠfarm	 ﾠto	 ﾠcity	 ﾠfor	 ﾠwork	 ﾠor	 ﾠseeking	 ﾠa	 ﾠprofessional	 ﾠdegree),	 ﾠnetwork	 ﾠeffects	 ﾠare	 ﾠlikely	 ﾠ
to	 ﾠbe	 ﾠcontinual	 ﾠand	 ﾠefficacious	 ﾠas	 ﾠsome	 ﾠfunction	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠtotal	 ﾠsize	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠrelevant	 ﾠnetwork,	 ﾠ
often	 ﾠdeclining	 ﾠin	 ﾠslope	 ﾠas	 ﾠthe	 ﾠnetwork	 ﾠgrows	 ﾠlarger.	 ﾠ	 ﾠIn	 ﾠthis	 ﾠsense,	 ﾠongoing	 ﾠforms	 ﾠof	 ﾠsocial	 ﾠNetwork	 ﾠexternalities	 ﾠand	 ﾠinequality	 ﾠ-ﾭ-ﾭ-ﾭ28-ﾭ-ﾭ-ﾭ	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
learning	 ﾠrelated	 ﾠto	 ﾠsignificant	 ﾠlife	 ﾠtransitions	 ﾠmay	 ﾠbe	 ﾠanalytically	 ﾠdifficult	 ﾠto	 ﾠdistinguish	 ﾠ
from	 ﾠpure	 ﾠnetwork	 ﾠexternalities.14	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
For	 ﾠpurposes	 ﾠof	 ﾠmodeling	 ﾠsocial	 ﾠlearning,	 ﾠ	 ﾠf(	 ﾠ)	 ﾠis	 ﾠa	 ﾠstep	 ﾠfunction	 ﾠthat	 ﾠobtains	 ﾠa	 ﾠpos-ﾭ‐
itive	 ﾠvalue	 ﾠif	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ(capturing	 ﾠthe	 ﾠtotal	 ﾠnumber	 ﾠor	 ﾠpercentage	 ﾠof	 ﾠall	 ﾠor	 ﾠobserved	 ﾠadopters,	 ﾠ
as	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠnetwork	 ﾠexternalities	 ﾠcase)	 ﾠexceeds	 ﾠa	 ﾠspecified	 ﾠthreshold,	 ﾠTi,	 ﾠfor	 ﾠindividual	 ﾠi.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
Normative	 ﾠInfluence	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ
A	 ﾠthird	 ﾠclass	 ﾠof	 ﾠmechanisms,	 ﾠnormative	 ﾠinfluence,	 ﾠworks	 ﾠnot	 ﾠby	 ﾠaffecting	 ﾠa	 ﾠpractice’s	 ﾠvalue	 ﾠ
directly,	 ﾠor	 ﾠby	 ﾠproviding	 ﾠinformation	 ﾠor	 ﾠassistance,	 ﾠbut	 ﾠthrough	 ﾠthe	 ﾠapplication	 ﾠof	 ﾠpositive	 ﾠ
and	 ﾠnegative	 ﾠsanctions	 ﾠupon	 ﾠnetwork	 ﾠmembers.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠLike	 ﾠpure	 ﾠexternalities,	 ﾠnormative	 ﾠ
influence	 ﾠgenerates	 ﾠcomplex	 ﾠcontagions	 ﾠ(it	 ﾠrequires	 ﾠthe	 ﾠengagement	 ﾠof	 ﾠnumerous	 ﾠnetwork	 ﾠ
alters)	 ﾠand	 ﾠentails	 ﾠongoing	 ﾠeffects.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠUnlike	 ﾠpure	 ﾠexternalities,	 ﾠhowever,	 ﾠnormative	 ﾠinfluence	 ﾠ
is	 ﾠa	 ﾠfunction	 ﾠof	 ﾠboth	 ﾠpeer	 ﾠsupport	 ﾠfor	 ﾠa	 ﾠcourse	 ﾠof	 ﾠaction	 ﾠand	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdensity	 ﾠof	 ﾠties	 ﾠamong	 ﾠ
those	 ﾠpeers	 ﾠ(on	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠability	 ﾠto	 ﾠexert	 ﾠinfluence	 ﾠon	 ﾠego	 ﾠis	 ﾠin	 ﾠpart	 ﾠconditional).	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠThe	 ﾠ
relevance	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠego	 ﾠnetwork’s	 ﾠinternal	 ﾠstructure	 ﾠis	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfingerprint	 ﾠof	 ﾠnormative	 ﾠinfluence	 ﾠ
processes	 ﾠ(Haynie	 ﾠ2001;	 ﾠKohler,	 ﾠBehrman	 ﾠ&	 ﾠWatkins	 ﾠ2001).	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
We	 ﾠdistinguish	 ﾠhere	 ﾠbetween	 ﾠtwo	 ﾠtypes	 ﾠof	 ﾠnormative	 ﾠinfluence.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠIn	 ﾠboth,	 ﾠat	 ﾠleast	 ﾠ
some	 ﾠof	 ﾠego’s	 ﾠnetwork	 ﾠalters	 ﾠattempt	 ﾠto	 ﾠinduce	 ﾠego	 ﾠto	 ﾠadopt	 ﾠa	 ﾠnew	 ﾠbehavior	 ﾠby	 ﾠproviding	 ﾠ
approval	 ﾠfor	 ﾠactions	 ﾠconsonant	 ﾠwith	 ﾠthe	 ﾠbehavior	 ﾠand	 ﾠnegatively	 ﾠsanctioning	 ﾠinconsistent	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
14	 ﾠCertain	 ﾠforms	 ﾠof	 ﾠmatching	 ﾠprocesses	 ﾠ(Granovetter	 ﾠ1974)	 ﾠcan	 ﾠbe	 ﾠtreated	 ﾠas	 ﾠforms	 ﾠof	 ﾠsocial	 ﾠlearning,	 ﾠ
albeit	 ﾠones	 ﾠin	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpayoff	 ﾠ(a	 ﾠjob	 ﾠplacement)	 ﾠis	 ﾠthe	 ﾠproduct	 ﾠof	 ﾠa	 ﾠbilateral	 ﾠchoice	 ﾠprocess.	 ﾠ	 ﾠIn	 ﾠsimple	 ﾠ
information	 ﾠsharing	 ﾠin	 ﾠjob-ﾭ‐referral	 ﾠnetworks,	 ﾠego	 ﾠpasses	 ﾠinformation	 ﾠabout	 ﾠan	 ﾠopportunity	 ﾠto	 ﾠa	 ﾠcontact,	 ﾠwho	 ﾠ
may	 ﾠuse	 ﾠit,	 ﾠdrop	 ﾠit,	 ﾠor	 ﾠpass	 ﾠit	 ﾠon	 ﾠ(Boorman	 ﾠand	 ﾠLevitt	 ﾠ1982).	 ﾠ	 ﾠIn	 ﾠthis	 ﾠcase,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠstrength	 ﾠof	 ﾠnetwork	 ﾠeffects	 ﾠmay	 ﾠ
approximate	 ﾠa	 ﾠfunction	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠnumber	 ﾠof	 ﾠpersons	 ﾠin	 ﾠego’s	 ﾠnetwork,	 ﾠadjusted	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthe	 ﾠprobability	 ﾠthat	 ﾠeach	 ﾠwill	 ﾠ
have	 ﾠuseful	 ﾠinformation,	 ﾠitself	 ﾠa	 ﾠfunction	 ﾠof	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠposition	 ﾠin	 ﾠbroader	 ﾠsocial	 ﾠnetworks.	 ﾠ	 ﾠIn	 ﾠgeneral,	 ﾠalters	 ﾠwho	 ﾠ
are	 ﾠhigher-ﾭ‐status	 ﾠthan	 ﾠego	 ﾠprovide	 ﾠbetter	 ﾠleads	 ﾠ(Lin,	 ﾠEnsel	 ﾠ&	 ﾠVaughn	 ﾠ1981).	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠIn	 ﾠsome	 ﾠcases,	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠa	 ﾠprocess	 ﾠ
can	 ﾠoccur	 ﾠso	 ﾠfrictionlessly	 ﾠas	 ﾠto	 ﾠrepresent	 ﾠa	 ﾠform	 ﾠof	 ﾠsimple	 ﾠcontagion.	 ﾠ	 ﾠBy	 ﾠcontrast,	 ﾠmatching	 ﾠprocesses	 ﾠthat	 ﾠ
require	 ﾠactive	 ﾠbrokerage	 ﾠ(e.g.,	 ﾠvouching	 ﾠfor	 ﾠa	 ﾠjob	 ﾠcandidate	 ﾠor	 ﾠsetting	 ﾠup	 ﾠa	 ﾠblind	 ﾠdate)	 ﾠrepresent	 ﾠa	 ﾠmore	 ﾠ
distinct	 ﾠmechanism.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠNetwork	 ﾠexternalities	 ﾠand	 ﾠinequality	 ﾠ-ﾭ-ﾭ-ﾭ29-ﾭ-ﾭ-ﾭ	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
behavior.15	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠBut	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfirst	 ﾠtype,	 ﾠego’s	 ﾠalters	 ﾠare	 ﾠdivided	 ﾠbetween	 ﾠthose	 ﾠattempting	 ﾠto	 ﾠin-ﾭ‐
duce	 ﾠgenerally	 ﾠapproved	 ﾠbehavior	 ﾠ(e.g.	 ﾠsmoking	 ﾠcessation	 ﾠor	 ﾠdieting)	 ﾠand	 ﾠthose	 ﾠwho	 ﾠare	 ﾠ
indifferent	 ﾠbut	 ﾠnot	 ﾠhostile.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠObservation	 ﾠof	 ﾠfriends’	 ﾠbehavior	 ﾠmay	 ﾠalso	 ﾠserve	 ﾠto	 ﾠproduce	 ﾠa	 ﾠ
plausibility	 ﾠstructure	 ﾠ(Berger	 ﾠand	 ﾠLuckman	 ﾠ1966)	 ﾠfor	 ﾠbehaviors	 ﾠthat	 ﾠmight	 ﾠotherwise	 ﾠseem	 ﾠ
illegitimate	 ﾠor	 ﾠdifficult	 ﾠto	 ﾠimagine	 ﾠ(e.g.,	 ﾠdivorce	 ﾠ[McDermott,	 ﾠFowler	 ﾠ&	 ﾠChristakis	 ﾠ2009]).16	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
In	 ﾠeither	 ﾠcase	 ﾠ-ﾭ‐–	 ﾠpersuasion	 ﾠor	 ﾠlegitimacy-ﾭ‐through-ﾭ‐observation	 ﾠ-ﾭ‐-ﾭ‐	 ﾠadoption	 ﾠoccurs	 ﾠwhen	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
group	 ﾠof	 ﾠalters	 ﾠsupporting	 ﾠor	 ﾠmodeling	 ﾠchange	 ﾠreaches	 ﾠa	 ﾠcritical	 ﾠmass	 ﾠ(Marwell	 ﾠand	 ﾠOliver	 ﾠ
1993)	 ﾠsufficient	 ﾠto	 ﾠinduce	 ﾠchange.	 ﾠ	 ﾠBy	 ﾠcontrast,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsecond	 ﾠtype	 ﾠof	 ﾠnormative	 ﾠinfluence	 ﾠen-ﾭ‐
tails	 ﾠstruggle	 ﾠbetween	 ﾠtwo	 ﾠsets	 ﾠof	 ﾠopposing	 ﾠnetwork	 ﾠalters,	 ﾠeach	 ﾠapplying	 ﾠpositive	 ﾠand	 ﾠneg-ﾭ‐
ative	 ﾠsanctions	 ﾠto	 ﾠsway	 ﾠego	 ﾠto	 ﾠits	 ﾠside	 ﾠ(e.g.,	 ﾠpolitical	 ﾠpartisans).	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠIn	 ﾠthe	 ﾠformer	 ﾠcase,	 ﾠadopt-ﾭ‐
ion	 ﾠoccurs	 ﾠwhen	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpercentage	 ﾠof	 ﾠnetwork	 ﾠpeers	 ﾠsupporting	 ﾠa	 ﾠpractice	 ﾠreaches	 ﾠsome	 ﾠ
critical	 ﾠmass.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠIn	 ﾠthe	 ﾠlatter,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠprobability	 ﾠof	 ﾠadoption	 ﾠof	 ﾠa	 ﾠpractice	 ﾠis	 ﾠa	 ﾠfunction	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
difference	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠproportion	 ﾠof	 ﾠnetwork	 ﾠalters	 ﾠadhering	 ﾠto	 ﾠeach	 ﾠoption.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠIn	 ﾠeach	 ﾠcase,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
relevant	 ﾠpercentages	 ﾠmust	 ﾠbe	 ﾠweighted	 ﾠby	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdensity	 ﾠof	 ﾠties	 ﾠwithin	 ﾠeach	 ﾠgroup,	 ﾠas	 ﾠbetter	 ﾠ
acquainted	 ﾠpeers	 ﾠwill	 ﾠbe	 ﾠbetter	 ﾠable	 ﾠto	 ﾠcoordinate	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠinfluence.17	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
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15	 ﾠSome	 ﾠeconomists	 ﾠcontend	 ﾠthat	 ﾠnetworks	 ﾠexert	 ﾠsocial	 ﾠinfluence	 ﾠbecause	 ﾠindividuals	 ﾠhave	 ﾠa	 ﾠ“taste	 ﾠfor	 ﾠ
conformity”	 ﾠ(Patacchini	 ﾠ&	 ﾠZenou	 ﾠ2011)	 ﾠthat	 ﾠleads	 ﾠthem	 ﾠto	 ﾠmimic	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmajority	 ﾠof	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠnetwork	 ﾠpeers	 ﾠwhen	 ﾠ
practices	 ﾠare	 ﾠdivided.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠAlthough	 ﾠthis	 ﾠsometimes	 ﾠmay	 ﾠbe	 ﾠa	 ﾠuseful	 ﾠsimplifying	 ﾠassumption,	 ﾠwe	 ﾠdoubt	 ﾠthat	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠa	 ﾠ
taste	 ﾠexists,	 ﾠso	 ﾠdo	 ﾠnot	 ﾠtreat	 ﾠthis	 ﾠas	 ﾠa	 ﾠdistinct	 ﾠmechanism.	 ﾠ	 ﾠEvidence	 ﾠthat	 ﾠyoung	 ﾠpeople	 ﾠdo	 ﾠlike	 ﾠto	 ﾠconform,	 ﾠbut	 ﾠ
that	 ﾠthe	 ﾠprocess	 ﾠis	 ﾠmore	 ﾠcomplicated	 ﾠthan	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsimple	 ﾠtaste-ﾭ‐for-ﾭ‐conformity	 ﾠthesis	 ﾠsuggests,	 ﾠcomes	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠsocial	 ﾠ
psychological	 ﾠwork	 ﾠon	 ﾠpluralistic	 ﾠignorance,	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠindicates	 ﾠthat	 ﾠstudents	 ﾠadjust	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠbehavior	 ﾠtoward	 ﾠwhat	 ﾠ
they	 ﾠbelieve	 ﾠ(often	 ﾠincorrectly)	 ﾠto	 ﾠrepresent	 ﾠthe	 ﾠnorms	 ﾠof	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠpeers	 ﾠ(Prentice	 ﾠ&	 ﾠMiller	 ﾠ1993).	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
16	 ﾠRossman	 ﾠ(2012:	 ﾠ96-ﾭ‐112)	 ﾠdistinguishes	 ﾠbetween	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdiffusion	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠnotion	 ﾠthat	 ﾠa	 ﾠpractice	 ﾠis	 ﾠlegitimate	 ﾠ
and	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdiffusion	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpractice	 ﾠitself,	 ﾠcontending	 ﾠthat	 ﾠan	 ﾠinstance	 ﾠof	 ﾠan	 ﾠalready	 ﾠinstitutionalized	 ﾠcategory	 ﾠ
(e.g.,	 ﾠlistening	 ﾠto	 ﾠa	 ﾠpopular	 ﾠsong	 ﾠin	 ﾠan	 ﾠestablished	 ﾠgenre)	 ﾠwill	 ﾠdiffuse	 ﾠfar	 ﾠmore	 ﾠeasily	 ﾠthan	 ﾠa	 ﾠpractice	 ﾠthat	 ﾠlacks	 ﾠ
prior	 ﾠcategorical	 ﾠlegitimacy	 ﾠ(see	 ﾠalso	 ﾠStrang	 ﾠ&	 ﾠMeyer1993	 ﾠand	 ﾠHsu,	 ﾠHannan	 ﾠ&	 ﾠKocak	 ﾠ2009).	 ﾠ	 ﾠNote,	 ﾠhowever,	 ﾠ
that	 ﾠa	 ﾠnew	 ﾠpractice	 ﾠis	 ﾠoften	 ﾠlegitimated	 ﾠat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsocietal	 ﾠlevel,	 ﾠoften	 ﾠwith	 ﾠassistance	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmass	 ﾠmedia	 ﾠ-ﾭ‐-ﾭ‐	 ﾠin	 ﾠ
effect,	 ﾠit	 ﾠis	 ﾠa	 ﾠglobal	 ﾠexternality	 ﾠ-ﾭ‐-ﾭ‐	 ﾠrather	 ﾠthan	 ﾠseparately	 ﾠwithin	 ﾠspecific	 ﾠnetworks.	 ﾠLocal	 ﾠnetwork	 ﾠeffects	 ﾠon	 ﾠ
legitimacy	 ﾠare	 ﾠprobably	 ﾠstrongest	 ﾠfor	 ﾠbehaviors	 ﾠthat	 ﾠare	 ﾠprivate	 ﾠand	 ﾠdifficult	 ﾠto	 ﾠobserve.	 ﾠ
17	 ﾠAs	 ﾠCentola	 ﾠand	 ﾠMacy	 ﾠ(2007:	 ﾠ711)	 ﾠhave	 ﾠwritten,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdistinction	 ﾠbetween	 ﾠnumber	 ﾠof	 ﾠalters	 ﾠand	 ﾠpercent-ﾭ‐
age	 ﾠof	 ﾠalters	 ﾠ“reflects	 ﾠan	 ﾠunderlying	 ﾠ(and	 ﾠoften	 ﾠhidden)	 ﾠassumption	 ﾠabout	 ﾠthe	 ﾠinfluence	 ﾠof	 ﾠnonadopters.	 ﾠ
Fractional	 ﾠthresholds	 ﾠmodel	 ﾠcontagions	 ﾠin	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠboth	 ﾠadopters	 ﾠand	 ﾠnonadopters	 ﾠexert	 ﾠinfluence,	 ﾠbut	 ﾠin	 ﾠop-ﾭ‐
posite	 ﾠdirection…In	 ﾠcontrast,	 ﾠnumeric	 ﾠthresholds	 ﾠmodel	 ﾠcontagions	 ﾠin	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠnonadopters	 ﾠare	 ﾠirrelevant.”	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠNetwork	 ﾠexternalities	 ﾠand	 ﾠinequality	 ﾠ-ﾭ-ﾭ-ﾭ30-ﾭ-ﾭ-ﾭ	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
Under	 ﾠnormative	 ﾠinfluence,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠargument	 ﾠof	 ﾠ	 ﾠf(	 ﾠ),	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ	 ﾠis	 ﾠreplaced	 ﾠby	 ﾠ .	 ﾠ
Here	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ	 ﾠindicates	 ﾠa	 ﾠsubset	 ﾠof	 ﾠadopters	 ﾠwho	 ﾠare	 ﾠpassionate	 ﾠabout	 ﾠinducing	 ﾠa	 ﾠpractice	 ﾠand	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
indicates	 ﾠa	 ﾠsubset	 ﾠof	 ﾠnonadopters	 ﾠwho	 ﾠare	 ﾠpassionate	 ﾠabout	 ﾠpreventing	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpractice.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
and	 ﾠ 	 ﾠare	 ﾠvectors	 ﾠthat	 ﾠindicate	 ﾠindividual	 ﾠi’s	 ﾠnetwork	 ﾠties	 ﾠat	 ﾠtime	 ﾠt	 ﾠ	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsubsets	 ﾠof	 ﾠpass-ﾭ‐
ionate	 ﾠadopters	 ﾠand	 ﾠnonadopters,	 ﾠrespectively,	 ﾠwhere	 ﾠnon-ﾭ‐existing	 ﾠties	 ﾠare	 ﾠrepresented	 ﾠ
with	 ﾠa	 ﾠzero	 ﾠentry.	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ 	 ﾠentries	 ﾠare	 ﾠtypically	 ﾠnormalized	 ﾠby	 ﾠthe	 ﾠrespective	 ﾠnetwork	 ﾠsize	 ﾠ
and	 ﾠpotentially	 ﾠweighted	 ﾠby	 ﾠthe	 ﾠrespective	 ﾠnetwork	 ﾠdensity.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ(One	 ﾠmight	 ﾠalso	 ﾠmodel	 ﾠ
heterogeneity	 ﾠinto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠnetwork,	 ﾠwith	 ﾠinfluence	 ﾠof	 ﾠalters	 ﾠvarying	 ﾠwith	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠtie	 ﾠstrength	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
ego	 ﾠor	 ﾠnetwork	 ﾠcentrality.)	 ﾠ	 ﾠSimilar	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsocial	 ﾠlearning	 ﾠcase,	 ﾠf(	 ﾠ)	 ﾠis	 ﾠa	 ﾠstep	 ﾠfunction,	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠ
obtains	 ﾠa	 ﾠpositive	 ﾠvalue	 ﾠif	 ﾠ 	 ﾠexceeds	 ﾠa	 ﾠspecified	 ﾠthreshold,	 ﾠTi,	 ﾠfor	 ﾠindividual	 ﾠi.	 ﾠNote	 ﾠ
that	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠabsence	 ﾠof	 ﾠpolarization	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpractice,	 ﾠ ,	 ﾠand	 ﾠf(	 ﾠ)	 ﾠtakes	 ﾠ 	 ﾠas	 ﾠthe	 ﾠinput.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
Mechanisms	 ﾠimplicated	 ﾠin	 ﾠcomplex	 ﾠcontagions	 ﾠof	 ﾠbeneficial	 ﾠbehavior	 ﾠin	 ﾠnetworks	 ﾠ
characterized	 ﾠby	 ﾠhomophily	 ﾠare	 ﾠlikely	 ﾠto	 ﾠexacerbate	 ﾠintergroup	 ﾠinequality;	 ﾠand	 ﾠdifferent	 ﾠ
mechanisms	 ﾠare	 ﾠlikely	 ﾠto	 ﾠdo	 ﾠso	 ﾠin	 ﾠdifferent	 ﾠways.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠYoung	 ﾠ(2009)	 ﾠderives	 ﾠthe	 ﾠimplications	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
several	 ﾠmechanisms	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthe	 ﾠshape	 ﾠof	 ﾠdiffusion	 ﾠcurves	 ﾠ(see	 ﾠalso	 ﾠRossman,	 ﾠChiu	 ﾠ&	 ﾠMol	 ﾠ2008),	 ﾠ
but	 ﾠunder	 ﾠlimiting	 ﾠassumptions	 ﾠ(an	 ﾠinfinite	 ﾠpopulation	 ﾠand	 ﾠrandom	 ﾠties)	 ﾠand	 ﾠwithout	 ﾠat-ﾭ‐
tention	 ﾠto	 ﾠimplications	 ﾠfor	 ﾠinequality.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠClear	 ﾠspecification	 ﾠof	 ﾠnetwork	 ﾠmechanisms	 ﾠis	 ﾠa	 ﾠne-ﾭ‐
cessary	 ﾠfirst	 ﾠstep,	 ﾠbut	 ﾠunderstanding	 ﾠhow	 ﾠdifferent	 ﾠmechanisms	 ﾠshape	 ﾠinequality	 ﾠwill	 ﾠre-ﾭ‐
quire	 ﾠadditional	 ﾠmodeling	 ﾠand	 ﾠempirical	 ﾠresearch.	 ﾠ
CAN	 ﾠNETWORK	 ﾠEFFECTS	 ﾠREDUCE	 ﾠINEQUALITY?	 ﾠ
Thus	 ﾠfar,	 ﾠwe	 ﾠhave	 ﾠfocused	 ﾠexclusively	 ﾠon	 ﾠmechanisms	 ﾠby	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠnetworks	 ﾠmay	 ﾠproduce	 ﾠ
higher	 ﾠlevels	 ﾠof	 ﾠinequality	 ﾠthan	 ﾠone	 ﾠwould	 ﾠexpect	 ﾠbased	 ﾠon	 ﾠdifferences	 ﾠin	 ﾠindividual	 ﾠendow-ﾭ‐
ments.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠWe	 ﾠhave	 ﾠnoted	 ﾠthat	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthis	 ﾠto	 ﾠoccur,	 ﾠhigh-ﾭ‐status	 ﾠpeople	 ﾠmust	 ﾠhave	 ﾠan	 ﾠinitial	 ﾠad-ﾭ‐Network	 ﾠexternalities	 ﾠand	 ﾠinequality	 ﾠ-ﾭ-ﾭ-ﾭ31-ﾭ-ﾭ-ﾭ	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
vantage	 ﾠin	 ﾠadopting	 ﾠa	 ﾠbeneficial	 ﾠpractice;	 ﾠnetworks	 ﾠmust	 ﾠbe	 ﾠcharacterized	 ﾠby	 ﾠhomophily;	 ﾠ
and	 ﾠthe	 ﾠprobability	 ﾠof	 ﾠadoption	 ﾠby	 ﾠany	 ﾠactor	 ﾠmust	 ﾠbe	 ﾠincreased	 ﾠby	 ﾠthe	 ﾠprior	 ﾠadoptions	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
his	 ﾠor	 ﾠher	 ﾠnetwork	 ﾠpeers.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠIt	 ﾠfollows	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠthis	 ﾠthat	 ﾠnetworks	 ﾠmay	 ﾠreduce	 ﾠinequality	 ﾠunder	 ﾠ
two	 ﾠconditions:	 ﾠfirst,	 ﾠif	 ﾠinitial	 ﾠadvantage	 ﾠwith	 ﾠrespect	 ﾠto	 ﾠa	 ﾠbeneficial	 ﾠpractice	 ﾠis	 ﾠnegatively	 ﾠ
correlated	 ﾠwith	 ﾠSES	 ﾠor	 ﾠother	 ﾠmeasures	 ﾠof	 ﾠprivilege	 ﾠ(inverted	 ﾠadvantage);	 ﾠand,	 ﾠsecond,	 ﾠif	 ﾠ
homophily	 ﾠis	 ﾠinsufficient	 ﾠto	 ﾠamplify	 ﾠinitial	 ﾠadvantages.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
Inverted	 ﾠAdvantage	 ﾠ
By	 ﾠinverted	 ﾠadvantage	 ﾠwe	 ﾠrefer	 ﾠto	 ﾠcases	 ﾠin	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠa	 ﾠgroup	 ﾠthat	 ﾠis	 ﾠsubject	 ﾠto	 ﾠdiscrimination,	 ﾠ
social	 ﾠisolation,	 ﾠor	 ﾠboth	 ﾠacquires	 ﾠa	 ﾠniche	 ﾠthat	 ﾠbecomes	 ﾠprofitable	 ﾠor	 ﾠprestigious.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠStylized	 ﾠ
examples	 ﾠinclude	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsuccess	 ﾠof	 ﾠFrench	 ﾠCanadians	 ﾠin	 ﾠhockey	 ﾠ(Belanger	 ﾠ1996),	 ﾠof	 ﾠAfrican	 ﾠ
Americans	 ﾠin	 ﾠbasketball	 ﾠand	 ﾠrap	 ﾠmusic	 ﾠ(Edwards	 ﾠ1979),	 ﾠand	 ﾠof	 ﾠJews	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠearly	 ﾠ20th	 ﾠcent-ﾭ‐
ury	 ﾠfilm	 ﾠand	 ﾠpopular	 ﾠmusic	 ﾠindustries	 ﾠ(Gabler	 ﾠ1989).	 ﾠ	 ﾠTo	 ﾠbe	 ﾠsure,	 ﾠnon-ﾭ‐network	 ﾠmechan-ﾭ‐
isms	 ﾠ(including	 ﾠdiscrimination	 ﾠin	 ﾠalternative	 ﾠpursuits	 ﾠor	 ﾠsocial-ﾭ‐identity	 ﾠeffects	 ﾠunrelated	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠbehavior	 ﾠof	 ﾠnetwork	 ﾠpeers)	 ﾠplay	 ﾠroles	 ﾠin	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠcases;	 ﾠbut	 ﾠif	 ﾠchoices	 ﾠto	 ﾠdevelop	 ﾠskills	 ﾠthat	 ﾠ
may	 ﾠlead	 ﾠto	 ﾠprofessional	 ﾠcareers	 ﾠare	 ﾠinfluenced	 ﾠby	 ﾠsocial	 ﾠlearning	 ﾠor	 ﾠpeer	 ﾠmodeling,	 ﾠthen	 ﾠit	 ﾠ
follows	 ﾠthat	 ﾠnetwork	 ﾠeffects	 ﾠwould,	 ﾠin	 ﾠsmall	 ﾠways,	 ﾠoppose	 ﾠbroader	 ﾠpatterns	 ﾠof	 ﾠinequality.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ Alternately,	 ﾠnetwork	 ﾠeffects	 ﾠmay	 ﾠtend	 ﾠto	 ﾠreduce	 ﾠintergroup	 ﾠinequality	 ﾠin	 ﾠvalued	 ﾠout-ﾭ‐
comes	 ﾠif	 ﾠthe	 ﾠinitially	 ﾠprivileged	 ﾠare	 ﾠmore	 ﾠlikely	 ﾠto	 ﾠparticipate	 ﾠin	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠharmful	 ﾠactivities	 ﾠas	 ﾠ
specific	 ﾠforms	 ﾠof	 ﾠdrug	 ﾠabuse	 ﾠ(Abelson	 ﾠ&	 ﾠMiller	 ﾠ1985)	 ﾠor	 ﾠinvestment	 ﾠin	 ﾠPonzi	 ﾠschemes.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
Such	 ﾠactivities	 ﾠmay	 ﾠspread	 ﾠthrough	 ﾠnetworks	 ﾠif	 ﾠshort-ﾭ‐term	 ﾠrewards	 ﾠnegate	 ﾠconsiderations	 ﾠ
of	 ﾠlong-ﾭ‐term	 ﾠharm	 ﾠ(as	 ﾠis	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcase	 ﾠfor	 ﾠaddictions);	 ﾠor	 ﾠif	 ﾠsocial-ﾭ‐influence	 ﾠprocesses	 ﾠyield	 ﾠsoc-ﾭ‐
ial	 ﾠside	 ﾠpayments	 ﾠsufficient	 ﾠto	 ﾠoutweigh	 ﾠlong-ﾭ‐range	 ﾠrisk.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠIn	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠcases,	 ﾠnetwork	 ﾠeffects	 ﾠ
could	 ﾠlimit	 ﾠinequality	 ﾠby	 ﾠproducing	 ﾠadditional	 ﾠharms	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsocioeconomically	 ﾠadvantaged.	 ﾠ	 ﾠNetwork	 ﾠexternalities	 ﾠand	 ﾠinequality	 ﾠ-ﾭ-ﾭ-ﾭ32-ﾭ-ﾭ-ﾭ	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
Limited	 ﾠHomophily	 ﾠ
Cases	 ﾠof	 ﾠinverted	 ﾠadvantage	 ﾠare	 ﾠrelatively	 ﾠfew	 ﾠand	 ﾠmay	 ﾠaffect	 ﾠintergroup	 ﾠinequality	 ﾠtrivial-ﾭ‐
ly,	 ﾠif	 ﾠat	 ﾠall.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠBy	 ﾠcontrast,	 ﾠcases	 ﾠin	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠnetwork	 ﾠhomophily	 ﾠis	 ﾠinsufficient	 ﾠto	 ﾠbias	 ﾠadoption	 ﾠ
of	 ﾠbeneficial	 ﾠpractices	 ﾠtoward	 ﾠthe	 ﾠinitially	 ﾠadvantaged	 ﾠmay	 ﾠbe	 ﾠmore	 ﾠimportant,	 ﾠmore	 ﾠinter-ﾭ‐
esting,	 ﾠand	 ﾠmore	 ﾠsusceptible	 ﾠto	 ﾠpolicy	 ﾠintervention.	 ﾠ	 ﾠDepartures	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠhomophily	 ﾠin	 ﾠnet-ﾭ‐
works	 ﾠoccur	 ﾠwhen	 ﾠties	 ﾠare	 ﾠformed	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠbasis	 ﾠof	 ﾠcomplementary	 ﾠattributes	 ﾠ(gender	 ﾠin	 ﾠhet-ﾭ‐
erosexual	 ﾠmarriage)	 ﾠor	 ﾠskills	 ﾠ(in	 ﾠorganizational	 ﾠteams);	 ﾠwhen	 ﾠactors	 ﾠintentionally	 ﾠform	 ﾠties	 ﾠ
to	 ﾠalters	 ﾠwho	 ﾠare	 ﾠdifferent	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠthemselves	 ﾠ(e.g.,	 ﾠin	 ﾠorder	 ﾠto	 ﾠbenefit	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠsocial	 ﾠlearning	 ﾠor	 ﾠ
externalities);	 ﾠor	 ﾠbecause	 ﾠsalient	 ﾠstatus	 ﾠcharacteristics	 ﾠare	 ﾠimperfectly	 ﾠcorrelated	 ﾠ(as	 ﾠis	 ﾠal-ﾭ‐
most	 ﾠalways	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcase).	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ Weakly	 ﾠcorrelated	 ﾠstatus	 ﾠparameters	 ﾠare	 ﾠmost	 ﾠlikely	 ﾠto	 ﾠreduce	 ﾠinequality	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcase	 ﾠ
of	 ﾠsimple	 ﾠcontagions	 ﾠin	 ﾠsmall	 ﾠworlds.	 ﾠ	 ﾠWhen	 ﾠadoption	 ﾠof	 ﾠa	 ﾠbeneficial	 ﾠpractice	 ﾠspreads	 ﾠ
through	 ﾠsimple	 ﾠcontagion	 ﾠ–	 ﾠwhen	 ﾠa	 ﾠsingle	 ﾠcontact	 ﾠis	 ﾠsufficient	 ﾠto	 ﾠinduce	 ﾠaction	 ﾠ–	 ﾠnetwork	 ﾠ
effects,	 ﾠeven	 ﾠgiven	 ﾠhigh	 ﾠlevels	 ﾠof	 ﾠhomophily,	 ﾠare	 ﾠunlikely	 ﾠto	 ﾠexacerbate	 ﾠinequality.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠFirst,	 ﾠas	 ﾠ
Blau	 ﾠ(1977)	 ﾠdemonstrated,	 ﾠas	 ﾠlong	 ﾠas	 ﾠstatus	 ﾠand	 ﾠidentity	 ﾠdimensions	 ﾠwith	 ﾠrespect	 ﾠto	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠ
networks	 ﾠare	 ﾠhomophilous	 ﾠ(e.g.	 ﾠeducation,	 ﾠincome,	 ﾠor	 ﾠrace)	 ﾠare	 ﾠincompletely	 ﾠcorrelated,	 ﾠ
homophilous	 ﾠchoice	 ﾠwith	 ﾠrespect	 ﾠto	 ﾠany	 ﾠone	 ﾠdimension	 ﾠwill	 ﾠbring	 ﾠone	 ﾠinto	 ﾠcontact	 ﾠwith	 ﾠact-ﾭ‐
ors	 ﾠwho	 ﾠvary	 ﾠon	 ﾠothers.	 ﾠ	 ﾠConsequently	 ﾠsome	 ﾠnetwork	 ﾠties	 ﾠserve	 ﾠas	 ﾠbridges	 ﾠamong	 ﾠgroups	 ﾠ
differentiated	 ﾠby	 ﾠrelative	 ﾠprivilege.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
Second,	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠpatterns	 ﾠare	 ﾠlikely	 ﾠto	 ﾠgenerate	 ﾠ“small	 ﾠworlds”	 ﾠ–	 ﾠglobal	 ﾠnetworks	 ﾠchar-ﾭ‐
acterized	 ﾠby	 ﾠconcentrated	 ﾠregions	 ﾠof	 ﾠdensely	 ﾠconnected	 ﾠactors	 ﾠunited	 ﾠby	 ﾠbridging	 ﾠties	 ﾠthat	 ﾠ
facilitate	 ﾠthe	 ﾠrapid	 ﾠspread	 ﾠof	 ﾠinformation	 ﾠ(Watts	 ﾠ1999).	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠWhere	 ﾠcontact	 ﾠwith	 ﾠa	 ﾠsingle	 ﾠprior	 ﾠ
adopter	 ﾠis	 ﾠsufficient	 ﾠto	 ﾠinduce	 ﾠaction	 ﾠ(i.e.,	 ﾠwhere	 ﾠcosts	 ﾠof	 ﾠadoption	 ﾠare	 ﾠlow	 ﾠand	 ﾠbenefits	 ﾠev-ﾭ‐Network	 ﾠexternalities	 ﾠand	 ﾠinequality	 ﾠ-ﾭ-ﾭ-ﾭ33-ﾭ-ﾭ-ﾭ	 ﾠ
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ident)	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠstrength	 ﾠof	 ﾠnetwork	 ﾠeffects	 ﾠdoes	 ﾠnot	 ﾠdepend	 ﾠupon	 ﾠego’s	 ﾠstatus,	 ﾠpractices	 ﾠmay	 ﾠ
move	 ﾠacross	 ﾠintergroup	 ﾠand	 ﾠstatus	 ﾠboundaries	 ﾠmore	 ﾠquickly	 ﾠthan	 ﾠthey	 ﾠwould	 ﾠdiffuse	 ﾠbased	 ﾠ
on	 ﾠindividual	 ﾠdifferences	 ﾠalone,	 ﾠeven	 ﾠif	 ﾠhigh	 ﾠlevels	 ﾠof	 ﾠhomophily	 ﾠproduce	 ﾠrelatively	 ﾠdense	 ﾠ
and	 ﾠhomogenous	 ﾠego	 ﾠnetworks.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠConsistent	 ﾠwith	 ﾠthis	 ﾠview,	 ﾠGolub	 ﾠand	 ﾠJackson’s	 ﾠ(2011)	 ﾠ
computational	 ﾠmodel	 ﾠreveals	 ﾠno	 ﾠimpact	 ﾠof	 ﾠhomophily	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠflow	 ﾠof	 ﾠinformation	 ﾠthrough	 ﾠa	 ﾠ
network,	 ﾠbut	 ﾠindicates	 ﾠthat	 ﾠhomophily	 ﾠsignificantly	 ﾠimpedes	 ﾠconsensus	 ﾠformation	 ﾠ(a	 ﾠpro-ﾭ‐
cess	 ﾠanalogous	 ﾠto	 ﾠcomplex	 ﾠcontagion).	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠDifferent	 ﾠcombinations	 ﾠof	 ﾠhomophily	 ﾠbias	 ﾠand	 ﾠad-ﾭ‐
option	 ﾠthresholds	 ﾠ(the	 ﾠnumber	 ﾠof	 ﾠcontacts	 ﾠrequired	 ﾠbefore	 ﾠa	 ﾠpractice	 ﾠis	 ﾠadopted)	 ﾠare	 ﾠlikely	 ﾠ
to	 ﾠhave	 ﾠvarying	 ﾠeffects	 ﾠon	 ﾠinequality.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠIdentifying	 ﾠthe	 ﾠtipping	 ﾠpoints	 ﾠat	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠnetwork	 ﾠ
effects	 ﾠon	 ﾠinequality	 ﾠturn	 ﾠnegative	 ﾠis	 ﾠan	 ﾠimportant	 ﾠresearch	 ﾠpriority.18	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
A	 ﾠvariant	 ﾠof	 ﾠthis	 ﾠmay	 ﾠoccur	 ﾠwhen	 ﾠnetworks	 ﾠprovide	 ﾠassistance	 ﾠto	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠmembers	 ﾠin	 ﾠ
learning	 ﾠabout	 ﾠand	 ﾠobtaining	 ﾠgood	 ﾠjobs.	 ﾠ	 ﾠIn	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠmatching	 ﾠprocesses,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠprobability	 ﾠthat	 ﾠ
any	 ﾠgiven	 ﾠone	 ﾠof	 ﾠego’s	 ﾠcontacts	 ﾠwill	 ﾠprovide	 ﾠuseful	 ﾠinformation	 ﾠis,	 ﾠfirst,	 ﾠa	 ﾠfunction	 ﾠof	 ﾠthat	 ﾠ
actor’s	 ﾠposition	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠbroader	 ﾠsocial	 ﾠstructure	 ﾠ(of	 ﾠthe	 ﾠprobability	 ﾠthat	 ﾠhe	 ﾠor	 ﾠshe	 ﾠhas	 ﾠaccess	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	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 ﾠ	 ﾠ	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 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
18	 ﾠThe	 ﾠmatter	 ﾠis	 ﾠcomplicated	 ﾠby	 ﾠa	 ﾠlack	 ﾠof	 ﾠresearch	 ﾠon	 ﾠhow	 ﾠchoice	 ﾠhomophily	 ﾠoperates	 ﾠin	 ﾠpractice,	 ﾠthat	 ﾠis,	 ﾠ
on	 ﾠthe	 ﾠchoice	 ﾠprocesses	 ﾠthat	 ﾠconstitute	 ﾠchoice	 ﾠhomophily	 ﾠor	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠconstraints	 ﾠthat	 ﾠgenerate	 ﾠstructural	 ﾠhom-ﾭ‐
ophily,	 ﾠeven	 ﾠthough	 ﾠdifferent	 ﾠprocesses	 ﾠwill	 ﾠgenerate	 ﾠdifferent	 ﾠresults	 ﾠin	 ﾠterms	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdistribution	 ﾠof	 ﾠattrib-ﾭ‐
utes	 ﾠwithin	 ﾠgroups.	 ﾠ	 ﾠImagine,	 ﾠfor	 ﾠexample,	 ﾠa	 ﾠfemale	 ﾠHispanic	 ﾠcollege	 ﾠgraduate	 ﾠwho	 ﾠprefers	 ﾠto	 ﾠassociate	 ﾠwith	 ﾠ
people	 ﾠlike	 ﾠherself	 ﾠin	 ﾠgender,	 ﾠnationality	 ﾠand	 ﾠeducational	 ﾠattainment.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠThat	 ﾠpreference	 ﾠcould	 ﾠtake	 ﾠthe	 ﾠform	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
(a)	 ﾠa	 ﾠdesire	 ﾠto	 ﾠmaintain	 ﾠfriendships	 ﾠwith	 ﾠpeople	 ﾠidentical	 ﾠto	 ﾠherself	 ﾠon	 ﾠall	 ﾠthree	 ﾠdimensions	 ﾠ(so	 ﾠthat,	 ﾠin	 ﾠeffect,	 ﾠ
female	 ﾠHispanic	 ﾠcollege	 ﾠgraduate	 ﾠacts	 ﾠas	 ﾠa	 ﾠsingle	 ﾠcategory;	 ﾠor	 ﾠ(b)	 ﾠa	 ﾠtendency	 ﾠto	 ﾠgravitate	 ﾠto	 ﾠothers	 ﾠbased	 ﾠon	 ﾠa	 ﾠ
(possibly	 ﾠweighted)	 ﾠaverage	 ﾠof	 ﾠthose	 ﾠthree	 ﾠattributes;	 ﾠ(c)	 ﾠa	 ﾠquota	 ﾠsystem,	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠthat	 ﾠshe	 ﾠrecruits	 ﾠfriends	 ﾠin	 ﾠ
each	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠthree	 ﾠcategories,	 ﾠwith	 ﾠlittle	 ﾠregard	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthose	 ﾠpersons’	 ﾠpositions	 ﾠon	 ﾠother	 ﾠsalient	 ﾠdimensions;	 ﾠ(d)	 ﾠor	 ﾠ
an	 ﾠexclusion	 ﾠprinciple	 ﾠ(whereby	 ﾠshe	 ﾠmaximizes	 ﾠsimilarity	 ﾠunder	 ﾠthe	 ﾠconstraint	 ﾠthat	 ﾠshe	 ﾠwill	 ﾠnot	 ﾠform	 ﾠties	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
alters	 ﾠin	 ﾠa	 ﾠparticular	 ﾠdiffering	 ﾠcategory,	 ﾠe.g.	 ﾠhigh-ﾭ‐school	 ﾠdropouts).	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠReflection	 ﾠsuggests	 ﾠthat	 ﾠa	 ﾠworld	 ﾠin	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠ
“homophily”	 ﾠreferred	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfirst	 ﾠof	 ﾠthese	 ﾠapproaches	 ﾠwould	 ﾠgenerate	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmost	 ﾠhomogeneous	 ﾠfriendship	 ﾠnets	 ﾠ
with	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmost	 ﾠstrongly	 ﾠcorrelated	 ﾠparameters	 ﾠ–	 ﾠwhich,	 ﾠother	 ﾠthings	 ﾠequal,	 ﾠwould	 ﾠgenerate	 ﾠthe	 ﾠstrongest	 ﾠinter-ﾭ‐
group	 ﾠdifferences	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠrelevant	 ﾠdimensions.	 ﾠ	 ﾠThe	 ﾠthird	 ﾠapproach	 ﾠwould	 ﾠgenerate	 ﾠthe	 ﾠleast	 ﾠhomogenous	 ﾠnet-ﾭ‐
works,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠleast	 ﾠstrongly	 ﾠcorrelated	 ﾠparameters,	 ﾠand	 ﾠweakest	 ﾠintergroup	 ﾠdifferences.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠSuch	 ﾠdifferences	 ﾠare	 ﾠ
not	 ﾠcaptured	 ﾠby	 ﾠconventional	 ﾠmeasures	 ﾠof	 ﾠhomophily	 ﾠbias	 ﾠ(which	 ﾠspecify	 ﾠthe	 ﾠprobability	 ﾠof	 ﾠhomophilous	 ﾠ
choice,	 ﾠnot	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmeaning	 ﾠof	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠa	 ﾠchoice).	 ﾠ	 ﾠAdditional	 ﾠresearch	 ﾠis	 ﾠneeded,	 ﾠas	 ﾠwell,	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠrelationship	 ﾠbetween	 ﾠ
homophily	 ﾠand	 ﾠtriadic	 ﾠclosure	 ﾠ–	 ﾠunder	 ﾠwhat	 ﾠconditions,	 ﾠfor	 ﾠexample,	 ﾠindividuals	 ﾠtend	 ﾠto	 ﾠsegregate	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠ
network	 ﾠbased	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠtraits	 ﾠthey	 ﾠshare	 ﾠwith	 ﾠdifferent	 ﾠalters,	 ﾠas	 ﾠopposed	 ﾠto	 ﾠbring	 ﾠtogether	 ﾠalters	 ﾠwith	 ﾠdifferent	 ﾠ
characteristics	 ﾠ(possibly	 ﾠcreating	 ﾠbridges)	 ﾠ(but	 ﾠsee	 ﾠKossinets	 ﾠ&	 ﾠWatts	 ﾠ2009).	 ﾠNetwork	 ﾠexternalities	 ﾠand	 ﾠinequality	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 ﾠ
to	 ﾠinformation	 ﾠuseful	 ﾠto	 ﾠego)	 ﾠand,	 ﾠsecond,	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠprobability	 ﾠthat	 ﾠhe	 ﾠor	 ﾠshe	 ﾠis	 ﾠinclined	 ﾠto	 ﾠuse	 ﾠ
that	 ﾠinformation	 ﾠto	 ﾠassist	 ﾠego	 ﾠ(Smith	 ﾠ2005).	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠThis	 ﾠsecond	 ﾠcondition	 ﾠproduces	 ﾠwhat	 ﾠmight	 ﾠ
be	 ﾠcalled	 ﾠthe	 ﾠparadox	 ﾠof	 ﾠweak	 ﾠties:	 ﾠas	 ﾠGranovetter	 ﾠ(1974)	 ﾠargued,	 ﾠacquaintances	 ﾠto	 ﾠwhom	 ﾠ
job-ﾭ‐seekers	 ﾠare	 ﾠweakly	 ﾠtied	 ﾠmay	 ﾠproduce	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmost	 ﾠuseful	 ﾠinformation	 ﾠprecisely	 ﾠbecause	 ﾠ
they	 ﾠare	 ﾠmore	 ﾠlikely	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠaware	 ﾠof	 ﾠnew	 ﾠopportunities	 ﾠthan	 ﾠare	 ﾠego’s	 ﾠclose	 ﾠfriends;	 ﾠyet	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
very	 ﾠacquaintances	 ﾠwho	 ﾠcan	 ﾠhelp	 ﾠmost	 ﾠmay	 ﾠbe	 ﾠleast	 ﾠwilling	 ﾠto	 ﾠtake	 ﾠthe	 ﾠrisk	 ﾠof	 ﾠvouching	 ﾠfor	 ﾠ
a	 ﾠpotential	 ﾠemployee.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠWe	 ﾠsuspect	 ﾠthat	 ﾠunder	 ﾠcertain	 ﾠconditions,	 ﾠwhat	 ﾠmight	 ﾠbe	 ﾠcalled	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
“paradox	 ﾠof	 ﾠweak	 ﾠties”	 ﾠmay	 ﾠgenerate	 ﾠgreater	 ﾠequality	 ﾠthan	 ﾠwould	 ﾠbe	 ﾠobserved	 ﾠbased	 ﾠon	 ﾠ
individual	 ﾠdifferences	 ﾠalone.	 ﾠ	 ﾠThe	 ﾠreason	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthis	 ﾠis	 ﾠthat	 ﾠan	 ﾠagent	 ﾠseeking	 ﾠa	 ﾠjob	 ﾠor	 ﾠother	 ﾠ
match	 ﾠmay	 ﾠobtain	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmost	 ﾠeffective	 ﾠassistance	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠ“weak	 ﾠties,”	 ﾠwho	 ﾠare	 ﾠordinarily	 ﾠless	 ﾠ
sociodemographically	 ﾠsimilar	 ﾠto	 ﾠego	 ﾠthan	 ﾠthose	 ﾠto	 ﾠwhom	 ﾠego	 ﾠis	 ﾠstrongly	 ﾠattached	 ﾠ(Rivera,	 ﾠ
Soderstrom	 ﾠ&	 ﾠUzzi	 ﾠ2010).	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠPut	 ﾠanother	 ﾠway,	 ﾠnetwork	 ﾠeffects	 ﾠthat	 ﾠwork	 ﾠthrough	 ﾠmatching	 ﾠ
processes	 ﾠare	 ﾠespecially	 ﾠlikely	 ﾠto	 ﾠinvolve	 ﾠsociodemographically	 ﾠdifferent	 ﾠnetwork	 ﾠalters.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
When	 ﾠstatus	 ﾠdifferences	 ﾠbetween	 ﾠmatch-ﾭ‐makers	 ﾠand	 ﾠmatch-ﾭ‐takers	 ﾠare	 ﾠsignificant,	 ﾠand	 ﾠhigh-ﾭ‐
status	 ﾠalters	 ﾠare	 ﾠwilling	 ﾠto	 ﾠuse	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠinformation	 ﾠor	 ﾠcontacts	 ﾠto	 ﾠhelp	 ﾠlower-ﾭ‐status	 ﾠassociates,	 ﾠ
networks	 ﾠcould	 ﾠmoderate	 ﾠintergroup	 ﾠinequality.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠAdditional	 ﾠresearch	 ﾠis	 ﾠnecessary	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
identify	 ﾠthe	 ﾠnetwork	 ﾠstructures	 ﾠand	 ﾠlabor-ﾭ‐market	 ﾠconditions	 ﾠfor	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠthis	 ﾠis	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcase.	 ﾠ
PRIORITIES	 ﾠFOR	 ﾠRESEARCH	 ﾠON	 ﾠNETWORK	 ﾠEFFECTS	 ﾠON	 ﾠINEQUALITY	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
Six	 ﾠresearch	 ﾠpriorities	 ﾠstrike	 ﾠus	 ﾠas	 ﾠespecially	 ﾠimportant:	 ﾠ
1.	 ﾠSpecify	 ﾠmechanisms	 ﾠand	 ﾠtest	 ﾠalternative	 ﾠspecifications.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠA	 ﾠfirst	 ﾠpriority	 ﾠis	 ﾠgreater	 ﾠ
rigor	 ﾠin	 ﾠspecifying	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmechanisms	 ﾠthrough	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠeffects	 ﾠoccur,	 ﾠ	 ﾠidentifying	 ﾠlikely	 ﾠeffects	 ﾠ
on	 ﾠthe	 ﾠbasis	 ﾠof	 ﾠboth	 ﾠtheory	 ﾠand,	 ﾠwhen	 ﾠpossible,	 ﾠfieldwork	 ﾠ(Watkins	 ﾠ&	 ﾠWarriner	 ﾠ2003);	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
comparing	 ﾠthe	 ﾠresults	 ﾠof	 ﾠmodels	 ﾠbased	 ﾠon	 ﾠalternative	 ﾠspecifications,	 ﾠin	 ﾠorder	 ﾠto	 ﾠidentify	 ﾠthe	 ﾠNetwork	 ﾠexternalities	 ﾠand	 ﾠinequality	 ﾠ-ﾭ-ﾭ-ﾭ35-ﾭ-ﾭ-ﾭ	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
mechanisms	 ﾠthat	 ﾠare	 ﾠmost	 ﾠimportant	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdiffusion	 ﾠof	 ﾠparticular	 ﾠclasses	 ﾠof	 ﾠphenomena.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
Several	 ﾠfine	 ﾠpapers	 ﾠcompare	 ﾠtwo	 ﾠpotential	 ﾠmechanisms,	 ﾠbut	 ﾠaccumulation	 ﾠof	 ﾠknowledge	 ﾠis	 ﾠ
impeded	 ﾠby	 ﾠthe	 ﾠabsence	 ﾠof	 ﾠstandard	 ﾠnomenclature	 ﾠand	 ﾠby	 ﾠthe	 ﾠabsence	 ﾠof	 ﾠsystematically	 ﾠ
broader	 ﾠcomparisons.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
2.	 ﾠEmploy	 ﾠcomputational	 ﾠmodels	 ﾠto	 ﾠunderstand	 ﾠbetter	 ﾠthe	 ﾠimplications	 ﾠfor	 ﾠsocial	 ﾠ
inequality	 ﾠof	 ﾠdifferent	 ﾠnetwork-ﾭ‐effect	 ﾠmechanisms,	 ﾠto	 ﾠidentify	 ﾠthe	 ﾠconditions	 ﾠunder	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠ
network	 ﾠeffects	 ﾠmost	 ﾠseverely	 ﾠexacerbate	 ﾠinequality	 ﾠas	 ﾠwell	 ﾠas	 ﾠthe	 ﾠconditions	 ﾠunder	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠ
they	 ﾠmay	 ﾠameliorate	 ﾠit,	 ﾠto	 ﾠtease	 ﾠout	 ﾠinteractions	 ﾠbetween	 ﾠtypes	 ﾠof	 ﾠmechanism	 ﾠand	 ﾠtypes	 ﾠ
and	 ﾠdegrees	 ﾠof	 ﾠhomophily,	 ﾠand	 ﾠto	 ﾠinvestigate	 ﾠmixed	 ﾠforms	 ﾠwhere	 ﾠexternalities	 ﾠare	 ﾠboth	 ﾠ
local	 ﾠand	 ﾠglobal.	 ﾠ	 ﾠAs	 ﾠdemonstrated	 ﾠby	 ﾠCalvo-ﾭ‐Armengol	 ﾠ&	 ﾠJackson’s	 ﾠ(2004)	 ﾠrecommendation	 ﾠ
to	 ﾠfocus	 ﾠresources	 ﾠon	 ﾠparticular	 ﾠclusters	 ﾠand	 ﾠneighborhoods	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpoor	 ﾠ(to	 ﾠproduce	 ﾠcritical	 ﾠ
mass	 ﾠfor	 ﾠchange	 ﾠprocesses	 ﾠthat	 ﾠcould	 ﾠramify	 ﾠto	 ﾠother	 ﾠnetworks),	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠresearch	 ﾠcan	 ﾠproduce	 ﾠ
not	 ﾠonly	 ﾠto	 ﾠfundamental	 ﾠscientific	 ﾠunderstanding	 ﾠbut	 ﾠto	 ﾠpolicy-ﾭ‐relevant	 ﾠknowledge	 ﾠas	 ﾠwell.	 ﾠ
3.	 ﾠConduct	 ﾠempirical	 ﾠresearch	 ﾠon	 ﾠnetwork	 ﾠeffects	 ﾠwith	 ﾠappropriate	 ﾠdata	 ﾠin	 ﾠa	 ﾠvariety	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
contexts	 ﾠand	 ﾠon	 ﾠadoption	 ﾠof	 ﾠa	 ﾠrange	 ﾠof	 ﾠgoods	 ﾠand	 ﾠpractices.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠBy	 ﾠappropriate	 ﾠdata	 ﾠwe	 ﾠmean,	 ﾠ
first,	 ﾠdata	 ﾠon	 ﾠactual	 ﾠnetwork	 ﾠties	 ﾠ(as	 ﾠopposed	 ﾠto	 ﾠdata	 ﾠon	 ﾠcopresence	 ﾠ[as	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpeer	 ﾠeffects	 ﾠ
literature],	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠmay	 ﾠor	 ﾠmay	 ﾠnot	 ﾠserve	 ﾠas	 ﾠa	 ﾠproxy	 ﾠfor	 ﾠinteraction);	 ﾠand,	 ﾠsecond,	 ﾠdata	 ﾠwith	 ﾠ
repeated	 ﾠobservations	 ﾠof	 ﾠsocial	 ﾠnetworks,	 ﾠadoption	 ﾠof	 ﾠparticular	 ﾠbeneficial	 ﾠpractices,	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
change	 ﾠin	 ﾠintergroup	 ﾠinequality.	 ﾠ	 ﾠSuch	 ﾠstudies	 ﾠshould	 ﾠuse	 ﾠcase-ﾭ‐specific	 ﾠinferential	 ﾠreasoning	 ﾠ
to	 ﾠask	 ﾠnot	 ﾠjust	 ﾠ“are	 ﾠthere	 ﾠeffects?”	 ﾠbut	 ﾠ“what	 ﾠmechanisms	 ﾠproduce	 ﾠthese	 ﾠeffects,”	 ﾠand	 ﾠtest	 ﾠ
both	 ﾠfor	 ﾠnetwork	 ﾠeffects	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠprobability	 ﾠof	 ﾠadoption	 ﾠand	 ﾠnetwork	 ﾠeffects	 ﾠon	 ﾠreturns	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
adoption,	 ﾠas	 ﾠwell	 ﾠas	 ﾠfor	 ﾠdifferences	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠslope	 ﾠof	 ﾠthese	 ﾠeffects	 ﾠfor	 ﾠdifferent	 ﾠkinds	 ﾠof	 ﾠactors.	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4.	 ﾠDifferentiate	 ﾠamong	 ﾠtypes	 ﾠof	 ﾠrelationship.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠWhile	 ﾠlimited	 ﾠavailability	 ﾠof	 ﾠappropri-ﾭ‐
ate	 ﾠdata	 ﾠoften	 ﾠleads	 ﾠresearchers	 ﾠto	 ﾠabstract	 ﾠaway	 ﾠdifferences	 ﾠamong	 ﾠtypes	 ﾠof	 ﾠties,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfew	 ﾠ
studies	 ﾠthat	 ﾠattend	 ﾠto	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠdifferences	 ﾠsuggest	 ﾠthat	 ﾠdifferences	 ﾠare	 ﾠconsequential.	 ﾠ	 ﾠHow	 ﾠ
does	 ﾠthe	 ﾠinfluence	 ﾠof	 ﾠkin	 ﾠdiffer	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠthat	 ﾠof	 ﾠfriends	 ﾠor	 ﾠco-ﾭ‐workers	 ﾠ(Christakis	 ﾠ&	 ﾠFowler	 ﾠ
2008)?	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠUnder	 ﾠwhat	 ﾠconditions	 ﾠare	 ﾠweak	 ﾠties	 ﾠmore	 ﾠinfluential	 ﾠthan	 ﾠstrong	 ﾠ(Krieger	 ﾠ&	 ﾠHay-ﾭ‐
nie	 ﾠ2011)?	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠWhen	 ﾠdo	 ﾠunreciprocated	 ﾠfriendship	 ﾠties	 ﾠmatter	 ﾠ(Faris	 ﾠ&	 ﾠEnnett	 ﾠ2011)?	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
5.	 ﾠStudy	 ﾠinteractions	 ﾠbetween	 ﾠnetworks	 ﾠand	 ﾠinstitutions:	 ﾠ	 ﾠSome	 ﾠinstitutional	 ﾠconfig-ﾭ‐
urations	 ﾠmay	 ﾠdampen	 ﾠthe	 ﾠability	 ﾠof	 ﾠsocial	 ﾠnetworks	 ﾠto	 ﾠexacerbate	 ﾠinequality:	 ﾠ	 ﾠFor	 ﾠexample,	 ﾠ
networks	 ﾠmay	 ﾠbe	 ﾠless	 ﾠimportant	 ﾠto	 ﾠlabor-ﾭ‐market	 ﾠoutcomes	 ﾠwhen	 ﾠjobs	 ﾠare	 ﾠplentiful	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
equal	 ﾠopportunity	 ﾠrules	 ﾠenforced	 ﾠthan	 ﾠwhen	 ﾠlabor	 ﾠmarkets	 ﾠare	 ﾠweak	 ﾠand	 ﾠdiscrimination	 ﾠ
tolerated;	 ﾠnetworks	 ﾠmay	 ﾠhave	 ﾠweaker	 ﾠeffects	 ﾠon	 ﾠtechnology	 ﾠadoption	 ﾠif	 ﾠtechnologies	 ﾠare	 ﾠ
made	 ﾠwidely	 ﾠavailable	 ﾠin	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠpublic	 ﾠsettings	 ﾠas	 ﾠcommunity	 ﾠcenters	 ﾠor	 ﾠlibraries;	 ﾠnetworks	 ﾠ
may	 ﾠmatter	 ﾠless	 ﾠfor	 ﾠaccess	 ﾠto	 ﾠgovernment	 ﾠservices	 ﾠwhen	 ﾠagencies	 ﾠinvest	 ﾠmore	 ﾠin	 ﾠoutreach;	 ﾠ
and	 ﾠnetworks	 ﾠmay	 ﾠhave	 ﾠless	 ﾠinfluence	 ﾠon	 ﾠinvestment	 ﾠdecisions	 ﾠwhen	 ﾠemployee	 ﾠinvestment	 ﾠ
accounts	 ﾠare	 ﾠgoverned	 ﾠby	 ﾠopt-ﾭ‐out	 ﾠ(as	 ﾠopposed	 ﾠto	 ﾠopt-ﾭ‐in)	 ﾠdecision	 ﾠrules.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠConversely,	 ﾠnet-ﾭ‐
works	 ﾠmay	 ﾠsometimes	 ﾠinteract	 ﾠwith	 ﾠinstitutional	 ﾠfactors	 ﾠto	 ﾠamplify	 ﾠlong-ﾭ‐term	 ﾠincreases	 ﾠin	 ﾠ
inequality:	 ﾠJohnson	 ﾠand	 ﾠRaphael	 ﾠ(2009)	 ﾠdemonstrate	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠinteraction	 ﾠof	 ﾠincarceration	 ﾠ
policies	 ﾠwith	 ﾠracial	 ﾠhomophily	 ﾠin	 ﾠsexual	 ﾠnetworks	 ﾠaccounts	 ﾠfor	 ﾠmost	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠblack-ﾭ‐white	 ﾠdif-ﾭ‐
ference	 ﾠin	 ﾠHIV	 ﾠinfection	 ﾠrates.	 ﾠ	 ﾠSimilarly,	 ﾠindividuals	 ﾠwho	 ﾠbenefit	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠnetwork	 ﾠeffects	 ﾠin	 ﾠ
high	 ﾠschool	 ﾠare	 ﾠmore	 ﾠlikely	 ﾠto	 ﾠattend	 ﾠelite	 ﾠinstitutions	 ﾠthat	 ﾠprovide	 ﾠthem	 ﾠwith	 ﾠeven	 ﾠricher	 ﾠ
social	 ﾠnetworks,	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠaugment	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠadvantages	 ﾠyet	 ﾠfurther.	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6.	 ﾠExplore	 ﾠcases	 ﾠin	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠnetwork	 ﾠeffects	 ﾠmay	 ﾠreduce	 ﾠinequality,	 ﾠwith	 ﾠattention	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
policy	 ﾠimplications	 ﾠof	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠcases.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠSuch	 ﾠcases	 ﾠmay	 ﾠenable	 ﾠus	 ﾠto	 ﾠdevelop	 ﾠprograms	 ﾠto	 ﾠreduce	 ﾠ
inequality	 ﾠby	 ﾠinfluencing	 ﾠnetworks	 ﾠor,	 ﾠalternately,	 ﾠby	 ﾠproviding	 ﾠfunctional	 ﾠequivalents	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
social	 ﾠnetworks,	 ﾠin	 ﾠorder	 ﾠto	 ﾠameliorate	 ﾠsome	 ﾠdisadvantages	 ﾠthat	 ﾠlow-ﾭ‐SES	 ﾠpersons	 ﾠface	 ﾠin	 ﾠ
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Terms/Definitions list:  
Complex	 ﾠcontagion.	 ﾠTransmission	 ﾠof	 ﾠbehavior	 ﾠrequiring	 ﾠ>1	 ﾠcontact	 ﾠbetween	 ﾠa	 ﾠprior	 ﾠadopter	 ﾠ
and	 ﾠan	 ﾠactor	 ﾠat	 ﾠrisk	 ﾠto	 ﾠadopt.	 ﾠ
Correlated	 ﾠstatus	 ﾠparameters.	 ﾠDegree	 ﾠto	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠmeasures	 ﾠof	 ﾠsocial	 ﾠstatus	 ﾠor	 ﾠsocial	 ﾠadvantage	 ﾠ
overlap,	 ﾠwith	 ﾠhigh	 ﾠcorrelations	 ﾠlimiting	 ﾠintergroup	 ﾠcontact	 ﾠand	 ﾠmobility.	 ﾠ
Ego/alter.	 ﾠ	 ﾠEgo	 ﾠis	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfocal	 ﾠnode	 ﾠin	 ﾠa	 ﾠnetwork.	 ﾠAlters	 ﾠare	 ﾠthe	 ﾠnodes	 ﾠto	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠego	 ﾠis	 ﾠconnected	 ﾠ
directly.	 ﾠ
Diffusion.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠThe	 ﾠprocess	 ﾠby	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠa	 ﾠpractice	 ﾠspreads	 ﾠthroughout	 ﾠ(is	 ﾠadopted	 ﾠby)	 ﾠmembers	 ﾠof	 ﾠa	 ﾠ
population.	 ﾠ
Homophily.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠtendency	 ﾠof	 ﾠactors	 ﾠin	 ﾠa	 ﾠnetwork	 ﾠto	 ﾠform	 ﾠties	 ﾠto	 ﾠalters	 ﾠwho	 ﾠare	 ﾠsimilar	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
themselves.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
Network	 ﾠeffect.	 ﾠEffect	 ﾠon	 ﾠego	 ﾠof	 ﾠalters’	 ﾠbehavior.	 ﾠ
Network	 ﾠexternalities	 ﾠ(global).	 ﾠBenefits	 ﾠto	 ﾠan	 ﾠadopter	 ﾠderiving	 ﾠdirectly	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠthe	 ﾠtotal	 ﾠnumber	 ﾠ
of	 ﾠadopters.	 ﾠ
Network	 ﾠexernalities	 ﾠ(local).	 ﾠBenefits	 ﾠto	 ﾠan	 ﾠadopter	 ﾠderiving	 ﾠdirectly	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠthe	 ﾠnumber	 ﾠof	 ﾠits	 ﾠ
network	 ﾠalters	 ﾠwho	 ﾠhave	 ﾠadopted.	 ﾠ
Network	 ﾠinteraction	 ﾠeffects.	 ﾠ	 ﾠThe	 ﾠconditioning	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠstrength	 ﾠof	 ﾠa	 ﾠnetwork	 ﾠeffect	 ﾠon	 ﾠsome	 ﾠ
characteristic	 ﾠon	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠnetwork	 ﾠmembers	 ﾠvary.	 ﾠ
Normative	 ﾠinfluence.	 ﾠNetwork	 ﾠeffects	 ﾠon	 ﾠego’s	 ﾠadoption	 ﾠof	 ﾠa	 ﾠpractice	 ﾠdue	 ﾠto	 ﾠpositive	 ﾠor	 ﾠ
negative	 ﾠsanctions.	 ﾠ
Peer	 ﾠeffects.	 ﾠEffects	 ﾠon	 ﾠactor	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠbehavior	 ﾠof	 ﾠactors	 ﾠin	 ﾠits	 ﾠvicinity	 ﾠ(e.g.,	 ﾠclassroom,	 ﾠ
organization,	 ﾠor	 ﾠneighborhood).	 ﾠ
Reservation	 ﾠprice.	 ﾠ	 ﾠAn	 ﾠadoption	 ﾠthreshold:	 ﾠThe	 ﾠprice	 ﾠ(in	 ﾠmoney,	 ﾠtime,	 ﾠor	 ﾠeffort)	 ﾠan	 ﾠactor	 ﾠwill	 ﾠ
pay	 ﾠto	 ﾠadopt	 ﾠa	 ﾠnew	 ﾠpractice.	 ﾠNetwork	 ﾠexternalities	 ﾠand	 ﾠinequality	 ﾠ-ﾭ-ﾭ-ﾭ2-ﾭ-ﾭ-ﾭ	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
Selection	 ﾠinto	 ﾠnetworks	 ﾠ(also	 ﾠ“network	 ﾠendogeneity”).	 ﾠCorrelations	 ﾠamong	 ﾠthe	 ﾠbehaviors	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
network	 ﾠmembers	 ﾠdue	 ﾠto	 ﾠthose	 ﾠmembers	 ﾠseeking	 ﾠout	 ﾠalters	 ﾠwith	 ﾠthose	 ﾠbehaviors.	 ﾠ
Social	 ﾠlearning.	 ﾠNetwork	 ﾠeffects	 ﾠon	 ﾠego’s	 ﾠadoption	 ﾠof	 ﾠa	 ﾠpractice	 ﾠdue	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠtransfer	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
information	 ﾠor	 ﾠassistance.	 ﾠ
Social	 ﾠnetwork.	 ﾠ	 ﾠA	 ﾠset	 ﾠof	 ﾠactors	 ﾠ(nodes)	 ﾠconnected	 ﾠby	 ﾠa	 ﾠset	 ﾠof	 ﾠrelations	 ﾠ(ties	 ﾠor	 ﾠedges)	 ﾠ
Simple	 ﾠcontagion.	 ﾠ	 ﾠTransmission	 ﾠof	 ﾠa	 ﾠbehavior	 ﾠrequiring	 ﾠonly	 ﾠone	 ﾠcontact	 ﾠbetween	 ﾠa	 ﾠprior	 ﾠ
adopter	 ﾠand	 ﾠan	 ﾠactor	 ﾠat	 ﾠrisk	 ﾠto	 ﾠadopt.	 ﾠ
Small	 ﾠworlds.	 ﾠLarge	 ﾠnetworks	 ﾠcharacterized	 ﾠby	 ﾠdensely	 ﾠconnected	 ﾠsubgraphs,	 ﾠsparsely	 ﾠ
connected	 ﾠto	 ﾠone	 ﾠanother	 ﾠby	 ﾠbridging	 ﾠties.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
Acronyms:	 ﾠNONE	 ﾠ
 
Summary Points list:  
1.	 ﾠSocial	 ﾠnetwork	 ﾠeffects	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠadoption	 ﾠof	 ﾠpractices	 ﾠthat	 ﾠhelp	 ﾠpeople	 ﾠget	 ﾠahead	 ﾠ(or	 ﾠon	 ﾠrisky	 ﾠ
behaviors	 ﾠthat	 ﾠmay	 ﾠimpede	 ﾠmobility)	 ﾠmay	 ﾠunder	 ﾠcertain	 ﾠconditions	 ﾠincrease	 ﾠintergroup	 ﾠinequality.	 ﾠ
2.	 ﾠThey	 ﾠare	 ﾠlikely	 ﾠto	 ﾠdo	 ﾠso	 ﾠwhen	 ﾠhigh-ﾭ‐SES	 ﾠindividuals	 ﾠare	 ﾠmore	 ﾠlikely,	 ﾠbased	 ﾠon	 ﾠindividual	 ﾠ
resources,	 ﾠto	 ﾠadopt	 ﾠbeneficial	 ﾠpractices	 ﾠ(or	 ﾠless	 ﾠlikely	 ﾠto	 ﾠadopt	 ﾠharmful	 ﾠpractices)	 ﾠand	 ﾠwhen	 ﾠ
networks	 ﾠare	 ﾠcharacterized	 ﾠby	 ﾠhomophily	 ﾠwith	 ﾠrespect	 ﾠto	 ﾠSES.	 ﾠ
3.	 ﾠ	 ﾠDespite	 ﾠmethodological	 ﾠchallenges,	 ﾠmuch	 ﾠresearch	 ﾠin	 ﾠboth	 ﾠsociology	 ﾠand	 ﾠeconomics,	 ﾠ
demonstrates	 ﾠrobust	 ﾠnetwork	 ﾠeffects	 ﾠon	 ﾠmany	 ﾠbehaviors	 ﾠrelated	 ﾠto	 ﾠschooling,	 ﾠlabor-ﾭ‐market	 ﾠ
participation,	 ﾠhealth-ﾭ‐related	 ﾠbehaviors,	 ﾠeconomic	 ﾠchoices,	 ﾠdemographic	 ﾠtransitions,	 ﾠsubstance	 ﾠ
abuse	 ﾠand	 ﾠdelinquent	 ﾠbehavior.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
4.	 ﾠSome	 ﾠresearch	 ﾠsuggests	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠstrength	 ﾠof	 ﾠnetwork	 ﾠeffects	 ﾠmay	 ﾠbe	 ﾠgreater	 ﾠfor	 ﾠactors	 ﾠwith	 ﾠ
initial	 ﾠadvantages,	 ﾠthus	 ﾠreinforcing	 ﾠthe	 ﾠtendency	 ﾠof	 ﾠnetwork	 ﾠeffects	 ﾠto	 ﾠexacerbate	 ﾠinequality.	 ﾠ
5.	 ﾠA	 ﾠvery	 ﾠsmall	 ﾠamount	 ﾠof	 ﾠresearch	 ﾠdemonstrates	 ﾠcases	 ﾠin	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠnetwork	 ﾠeffects	 ﾠare	 ﾠassociated	 ﾠ
with	 ﾠincreasing	 ﾠinequality	 ﾠin	 ﾠsome	 ﾠpractice	 ﾠbetween	 ﾠactors	 ﾠin	 ﾠdifferent	 ﾠvillages,	 ﾠcities,	 ﾠor	 ﾠ
organizations.	 ﾠNetwork	 ﾠexternalities	 ﾠand	 ﾠinequality	 ﾠ-ﾭ-ﾭ-ﾭ3-ﾭ-ﾭ-ﾭ	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
6.	 ﾠUnder	 ﾠsome	 ﾠconditions,	 ﾠnetwork	 ﾠeffects	 ﾠmay	 ﾠameliorate	 ﾠinequality.	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
Future Issues list [AU note: This duplicates the last section of the ms.]:  
	 ﾠ
1.	 ﾠSpecify	 ﾠmechanisms	 ﾠand	 ﾠtest	 ﾠalternative	 ﾠspecifications.	 ﾠ
2.	 ﾠ	 ﾠEmploy	 ﾠcomputational	 ﾠmodels	 ﾠto	 ﾠunderstand	 ﾠbetter	 ﾠthe	 ﾠimplications	 ﾠfor	 ﾠsocial	 ﾠ
inequality	 ﾠof	 ﾠdifferent	 ﾠnetwork-ﾭ‐effect	 ﾠmechanisms.	 ﾠ
3.	 ﾠConduct	 ﾠresearch	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠimpact	 ﾠof	 ﾠnetwork	 ﾠeffects	 ﾠon	 ﾠinequality	 ﾠwith	 ﾠappropriate	 ﾠ
data	 ﾠ(with	 ﾠrepeated	 ﾠobservations	 ﾠof	 ﾠnetwork	 ﾠties,	 ﾠadoption	 ﾠof	 ﾠbeneficial	 ﾠpractices,	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
change	 ﾠin	 ﾠintergroup	 ﾠinequality).	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
4.	 ﾠDifferentiate	 ﾠamong	 ﾠtypes	 ﾠof	 ﾠrelationship.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
5.	 ﾠStudy	 ﾠways	 ﾠin	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠinstitutions	 ﾠcondition	 ﾠthe	 ﾠimpact	 ﾠof	 ﾠnetwork	 ﾠeffects	 ﾠon	 ﾠ
inequality.	 ﾠ
6.	 ﾠExplore	 ﾠcases	 ﾠin	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠnetwork	 ﾠeffects	 ﾠmay	 ﾠreduce	 ﾠinequality.	 ﾠ